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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
(Key Findings and Recommendations)
1. Budget is a fiscal tool in the hands of the government that is effectively used to 
accomplish various socio-economic objectives. Budget should play more functional roles than 
just a statement of revenue and expenditure. Public revenue and expenditure patterns and nature 
must be designed in such a way that they support the intended socio-economic objectives of the 
government. The main objectives most governments try to achieve using the budget are (i) macro 
and fiscal sustainability; (ii) public service delivery, both social and economic services; and (iii) 
management and provision of public investments.  
 
2. In Tanzania, for the budget to remain a relevant tool for development policy, it has to 
ensure: (i) the country’s macro and fiscal sustainability; (ii) efficient resource allocation to 
provide quality socio-economic services, such as education, health, and social protection; and 
(iii) provision and management of public investment, such roads, railways, energy, and 
irrigation, to spur economic growth in the country. These objectives are also stated in various 
government policy and strategic documents, including the MKUKUTA. is the budget is assessed 
against these objectives to determine whether it has remained the government’s main fiscal tool 
for accomplishing these objectives.  
 
Macro and Fiscal Sustainability 
3. Tanzania was successful at creating additional fiscal space during most of 2000s. 
Increased revenue collection resulted in part from strong economic growth, together with 
increased aid and concessional loans; these combined to provide additional fiscal space, which 
helped to expand public spending. However, in the last three years of the 2000s, revenue and aid 
to GDP ratios declined/stagnated, and as a consequence, additional fiscal space was created from 
increased concessional borrowing. From 2009/10 onward, additional fiscal space is being created 
mostly from non-concessional borrowing from external and domestic sources. Despite the non-
concessional borrowing, Tanzania remains at low risk of debt distress. 
4. Reducing current spending is necessary as Tanzania exits from fiscal stimulus. A 
large share of the additional fiscal space created over recent past was directed to current 
spending, partly driven by fiscal stimulus due to global economic crisis. Most measures 
implemented through the fiscal stimulus required increased current spending. Evidence from 
other parts of the world shows that discretionary fiscal expansions are difficult to reverse. This is 
the first major episode for Tanzania (and other African and low-income countries) that had the 
fiscal space to attempt countercyclical policy. It will be important to monitor whether these were 
indeed reversed and credibility maintained (and whether certain categories of discretionary 
current spending prove easier to reverse) or whether Tanzania will have to eschew future active 
fiscal responses (or categories of discretionary spending) out of the realization that exit cannot be 
safely assumed. v 
 
5. There was significant overestimation of domestic revenue for the 2010/11 budget. 
Domestic revenue was overestimated by at least TShs500 billion, or 1.8% of GDP, which 
resulted in a significant financing gap. To close the gap, the government is cutting recurrent 
expenditure back from the level planned in the budget. This might be damaging but should be 
manageable. Nonetheless, a careful approach in cutting expenditure is necessary to protect key 
expenditure program areas. Moreover, fiscal risks associated with overestimation of other 
revenue streams, including access to non-concessional borrowing from foreign banks and aid for 
projects, might also result in further cuts or build up of arrears, especially in development 
spending program. Strict commitment control would be imperative to protect build up of arrears 
where expenditure cuts prove to be difficult or, as in the case of roads, where expenditure 
discipline has lapsed. Increased non-concessional borrowing earmarked for infrastructure 
spending requires a strengthened institutional framework to ensure quality and risk management 
of the public infrastructure investment. It also requires a sound debt management strategy. 
 
Strategic Allocation
6.  A large share of the budget is allocated to the MKUKUTA strategic interventions. 
More than 70 percent of the 2010/11 budget is allocated to the MKUKUTA strategic 
interventions; economic growth and reduction of poverty (cluster 1) receive the greatest 
attention. Planned increases in infrastructure expenditure drive increased allocations to cluster 1. 
Unless a cautious approach to expenditure cuts and access to non-concessional external 
borrowing are ensured, allocation to the MKUKUTA and cluster 1 could be lower than 
anticipated. Apart from accessing the funding from non-concessional external sources, another 
priority is improved execution of the development budget, especially large infrastructure 
investments. This will be important to ensure meeting the MKUKUTA strategic objective of 
economic growth and poverty reduction. 
 
7. Allocation to priority sectors is high, consistent with high share of MKUKUTA 
allocations in the budget. Key sectors, such as education, health, water, roads, agriculture, and 
energy, are projected to spend more than 60 percent of the overall budget (excluding interest 
payment) in 2010/11. The planned spending in these sectors represents an increase compared 
with the budget and actual spending in 2009/10. The high share of allocation to priority sectors is 
driven by increased budgetary resources to the education, agriculture, and roads sectors, 
consistent with the government intention of achieving the MKUKUTA strategic objectives. 
While increased budgetary resources are welcome, prioritization within these sectors needs to 
receive maximum attention to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the spending programs. 
Again, key sectors share in the budget might be lower than 60 percent unless a cautious approach 
to expenditure cuts and access to non-concessional external borrowing is ensured.  
 
8. However, the share of capital spending in the budget is low and needs to be 
increased by reducing current spending. Despite the increased allocations to both the 
MKUKUTA and priority sectors in the budget 2010/11, allocations to capital spending programs, 
such as infrastructure investment, remain low at 18 percent and equivalent to 5.5 percent of 
GDP. With continued low execution of the development budget as well as inaccessibility of 
planned non-concessional external borrowing, the share of capital spending could decline 
further, which would translate to low infrastructure investment. To realize the MKUKUTA vi 
 
objectives of growth and reduction of poverty, Tanzania will need to step up capital spending, 
such as infrastructure investment in transport, water, and energy. Creating required additional 
space, the government will have to reduce current spending in favor of capital spending. 
Reduction of spending on goods and services in favor of capital spending is necessary.
 
9. In addition, low budget allocation for infrastructure maintenance needs to be 
reversed. The overall share of the budget allocated for infrastructure maintenance declined in 
2010/11. This share could decline further unless allocation for infrastructure maintenance is not 
protected in planned expenditure cuts. Inadequate allocation for infrastructure maintenance, 
especially in the energy and roads sectors, has resulted in unreliability and low accessibility to 
electricity and rural roads. This problem hinders Tanzania’s potential for higher growth and 
reduction of poverty. Some backlogs and additional new infrastructure investment require 
increased allocation for maintenance to avoid a huge rehabilitation or reconstruction expense in 
the future. Increased allocation for maintenance in key sectors will also ensure reliability of and 
access to key services, such as rural roads and electricity, which are critical for the growth of the 
economy. Therefore, the government will need to find some new ways to increase resources for 
infrastructure maintenance.  
10. As more resources are being transferred to LGAs, planning and implementation 
capacity needs improvement. Consistent with increased budgetary resources to priority sectors 
such as education and agriculture, planned expenditures in the LGAs increase. LGAs are 
responsible for delivering primary and secondary education, primary health, agriculture 
extension services, and rural roads maintenance. Planned expenditure at the LGAs is 23 percent 
of the overall budget in 2010/11, which is an increase of 2.5 percent compared with actual 
spending in 2009/10. As in priority sectors, LGAs spending program prioritization need to be 
improved to ensure that resources are applied where they are most effective and efficient. In 
addition, planning and implementation capacity needs to be improved. 
 
11. The cost of providing higher education is high and continues to rise, prompting 
sustainability concerns. Higher education has also expanded very rapidly. Unit costs have been 
controlled and increasingly funding is raised through the Higher Education Students Loan Board 
(HESLB). Affordability of expanded higher education rests on the government’s developing a 
strategy for recovering loans (generating reflows) from graduates. This is an issue of equity as 
well as affordability. Currently, tertiary education is on course to overtake primary education as 
the largest share of the education budget, but only 4 percent of the population will go to 
university, and this cohort derives largely from the richest stratum of society. 
 
12. Development budget execution improved significantly in 2009/10, but delays in the 
release of funds remained. Increased release of funds led to improvement in development 
budget execution rate. The release rate rose to approximately 80 percent of funds budgeted for 
development spending, but more than 50 percent of the funds were released in the last quarter of 
the FY. Delays in the release of funds are due to delays in meeting disbursement conditions, 
including procurement. Hence, improvement in planning, preparation, procurement, and 




Quality of Public Service Delivery in Education 
13. Focus should now be moved to improving the quality of education. There is a major 
problem with quality in primary education. Given that Tanzania now spends significant sums on 
primary education, poor quality is a value for money issue across the system. The average level 
of achievement in primary school is too low and means the full benefits of universal education
are not being realized. Furthermore, standards of achievement have been deteriorating, with a 20 
percent drop in the pass rate for the primary school leavers’ exam since 2007. Deteriorating 
quality can wipe out any efficiency gains made from better management or a more equal 
resource allocation. Moreover, at a national level, poor quality could undermine the demand for 
education among poor groups.  
 
14. Highly variable social conditions, public spending levels and managerial/teaching 
efficiency contribute to highly variable outcomes across Tanzania. Spending per child can be 
three or four times higher from one district to the next. The level of spending is strongly 
correlated with educational outcomes, with evidence of diminishing returns in the best-resourced 
districts. But unequal levels of spending are very persistent. The current system has difficulty 
responding to this problem. In addition, some districts achieve far better educational outcomes 
than others with the same level of resources and social conditions. Something aside from 
environmental factors causes some districts to be far more efficient than others. We assume that 
managerial efficiency and teacher effort, measured by such indicators as teacher absenteeism, are 
among the causes. Hence, there is a strong need to examine what’s going on in districts identified 
as highly inefficient, unrelated to the level of resources or social conditions. Tanzania might 
achieve current educational outcomes at an annual saving of TShs 250 billion (one quarter of the 
primary education budget), if all districts achieved the efficiency found in Tanzania’s “frontier” 
districts.  
 
15. Directing incremental resources to underserved districts would improve learning 
outcomes, equity and efficiency. Inequalities in resources and results are pronounced, and there 
is strong evidence that shifting incremental resources to the worst served areas is likely to 
improve efficiency rather than reduce it. The worst served districts tend to have worse social 
conditions that push up cost, but the marginal impact of spending would be highest in the worst 
served districts even despite this effect. Hence, equity and efficiency imperatives are aligned and 
it is essential to find a way to shift incremental resources to the worst served districts. 
 
16. Secondary education is both a success and a problem. The success is that the speed of 
expansion has been extraordinary and has made great progress in rectifying Tanzania’s historic 
deficit in post-primary education. The corresponding problem is that resources are spread more 
and more thinly over the increasing numbers of pupils, which is creating a critical quality 
problem in secondary education outside a small group of excellent schools. This destroys value 
for money, as in 2010, Tanzania spent more than TShs 8 million for every Division (DIV) I-III 
Form 4 passer compared with just TShs 4 million in 2008. The rapid pace of expansion seems to 
have outstripped the supply of suitably skilled teachers. The output of well educated secondary 




Public Investment Management 
 
17. Lack of public investment program that aims to enhance strategic consistency and 
coordination of public investments within a program based approach. Tanzania could 
usefully develop a national public investment program (PIP) that brings together all the 
investment projects that fit within its national and sectoral strategies to avoid proliferation of 
low-impact, unrelated, and small sized projects. A PIP also provides a framework for interaction 
with donors and channeling aid flows to priority areas. Countries that have developed a 
coordinated PIP have made it easier for central institutions to prioritize, implement, and monitor 
and evaluate projects. In Tanzania, failure to prioritize road projects in 2010 led to over-
commitments that had macro impacts as well as real costs (penalties). 
 
18. Despite having launched several well thought and thorough strategic plans, such as 
Vision 2025 and MKUKUTA II, it is unclear what role each is to play within Tanzania’s 
national and sectoral planning processes. The MKUKUTA II serves as the new government 
poverty reduction strategy, and the MoF’s Poverty Eradication Department (PED) is working out 
an implementation plan. At the same time, the President recently instructed the President’s 
Office Planning Commission (POPC) to develop a 15-year strategic plan (and, within that, a 
five-year strategic plan) for the administration as a means to reach the goals set forth in Vision 
2025. In addition, most sectoral ministries have developed their own medium-term strategic 
plans. It is important to bring order to this web of planning exercises. 
 
19. Even though a web of national strategies exists, no central public agency was seen, 
until recently, as in charge or taking charge of its implementation. Recently though, the 
President has tasked the POPC with making these strategic plans operational. This is a welcome 
development. However, without a uniform public investment management process for the whole 
of government and data on each project, it will be extremely complicated to ensure that the high 
impact projects are chosen and will produce their intended results in growth and poverty 
reduction. The government has realized this shortcoming and intends strengthen its ability to 
prioritize its interventions. 
 
20. To be successful in their intention to focus more sharply on prioritization across the 
whole of government, authorities need to assign clear roles for the POPC, MoF, central 
agencies that have a role to play in this process. Currently, each agency is acting on its own 
mandate, issued directly by the President or embedded in Tanzania’s laws and regulations. It will 
be important to agree on the roles and responsibilities of the POPC and the MoF, respectively, in 
the PIM process and come to a common understanding of what these two key institutions will 
and will not do. In addition, it could be worthwhile to set up a secretariat in which both the MoF 
and the POPC are represented that will coordinate the overall process of project selection, 
evaluation (ex ante and ex post), and monitoring of project implementation.  
 
21. To analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of Tanzania’s public investment program 
(PIP), basic information about its costs, outputs, and outcomes must be collected and 
analyzed centrally. Currently, the MoF collects expenditure data on the development budget, 
but no other information about Tanzania’s public investment program is available centrally at the 
MoF, the POPC, or at the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). The line ministries, most of which do ix 
 
collect information regarding their projects, receive little or no guidance from central ministries 
on how to prepare, evaluate (ex ante or ex post), or monitor their projects.  
 
22. Standardized and uniform information needs to be centrally collected on each 
project to allow for prioritization of Tanzania’s scarce public resources across the whole of 
government. This could be greatly facilitated by the instigation of a process through which each 
public investment project must pass before being incorporated in the country’s MTEF and annual 
budget. Such a process should allow for various evaluation points at which its viability is 
checked by the central agencies and, when it is found to lack the required impact or the 
information needed to make such a judgment, is sent back. This process could vary with the size 
of the projects, but the central agencies will need to make an explicit decision about the viability 
of the project before it is granted inclusion in the MTEF and annual budget. Currently, these 
decisions are basically left to the line ministries, which are well suited to prioritizing within their 
own sectors but not for the government as a whole.  
 
23. Phased implementation of the proposed improvements as capacity gets built is 
needed, and focus should be on those projects or sectors where larger projects are taking 
place and/or where large improvements in effectiveness can be expected through a more 
rule based system of project appraisal. The PIM diagnosis has focused squarely on how to 
improve the coordination and decision making process at the center and, as such, on the quality 
at entry part of the project cycle. It has not delved into the implementation and ex post evaluation 
phases of the public investment cycle, not because they are unimportant, but because once 
uniform information has been gathered, these issues can be better analyzed and more informed 
improvements proposed. In recognition of these issues, MoF recently set up a productivity unit 










1.1 The main objective of the budget analysis chapter is to provide an overall assessment 
of how well the approved budget allocations in 2010/11 align with the strategic objectives and 
with sector strategic priorities of the Second National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of 
Poverty (known by its Kiswahili acronym, MKUKUTA II). It also assesses the consistency of 
the actual spending and approved budget in 2009/10. In evaluating the alignment of the budget 
and MKUKUTA’s strategic objectives and sector strategic priorities, the analysis gauges the 
accuracy and reliability of the macro and budget framework, share of the budget allocated to 
MKUKUTA cluster strategies, share of the budget allocated to capital investment, and strategic 
prioritization within key sectors.  
1.2 This budget analysis chapter summarizes nine background notes that covered six key 
sectors and three thematic areas. The six key sectors are education, health, water, roads, energy, 
and agriculture; the three thematic areas are the wage bill, local government, and aggregate 
analysis. The six sectors were selected because they consume approximately 60 percent of the 
overall budget and are keys to achieving the MKUKUTA strategic objectives of growth and 
reduction of poverty. The three thematic areas were selected because of their crosscutting nature, 
as they touch each key sector but also are critical for achieving the MKUKUTA strategic 
objectives.  
 
MEDIUM TERM MACROECONOMIC AND BUDGET FRAMEWORK
Medium Macroeconomic Context 
1.3 The 2000s represented a decade of accelerated growth for Tanzania; GDP 
increased 5-7 percent per annum during that period. High birthrates and longer lives meant GDP 
per capita grew at more like 4 percent per annum.  
1.4 Figure 7 show that, fundamentally, the structure of production has changed very little 
over the period, although the share of agriculture has declined gradually and is expected to 
continue to do so. Looking to 2015, the government forecasts particularly significant growth in 











Figure 7. Steady Structure of Production 
1.5 Tourism, mining and manufacturing have grown, but greater growth has been in 
sectors meeting domestic demand: food and non-traded or non-tradable goods and services like 
construction, trade and repairs, and telecommunications (Figure 8). Domestic demand has been 




Figure 8: Sectoral Contribution to Growth, Trend and 2009 
 
 
1.6 For part of the 2000s, Tanzania managed rapid output growth with relatively low 
inflation. Inflationary pressure started to build gradually from 2005, and prices accelerated in 
2008, when inflation reached 12 percent. But inflationary momentum drained away through 2010 
such that inflation reached 4.5 percent in September. The exchange rate in general depreciated 
gradually against Tanzania’s main trading currencies during 2005-2010. There was a significant 
depreciation against the dollar in late 2008 and an even more significant depreciation has 
occurred from July 2010. This need not spark a resurgence of significant inflation in Tanzania, 

















Figure 9: Inflation and Exchange Rate Dev.   Figure 10: Real Bilateral Exchange Rate Mov. 
1.7 Following debt relief and until 2009, Tanzania has been very cautious about amassing 
further public debt and adopted a fiscal “anchor” of no net domestic borrowing. With growth, 
this has meant that Tanzania’s debt stock has reached very manageable levels below 40 percent 
of GDP. From 2009/10, controlled domestic borrowing has been within the bounds of the 
sustainable debt management. 
 
1.8 The outlook for Tanzanian growth is positive, but with considerable potential 
downsides. Growth of 6 percent in 2009 is estimated to increase to 7 percent in 2010, and it 
could rise to 7-8.5 percent thereafter provided that the investment climate is improved and the 
impact of less buoyant economic and fiscal trends in OECD countries is limited.  
 
Impact of the Global Crisis 
1.9 For a mixture of reasons, the global crisis has had less of an impact on Tanzania’s 
GDP than had been forecast. Tanzania’s low-geared banks and fairly inward-looking pattern of 
growth insulated it from the financial shock and, to a degree, from external demand shocks. As it 
turned out, the terms of trade effects of the crisis were generally quite positive for Tanzania, and 
the import bill declined faster than the export earnings largely due to falling prices of fuel and 
intermediate goods. Figure 8 shows that many productive sectors saw below trend growth in 
2009, not least crops, although this had more to do with a drought affecting food production in 









































































































































































































































































1.10 There has been no banking crisis in Tanzania. Into the 1990s the banking system 
was simply taking deposits and lending to government and parastatals in a directed way. But at 
the end of that decade, privatization and new macroeconomic policies encouraged banks to lend 
to the private sector, and through the 2000s, there was very fast growth in private sector credit; it 
exceeded 30 percent in some years. This is from such a low base that most banks are still very 
liquid and Tanzania does not share the troubles of the European or American banking systems. 
However, there was a marked reduction in the growth of credit to the private sector in late 2008. 
 
Figure 11: Current Account Deficit Reduces in Downturn 
 
1.11 Tanzania was vulnerable to a collapse in foreign investment and especially to a 
collapse in aid flows during the crisis. Neither of these threats materialized. The current 
account deficit narrowed from 14.7 percent of GDP in 2007/08 to 11.1 percent of GDP in 
2009/10, principally due to a fall in import prices. But in 2009/10 gross reserves grew by 2.3 
points of GDP.  
 
Medium Term Fiscal Outlook 
1.12 Fiscal deficit has continued to rise. While revenue and aid (as percentage of GDP) 
has stagnated, public spending continues to increase, and the fiscal deficit has also continued to 
expand. The fiscal deficit (after grants) reached 6.9 percent of GDP in 2009/10, up from 4.5 
percent in 2008/09 (Figure 1). It is expected to come down slightly to 6.5 percent of GDP in 
2010/11. The deficit was financed by relaxing further the limit on net domestic financing (NDF) 
to 1.8 percent of GDP, supplemented by increased concessional foreign borrowing, which 
reached 4.5 percent of GDP.  
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1.13 The government of Tanzania was successful at creating fiscal space for most of 
the 2000s by relying principally on domestic revenue as well as increased aid grants and loans 
with little domestic and no non-concessional foreign borrowing. From 2002/03 through 2008/09, 
fiscal resources increased by 9.1 percent of GDP, and this was financed 56 percent from 
domestic revenue, 26 percent from aid grants and loans, and 18 percent from domestic 
borrowing. 







(attempted in budget) 
change contribution  change contribution  change contribution 
Fiscal  Space  2.3% 4.2% 4.1% 
domestic revenue  4.4%  194.9%  -0.6%  -14.0%  2.5%  60.8% 
grants 2.2%  96.9%  -2.2%  -54.0%  1.2%  29.2% 
concessional borrowing  -0.6%  -26.0%  1.4%  32.6%  -1.2%  -28.6% 
domestic borrowing  -2.5%  -110.0%  3.4%  81.3%  0.0%  -0.8% 
non-concessional borrowing  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  2.2%  54.3% 
adjustments to cash and 
expenditure float  -1.3%  -55.7%  2.2%  52.9%  -0.6%  -13.6% 
1.14 The means of increasing fiscal space changed from 2008/09. There has been no 
increase in the share of GDP raised in domestic revenue since 2007/08 (Table 1). Grants have 
not kept up with GDP. So fiscal space has been created by increasing borrowing from 
concessional sources, in the domestic market, and, in the 2010/11 budget, from commercial 
external financiers. The contrast in pre- and post-2008/09 is very clear in table 3. In 2004/05-
2007/08, fiscal space was increased by 2.3 percent of GDP by increasing domestic revenue and 
grants while borrowing reduced (absorbing some of the fiscal space). A further 4.2 percent of 
GDP was added in just two years (2007/08-2009/10), but contributions were very different. 









2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
Overall balance before grants Overall balance after grants 
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concessional and domestic borrowing. Of course, this change was due to the attempt to maintain 
and boost spending during the downturn of 2009-2010. 
 
1.15 As Table 1 and Figure 13 indicate, the 2010/11 budget projections for fiscal space 
are exceptional. Compared with the actual achievement in 2009/10, this budget sought to 
increase fiscal space by 4.1 percent of GDP in one year as Tanzania came out of the slowdown 
of 2009/10. This very rapid expansion in spending (quite different from that agreed in the IMF’s 
PSI weeks before this budget was announced) required a 2.5 percent increase in domestic 
revenue despite falling performance in the previous two years; a 1.2 percent increase in grants 
despite falling budget support commitments; a maintenance of domestic borrowing at the 
maximum agreed during the downturn; and substantial increase in non-concessional foreign 
borrowing worth a further 2.2 percent of GDP (concessional borrowing was expected to decline 
following the “front-loading” of World Bank lending in 2009/10). 
   
  Figure 13: Ambition in the 2010/11 Budget – increases as % GDP 
 
1.16 The 2010/11 budget planned borrowing at the upper limit recommended in the 
Debt Sustainability Analysis. Other factors make permanent debt-financing of the budget a 
potential concern. It is within the constraint of debt sustainability for Tanzania to add about 2 
percent of GDP to fiscal space with domestic and foreign borrowing in the next two years. Debt 
sustainability analysis shows that Tanzania could borrow at this higher level without 
encountering debt problems, provided the funds are productively invested. The public sector debt 
is below 40 percent of GDP, so net borrowing at approximately 2 percent of GDP will not 
increase that stock if it supports 7 percent GDP growth. Caveats are: what happens to medium 
term competitiveness if foreign debt is used for current consumption instead of investment in 
competitiveness? What happens to debt sustainability if foreign debt is much more expensive 
than assumed? Is the true level of borrowing even higher due to hidden arrears financing? Is the 
domestic banking system sustaining its lending to the private sector now that government has 
started borrowing from it again? All these risks are real in Tanzania.  
 
 
-4.0% -2.0% 0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0%
annual increase achieved 
2007/8-2009/10
















1.17 On the financing side, government seems to have significantly overestimated 
domestic revenue, and possibly also non-concessional finance and aid. Domestic revenue is 
estimated to be TShs 500 billion below target at least. It remains to be seen whether concessional 
borrowing can be mobilized at acceptable rates and terms. 
 
1.18 Indications are that government will use a combination of planned expenditure 
cuts in the midterm budget review, modest revenue measures, and foreign bank loans to 
finance 2010/11 expenditure below the planned level by at least 1.5 percent of GDP. Cash 
budgeting meant that spending in the first and second quarters was restrained (almost TShs 1 
trillion below original estimates), although this TShs 1 trillion has not actually been trimmed 
from budgets; technically it is just postponed. Approximately TShs 300 billion of low priority 
expenditures were identified in the Mid-Year Budget review, such that government need retain 
only TShs 200 billion of the TShs 1 trillion under-spent in the first and second quarters to make 
up for the expected revenue shortfall of TShs 500 billion. In addition, TShs 800 billion of non-
concessional finance from foreign banks still has not been mobilized, so there is some risk that 
these resources won’t be mobilized or won’t be absorbed in 2010/11, and there is a possibility 
that domestic revenue may underperform by more than TShs 500 billion. The likelihood is that 
further use of cash budgeting will limit expenditures to the availability of resources, 
notwithstanding the tendency to accumulate arrears that has emerged in certain sectors. 
 
1.19 Spending additional to budget estimates has been undertaken largely in energy 
and transport sectors, financed by arrears. The level is estimated at TShs 255 billion, 
equivalent to 0.73 percent of GDP, as of March 2011. There is an intention to cut planned 
development spending by TShs 255 billion to pay off unpaid bills before the end of 2010/11. 
















































































1.20 On the macro level, Tanzania might be financing little more than 50 percent of 
actual expenditures with domestic revenue in 2010/11. This will leave a considerable re-
adjustment challenge for 2011/12, especially if there is a significant carryover of arrears. 
The planned budget involved a 20 percent real increase in public spending compared with 
2009/10. Even with TShs 500 billion in cuts, this leaves a high level of recurrent commitments to 
maintain. As there is very little scope for expanding any type of borrowing beyond 2010/11 
levels, it will be difficult for government to meet recurrent commitments or increase investment 
spending without a major cost-cutting drive. Government may also consider new tax measures, 
as the scope for increasing revenue as a share of GDP now seems, owing to administrative 
improvements, greatly diminished compared with the mid 2000s. 
 
Figure 15: Recurrent Budget and Domestic Revenue 
 
 
1.21 The budget remains less credible and less relevant and can leave a distorted and 
sub-optimal pattern of commitments going into the next budget. In the 2010/11 budget, 
recurrent spending is planned at 20 percent of GDP, while domestic revenue is planned at 17.8 
percent and is likely to be 15-16 percent of GDP in reality (dotted line in Figure 15: ). In fact, 
recurrent expenditures are even higher than this because the development budget conceals a large 
quantity of non-capital elements (Table 10). The sanctity of the “golden rule,” which suggests 
that recurrent spending should be financed from current revenue, is not demonstrated in 
Tanzania. In addition, a switch to higher debt financing coincident with a reduction in true 
capital spending will be bad for medium term competitiveness, a situation Tanzania does face. 
There are further problems even if capital spending does not suffer disproportionately. Cash 
budgeting is crude and can result in sub-optimal expenditure cuts. For example, it can cut high 
priority discretionary items that complement other non-discretionary items resulting in waste, for 
example cutting fuel without cutting the wages of workers who need the fuel to work. Likewise, 
unplanned, arrears-financed spending is, by definition, not the highest priority and can cause 
over-commitment in the development budget, which will prevent projects from being completed 
in future years. The budget is a tool for maximizing the utility of public resources within a 
constraint. If the constraint is seriously underestimated and the budget’s plans are ignored, the 
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Revenue and Aid Outlook 
1.22 Revenue collection improved rapidly in the middle part of the 2000s but slowed 
down a great deal from 2008/09. Until 2008/09, the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) and 
other domestic collecting agencies met the revenue targets set in the budget. Tanzania managed, 
for several years running, to achieve increases in domestic revenue on the order of 1 percent of 
GDP despite virtually no tax rate increases; this was the result of administrative improvements 
and dispute settlements. 
 
1.23 Since 2008/09, revenue targets have proved increasingly over-ambitious, and 
revenue appears to have reached a ceiling at around 16 percent of GDP lower than targets 
of 17-18 percent of GDP. In 2009/10, domestic revenue actually fell to 15.3 percent of GDP, a 
level not seen since 2006/07. Table 2 shows that in 2006/07-2009/10, only income tax and “other 
tax” have increased significantly as a share of GDP. Non-tax revenue is inexplicably falling as a 
share of GDP despite high commodity prices (gold). Value added tax is increasing only slightly 
faster than GDP. The implications are that if domestic revenue is to increase further as a share of 
GDP, specific measures will need to be taken, including broadening the tax base and reducing 
tax exemptions. 
 
Table 2: Domestic Revenue Performance 
 
% GDP  2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 Pre. l  2010/11 
Budget  Actual Budget  Actual Budget  Actual Budget  Actual Budget 
Domestic revenue  12.7%  14.1% 15.3% 15.9% 18.0% 16.2% 17.3% 15.3% 17.8% 
Tax revenue  11.7%  13.0% 13.9% 14.7% 16.9% 15.3% 16.0% 14.6% 16.2% 
 Import Duty  0.9%  1.2% 1.4% 1.3% 1.6% 1.4% 1.4% 1.2% 1.3% 
 Excise Duty   3.8%  2.7% 4.2% 2.9% 4.7% 4.6% 4.9% 2.8% 3.1% 
 Value Added Tax  2.7%  4.3% 2.9% 4.6% 3.5% 2.9% 3.2% 4.6% 5.4% 
 Income Tax  3.2%  3.7% 3.6% 4.3% 5.3% 4.6% 4.7% 4.4% 4.7% 
Other Taxes  1.0%  1.1% 1.9% 1.7% 1.8% 1.7% 1.8% 1.6% 1.7% 
Nontax revenue  1.0%  1.1% 1.4% 1.2% 1.1% 0.9% 1.4% 0.7% 1.5% 
 
 
1.24 Despite rapid economic growth and rapid increase in domestic revenue 
mobilization, foreign aid loans and grants have remained a significant and fairly steady 
share of GDP and a highly significant financing item in the budget. Table 3 shows that grants 
have been fairly stable at just below 5 percent of GDP in recent years, although they were higher 
in 2007/08. The government appears to have difficulty estimating the likely flow of grants; 
project grants are the least predictable financing item. In 2007/08, grants were double the level of 
aid loans. This was so in the 2009/10 budget, but in reality loans and grants were at equal levels 
that year. About 60 percent of aid in Tanzania has been relatively predictable budget aid in the 
form of general budget support or basket funding, although the government expects this share to 
drop significantly in 2010/11. Budget support and basket funding are both forecast to fall from a 
combined 3.1 percent of GDP in 2009/10 to just 2.4 percent of GDP in 2010/11.  
 
1.25 Foreign borrowing has all been highly concessional up to at least 2009/10 and has 
been roughly 3.6 percent of GDP except in 2009/10, when some anti-cyclical fast disbursing 
budget support pushed it up to 4.5 percent of GDP due to frontloading of the World Bank 




1.26 The outlook for aid financing is reasonable, but it is uncertain whether aid will 
maintain its share of GDP or the budget in the medium term. Tanzania has dropped 
somewhat in various rankings like Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) and 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which may depress aid levels. The level of 
general budget support seems to be reducing in 2010/11, and this may be a measure of 
Tanzania’s perceived aid worthiness. However, the main risk remains donors’ willingness to 
finance rapidly expanding aid programs in Tanzania when they are facing fiscal problems of 
their own. 
Table 3: Aid Financing 
 
% GDP  2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
Budget  Actual Budget  Actual Budget  Actual Budget  Prel. Actual  Budget 
Grants 7.4%  4.9% 7.4%  6.9% 5.4%  4.7% 6.9%  4.6% 5.8% 
Program   2.4%  2.5% 2.7%  2.7% 2.1%  2.3% 2.7%  2.2% 1.8% 
Project 2.2%  1.2% 3.0%  2.8% 2.4%  1.2% 2.8%  1.5% 3.4% 
Basket support   1.1%  0.6% 0.8%  0.9% 0.8%  1.0% 0.9%  0.9% 0.6% 
MDRI (IMF)  1.7%  0.6% 0.9%  0.5% 0.3%  0.3% 0.4%  0.1% 0.0% 
Foreign 
borrowing (net)  3.8%  3.7% 3.6%  3.2% 3.6%  3.6% 3.4%  4.5% 3.4% 
Program Loans  1.7%  1.4% 1.2%  1.6% 1.0%  1.3% 1.2%  1.8% 0.5% 
Project loans  1.9%  2.2% 2.2%  0.9% 1.9%  1.8% 1.4%  2.3%  2.2% 
Basket support   0.5%  0.2% 0.4%  0.9% 0.8%  0.6% 1.0%  0.6% 0.7% 
Amortization -0.3%  -0.2% -0.2%  -0.2% -0.2%  -0.1% -0.2%  -0.2% -0.1% 
 
Budget Allocation Analysis – 2010/11 
1.27 This section on analysis of the 2010/11 budget allocations covers four main areas. 
These areas include allocation as per MKUKUTA, broad functions, major sectors, and economic 
nature of spending. The areas covered under this analysis are selected based on their cross- 
cutting nature. The main objectives of analyzing the budget across the four main areas is to 
determine whether the 2010/11 budget has remained focused on economic growth as spelled out 
in MKUKUTA II and key sectors’ strategic policy objectives. In addition, this analysis pays 
particular attention to the wage bill and allowances, implementation of the D by D policy, and 
implementation of the maintenance policy. While it focuses on the 2010/11 budget, the analysis 
also looks back on actual spending trends in some key areas and sectors in 2009/10.  
By MKUKUTA
1.28 More than 70 percent of the 2010/11 budget is allocated to MKUKUTA (Table 4). 
The share of the budget allocated to MKUKUTA shows some notable increase in 2010/11, with 
the caveat that the funding for such budget is not fully secured. The identified financing gap in 
the budget would need to be filled to maintain the current share of the budget allocated for 
MKUKUTA interventions. While a large share of budgetary resources remains allocated to 
MKUKUTA, a thorough review and assessment is needed to ascertain whether all cluster 
strategies are meaningful for achieving MKUKUTA objectives. There is also a need for thinking  
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about building a more robust and simplified classification that could map budget allocations to 
the MKUKUTA broadly. 
 
Table 4: Budget allocation between MKUKUTA and non-MKUKUTA 
 
Source: MoFEA, IFMS data and author’s computation 
 
1.29 Cluster 1, economic growth and reduction of poverty, receives the largest share of 
the MKUKUTA allocations (Table 5). This reflects a shift toward prioritizing economic growth 
and poverty reduction from social well being. The increased cluster 1 share is consistent with the 
government policy of promoting economic growth by improving economic infrastructure 
services and productive sectors. Consequently, the increased cluster 1 share is on account of a 
huge increase in allocations for roads and agriculture sectors in the 2010/11 budget. This 
increase is also consistent with the MKUKUTA II strategic objectives. The MKUKUTA II puts 
more emphasis on economic growth as a sustainable means of reducing poverty. The increase in 
the share of cluster 1 is compensated by reduction in all other clusters as well as non-
MKUKUTA allocations. There is also a significant reduction in cross-cluster allocations, which 
suggests some decline in spending that cuts across clusters, such as capacity building programs. 
However, as noted above, the identified financing gap in the budget would reduce the cluster 1 
share if not filled, given that a large part of the gap is expected to be filled by non-concessional 
external borrowing earmarked for infrastructure spending. Again, since a large share of spending 
in cluster 1 is for capital spending, execution of the development budget would need to be 
improved to realize intended MKUKUTA II growth objectives.  
 
Table 5: Budget allocation between MKUKUTA clusters (shares) 
 
Source: MoFEA, IFMS data and author’s computation 
 
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
Total MKUKUTA 64.5% 62.0% 59.8% 66.3%
Non-MKUKUTA 35.5% 38.0% 40.2% 33.7%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Total MKUKUTA 70.6% 70.8% 71.2% 73.2%
Non-MKUKUTA 29.4% 29.2% 28.8% 26.8%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Incl. LGAs transfers, but excl. MDAs wages
Incl. LGAs transfers and MDAs wages
% of Mkukuta % of Overall % of Mkukuta % of Overall % of Mkukuta % of Overall % of Mkukuta % of Overall
Cluster I 33.1% 23.4% 34.1% 24.1% 39.2% 27.9% 44.8% 32.8%
cluster II 45.0% 31.8% 45.5% 32.2% 42.7% 30.4% 39.8% 29.1%
Cluster III 16.5% 11.7% 16.0% 11.3% 15.0% 10.7% 13.9% 10.2%
Cross Cutting 5.4% 3.8% 4.4% 3.1% 3.1% 2.2% 1.5% 1.1%
Total MKUKUTA 100.0% 70.6% 100.0% 70.8% 100.0% 71.2% 100.0% 73.2%
Non-MKUKUTA 29.4% 29.2% 28.8% 26.8%
Overall 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
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Table 6: Budget and actual spending in selected non-MKUKUTA votes (shares) 
Source: MoFEA, IFMS data and author’s computation 
1.30 In non-MKUKUTA spending, the share of allocations for public debt and general 
services is the largest. Although its share declines in 2010/11 compared with previous years, it 
is still 9 percent of the overall budget (Table 6). A large share of allocations in this vote (22—
approximately 50 percent) is for spending on general services items such as pension and social 
benefit contributions. Public debt service consumes approximately 40 percent of the allocations 
in this vote, most of it allocated for paying interest on domestic debt. Foreign debt service 
consumes slightly less than 10 percent of the entire allocation to the vote. The low budgetary 
allocations for debt service are consistent with debt sustainability analysis (DSA), which shows 
the debt sustainability indicators for Tanzania to be low. Nonetheless, given that a large part of 
the budget, especially the financing gap, increasingly is being financed through non-concessional 
external and domestic borrowing, allocations for debt service will increase in the future, which 
may reduce allocations for other key areas. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the non-
concessional external borrowing earmarked for infrastructure investment is channeled to high 
return investments with high potential for economic growth and revenue generation.  
 
1.31 Increasingly, a large share of the budget remains unallocated despite knowing 
spending plans during budgeting time. The contingency funds (both emergency and non-
emergency) have increased over time and now constitute 7 percent of the total recurrent budget. 
Allocation for contingency is a good idea during a period of uncertainty or crisis, as has occurred 
recently in Tanzania. Nevertheless, appropriate size and transparency, both ex ante and ex post, 
are important in allocation and spending of the contingency funds. A too large contingency 
reduces the credibility of the budget as a tool for planning and resource allocation. Also, 
reallocating funds from a too large contingency to other votes at some stage during the budget 
implementation causes some unnecessary disruptions in planning and may impact on the quality 
of spending. Hence, it is also important to appreciate size of contingency while ensuring 
transparency (both ex ante and ex post) in allocation and spending, especially for contingency 
emergency. Moreover, for non-emergency contingency allocations, since the spending plans are 
known by the time of budgeting, it is important that these funds are allocated in relevant 
spending votes.  
 
Vote code Vote name 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
Actual Actual Actual Budget
22 Public Debt 10.8% 10.0% 9.1% 9.1%
28 Police Force 2.8% 2.4% 2.1% 2.5%
29 Prison Service 1.4% 1.2% 1.2% 1.0%
30 President's Office 3.8% 3.3% 2.7% 2.2%
34 Foreign Affairs 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 1.0%
38 Defence 4.0% 3.9% 4.1% 3.5%
39 National Service 0.9% 0.9% 1.2% 0.9%
42 Natinal Assebly Fund 1.8% 0.9% 0.8% 0.5%
57 Ministry of Defence 1.2% 1.3% 0.4% 1.3%
21,50 Treasury & MoFEA 3.2% 6.4% 6.1% 13.2%
Sub total 31.3% 31.6% 29.0% 35.3%
Grand Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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By Broad Functions 
1.32 Economic and social services provision is the government’s main priority in the 
2010/11 budget. The government continues to prioritize provision of economic services, 
including roads, energy, railways, and ports, and social services, such as education, health, and 
water in 2010/11 budgetary allocations. Increased allocations for roads, health, and education are 
the main drivers of increased share allocations for economic and social services, especially in the 
development budget. About 50 percent of the budget is allocated in two broad areas. 
1.33 Table 7). Prioritization of the economic and social services provision is consistent with 
the government intention of achieving the MKUKUTA II strategic objective of economic growth 
as a sustainable means of reducing poverty. However, the main challenge will be to ensure the 
full execution of expenditure programs in these sectors, given that they are mostly development 
programs that can be subjected to budget cuts in case of revenue shortfalls. The budget’s already 
identified financing gap poses the main risk to these expenditure programs, as the development 
budget would be subject to cuts in case of failure to close the gap through non-concessional 
external borrowing. The other challenge would be the capacity constraints associated with 
planning and execution of development projects, especially where capital investment is high, as 
in the roads and energy sectors. 
 
1.34 Productive services, defense and security, and debt service have all seen their 
budget shares decline in 2010/11. However, the share of productive services may be higher 
than what is indicated in  
1.35 Table 7 once some of the budgetary allocations for Kilimo Kwanza included in 
administration functions (vote 21, Treasury) have been reallocated into the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS, vote 43). Reallocation of these budgetary resources will 
see that the share of productive services rises while the share of administration declines. The 
share of administration will also decline further once budgetary allocations for the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA) infrastructure projects (under vote 21, Treasury) are also reclassified 
to economic services.  
 
1.36 The development budget for economic and social services is predominantly 
foreign funded. While the share of foreign funds going to provision of economic services 
increases in the 2010/11 budget, the share of local funds declines. Despite the decline, the share 
of local development funds going to provision of infrastructure services is significantly larger 
than foreign development funds. In social service, the share of foreign development funds is 
larger than local funds, which indicates development partners’ preference for provision of the 
key social services, such as water, health, and education services. However, the share of local 
funds in development budgets of social services increases from 2009/10 to 2010/11. Expansion 
of social infrastructure, such as construction and rehabilitation of secondary schools and health 
centers in every ward, is the main driver of increased local development funds to social sectors. 
As noted already, the identified financing gap in the budget is the main risk to these expenditure 
programs, as the local development budget would be subjected to expenditure cuts in case of 




Table 7: Budget allocation between broad functions (shares) 
 




1.37 More than 60 percent of the discretionary budget is allocated to six key sectors in 
the 2010/11 budget. This is equivalent to a more than 10 percent increase in allocation for the 
six key sectors compared with actual spending in the same sectors in previous years. 
 
1.38 Table 8 Approximately one third of this is allocated to the education sector, while the 
roads sector consumes approximately one quarter. The share of the overall budget (excluding 
interest rate) allocated to the water sector is the lowest among the six key sectors. The increased 
allocation to the six key sectors shows the government’s commitment to achieve the 
MKUKUTA II strategic objectives by allocating a large share of budgetary resources. Despite 
increased allocations to these sectors, prioritization within the sectors needs to receive maximum 
attention to ensure the spending programs’ effectiveness in achieving the MKUKUTA II and 
sector strategic objectives. Moreover, as already noted above, the identified financing gap in the 
budget is the main risk as the locally funded development programs and would be the first 
dropped to close the gap in the event of shortfalls in planned resources. 
1.39 Allocations to priority sectors continue to increase, consistent with increased 
allocation to MKUKUTA cluster strategies. Six priority sectors consume approximately 62 
percent of the 2010/11 budget (excluding interest rate), equivalent to 17 percent of GDP. This is 
equivalent to an estimated 2 percent increase in share for these sectors in 2010/11 compared with 
2009/10. The main drivers of increased allocations to priority sectors are health and roads, which 
saw significant increases in the 2010/11 budget. Other sectors (except education, which 
experienced a slight decline in its share of budgetary allocation) saw their share remaining stable 
in 2010/11. The energy sector share the overall budget also declined, while budgetary allocations 
for the energy sector remained stable as a percentage of GDP. Energy’s decline in budget share 
and low execution rate suggest that actual spending in the sector will continue to be low. This 
situation raises serious doubts about whether the government will be able to meet the 
MKUKUTA II strategic objective of increasing the accessibility and reliability of electricity, 
especially in rural areas. 
 
 
                                                 
1 See annex for the exact definition of major sectors. 
Rec Total Rec Total Rec Total Rec Total
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
Broad Functions
Administration 23.1 15.9 15.3 15.5 20.3 30.7 23 15.8 18.5 26.5 23.0 14.1 25.4 21.5 22.6 24.0 24.7 21.1 22.4 23.5
CFS 15.9 0 0 0 10.1 14.4 0 0 0 9.4 22.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.0 22.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.1
Defense and Security 11.8 1.1 0.2 0.5 7.7 10.7 2.4 0.3 1.1 7.4 10.1 6.9 0.3 2.6 7.9 10.1 4.2 0.2 1.6 7.3
Economic Services 6.8 57.7 24.9 36 17.4 5.7 48.4 30.2 37 16.5 5.2 45.4 16.9 26.7 11.6 5.0 36.7 23.5 28.2 12.7
Production Services 3.4 1.4 6.3 4.6 3.9 3.6 3.3 4.8 4.2 3.8 3.7 3.4 7.8 6.3 4.4 3.6 2.1 5.7 4.4 3.8
Social Services 39 23.9 53.3 43.4 40.6 34.9 22.9 48.9 39.1 36.4 35.2 30.3 49.5 42.9 37.5 34.7 32.3 49.5 43.4 37.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
D e vD e vD e vD e v 
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1.40 The education, health, and road sectors continue to top the six priority sectors. 
These three sectors consume more than 70 percent of the budget allocated for priority sectors in 
2010/11. This is consistent with the government intention of providing social services (such as 
education and health) to the majority of Tanzanians and providing economic infrastructure (such 
as roads and electricity) to spur economic growth. MKUKUTA II puts great emphasis on 
economic growth and provision of key social services to reduce poverty. Despite increased 
attention to these key sectors, the main challenges would be protecting the sector from budget 
cuts in case of failure to close the resource gap as well as increased execution of development 
budgets, especially for heavy capital spending programs (infrastructure sectors).  
 
1.41 There are some significant weaknesses in alignment between sectors’ budget 
allocations and strategic priorities in 2010/11. For instance, in the agriculture sector, the 
current composition of budgeted public spending is not well aligned with the evolving sector 
priorities. The MKUKUTA II prioritizes as follows: (1) supporting physical infrastructure; (2) 
water and irrigation infrastructure; (3) financial and extension services; (4) knowledge and 
information; (5) value addition activities (crop production, livestock, fish processing, and 
mechanization); and (6) trade and export development services. Comparing this list with the 
functional composition of planned expenditures in the 2010/11 budget clearly shows that the 
planned expenditure is biased toward inputs and, recently, rural finance; few resources go to 
rural infrastructure, value addition, research, and extension. Irrigation expenditure has recently 
increased but remains insufficient to fill the gap in demand. Rural roads, which are critical for 
increased agriculture production and productivity, remain significantly underfunded. Moreover, 
the analysis shows that large share agricultural sector expenditures goes into current spending, 
not into capital expenditure, which is critical for creating preconditions for long-term growth.   
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Table 8: Budget and Actual Spending Between Major Sectors  
 
 
      Source: MoFEA, IFMS data and author’s computation 
 
1.42 In health, the sector budget is partially aligned with the Health Sector Strategy 
(HSSP III). The budgeted per capita spending for health increases in 2010/11 compared with 
2009/10, but it is financed largely through aid and mostly on ephemeral Global Fund resources. 
Capital spending to improve and expand the network is another HSSP III priority that appears to 
be met with financing in the 2010/11 budget. The Malaria Control Programme is another HSSP 
III priority and a big push is funded in the 2010/11 budget. However, the 2010/11 health sector 
budget is weakly aligned with the HSSP III, especially in terms of declining real resources for 
district health staffing and lack of improvement in the relative resourcing of underserved 
districts. Across all programs, the goods and services category of spending may be vulnerable to 
Fiscal Years Education  Health Water Agriculture  Roads Energy Total
2007/08 Actual 20.6% 9.0% 3.5% 4.9% 9.4% 1.3% 48.8%
2008/09 Actual 18.0% 13.6% 2.6% 4.2% 9.4% 1.3% 49.2%
2009/10 Actual 17.1% 8.7% 2.8% 5.6% 13.4% 1.6% 49.1%
2010/11 Budget 19.3% 9.7% 3.3% 5.9% 13.9% 3.0% 55.1%
2007/08 Actual 42.2% 18.5% 7.2% 10.0% 19.3% 2.7% 100.0%
2008/09 Actual 36.6% 27.6% 5.3% 8.6% 19.2% 2.7% 100.0%
2009/10 Actual 34.8% 17.8% 5.6% 11.4% 27.2% 3.2% 100.0%
2010/11 Budget 33.1% 19.0% 6.4% 12.8% 24.2% 4.5% 100.0%
2007/08 Actual 21.7% 9.5% 3.7% 5.2% 9.9% 1.4% 51.4%
2008/09 Actual 18.7% 14.1% 2.7% 4.4% 9.8% 1.4% 51.1%
2009/10 Actual 17.6% 9.0% 2.8% 5.8% 13.8% 1.6% 50.7%
2010/11 Budget 20.9% 11.1% 4.0% 8.1% 15.3% 3.1% 62.5%
2007/08 Actual 4.7% 2.1% 0.8% 1.1% 2.2% 0.3% 11.1%
2008/09 Actual 4.6% 3.5% 0.7% 1.1% 2.4% 0.3% 12.7%
2009/10 Actual 4.6% 2.4% 0.7% 1.5% 3.6% 0.4% 13.2%
2010/11 Budget 5.9% 3.4% 1.1% 2.3% 4.3% 0.9% 18.0%
(Sector Share of Total Spending)
(Sector Share of Total Priority Spending)
(Sector Share of Total Spending excl interest)









Education Health Water Agriculture Roads Energy
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
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in-year expenditure cuts in 2010/11, as there is a significant financing gap in the budget due to an 
expected shortfall in revenue mobilization. While the budgeted funding for goods and services 
already does not keep up with inflation in the health sector, further cuts on these lines might be 
damaging. It is important that the government protects spending on essential drugs and maternal 
and child health care during expenditure cuts.  
 
1.43 The 2010/11 education sector budget is broadly aligned with the Education Sector 
Development Program (ESDP) and the MKUKUTA II strategic objectives. There is an 
increase in overall resources allocated for education in the 2010/11 budget. Increased sector 
resources make space for increased funding for secondary and higher education, which are also 
priorities in the education sector strategy and the MKUKUTA II. Containment of the wage bill at 
reasonable levels means non-salary funding increases sharply outside primary education, which 
could be what is needed to extend the network and invest in quality of education. However, there 
is stagnation in funding for teacher education in addition to a real and per capita reduction in 
resources allocated for primary education.  
 
1.44 The transport sector 2010/11 budget analysis led to the conclusion that it is 
weakly aligned with the sector strategy. The Transport Strategic Investment Plan (TSIP) 
suffers from two main weaknesses: unrealistic budget expectations, which generate a significant 
financial gap, and weak prioritization. It is essential to establish the link to and integration with 
the MTEF and MKUKUTA II priorities and align the financial resources accordingly. Growth 
expectations and the transport support they will require should be re-thought to bring sector 
budget forecast closer to reality and ensure that they are better reflected in Transport Strategic 
Investment Plan. The Local Government Transport Programme (LGTP) requires full and 
sustainable funding for the transport sector budget to be aligned with the MKUKUTA II strategic 
objectives and the TSIP priorities. Funding allocated to the railways network is minimal, and a 
strategy for the rehabilitation and extension for the network is not yet clearly defined. Road 
maintenance needs more funding and better prioritization; to meet objectives in this area, the 
government will need to devise new ways to increase funding for roads maintenance beyond the 
fuel levy collected by the Road Fund Board.  
 
1.45 Improving prioritization and budget discipline in the transport sector remains a 
key priority. The TANROADS practice of over-committing for roads construction projects is 
having an impact on budget sustainability. TANROADS continues contracting above the 
approved budget, as the fund management team fails to maintain control of implementing the 
TSIP and fully delegates to the government responsibility for ensuring sufficient funding. This 
practice has resulted in an approximate 20 percent financing gap for ongoing projects. Further 
enhanced efforts to strengthen domestic procurement, and especially to improve oversight of 
procurement, could be a way to solve the problem. 
 
1.46 A substantial share of the water sector budget in 2010/11 is allocated for 
provision of water and sanitation services in urban, peri-urban, and rural areas, consistent 
with sector priority objectives. Analysis of the water sector budget shows that the budget 
allocation for the sector is slowly increasing over time, replacing the stop-and-go characteristic 
of previous years. This positive development is expected to improve implementation of water 
sector investments, which are usually characterized by long-term investments that require many  
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years to implement. Despite increased allocations to the water sector, development spending 
favors urban areas. Moreover, budget execution for the water sector is rather weak, with 
significant under spending of the development budget. The overall under spending is due partly 
to delays in the release of foreign development funds, which fund almost all investments in the 
sector. This issue requires solutions that include (i) increased contribution of local funds in the 
sector’s development budget; (ii) improved planning and procurement in water agencies so that 
disbursement of foreign funds can take place without delays; and (iii) improved and timely 
reporting and monitoring of actual spending and outcomes data.  
 
1.47 The 2010/11 energy sector budget and sector priority objectives are weakly 
aligned. The sector’s budget allocation in 2010/11 declines from previous years despite low 
accessibility and unreliability of electricity in the country. Moreover, a record of significantly 
low execution of the development budget suggests actual spending in the sector is much lower 
than the budget would indicate. The budget does not seem to function as a planning instrument 
for implementation of strategic priorities, since the actual development spending is significantly 
lower than approved development spending. For instance, in the past three years, execution of 
Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MoEM) development budgets has not gone beyond 30 percent, 
despite the sector and MKUKUTA II objectives of making electricity more accessible and 
reliable in Tanzania. The problem is one of planning rather than execution: planning weaknesses 
are revealed in the translation of strategy and master plans into implementation actions to which 
the budget funds should be assigned. Strong efforts are needed to make the planning side of the 
budget more relevant.  
By Economic Nature 
1.48 There is a significant increase in allocation for development spending in the 
2010/11 budget. This represents a shift toward prioritizing spending on development programs 
and projects from recurrent spending. While allocation for recurrent spending declines from 69.5 
percent of total budget in 2009/10 to 65 percent in 2010/11, allocations for development 
spending increase from 30.5 percent in 2009/10 to 35.5 percent in 2010/11 (Table 9). Allocations 
for development spending are equivalent to approximately 11 percent of GDP in 2010/11 
compared with budget allocations of 9.1 percent and actual spending of 8.6 percent of GDP in 
2009/10. This increase is due to increased development spending in key growth enhancing 
sectors such as roads, health, education, and agriculture. Both local and foreign components of 
the development budget have increased in 2010/11 compared with 2009/10, but the locally 
funded component increases faster than the foreign funded component. The first challenge will 
be to realize the resources required to implement planned projects and programs, given the 
already identified financing gap in the budget. The second important challenge is the low 
capacity in key MDAs and LGAs to implement all these development programs and projects. 
 
1.49 Recurrent spending remains a large share of the budget, although it shows some 
decline in 2010/11. Planned recurrent spending is approximately 65 percent of the overall 
budget, equivalent to 20 percent of GDP, down from actual spending of 68 percent of the overall 
2009/10 budget, equivalent to 18.3 percent of GDP. Wage bill and goods and services allocations 
consume more than 65 percent of the overall recurrent budget in 2010/11. A planned increase in 
basic salaries of civil servants, together with an increase in personnel emoluments of public 
enterprises, are the main reasons for keeping the share of wage bill high in the recurrent budget.  
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While the overall basic salaries increase by 26 percent, personnel emoluments (PE) of public 
enterprises increase by 36 percent. Allocations for other charges, which include spending on 
goods and services, and allowances, also slightly increase in the 2010/11 budget. Nonetheless, 
share of allowances in the 2010/11 budget declines. The decline in the share of allowances is 
mainly due to a decline in the share of duty facilitating allowances, especially in MDAs. 
 
Table 9: Decomposition of the Budget 
 
 
Source: MoFEA, Budget Digest 2010/11. 
 
1.50 Allocation for debt service increases slightly in the 2010/11 budget, driven mainly 
by increased allocations for interest payment on domestic debt. Despite increased allocations 
for debt service, debt indicators show that Tanzania’s debt position is sustainable. The 
government is planning to finance its 2010/11 budget (close the financing gap), especially 
spending on infrastructure investment, through additional non-concessional borrowing. Although 
this strategy does not jeopardize its debt sustainability position, Tanzania would be faced with 
some additional fiscal pressure on the budget in future, in terms of increased allocations for debt 
service. This also assumes that additional non-concessional borrowing will be on reasonable 
terms. It is therefore important that all infrastructure investments to be financed by additional 
resources from non-concessional borrowing spark much needed additional economic growth that 




Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Prel. Actual Budget
Recurrent expenditure 63.8% 70.3% 63.7% 65.6% 65.5% 68.7% 69.5% 68.1% 64.5%
Development expenditure 36.2% 29.7% 36.3% 34.4% 34.5% 31.3% 30.5% 31.9% 35.5%
Total expenditure 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Recurrent expenditure 19.0% 9.0% 24.3% 8.3% 23.8% 37.8% 37.1% 18.8% 7.8%
Development expenditure -24.0% -1.5% 26.9% 35.4% 13.2% 17.6% 13.4% 22.6% 35.2%
Total expenditure 25.3% 16.4% 19.9% 30.8% 28.9% 20.0% 16.2%
Recurrent expenditure 18.1% 16.1% 17.2% 14.9% 17.6% 17.7% 20.7% 18.3% 20.0%
Development expenditure 10.3% 6.9% 9.8% 7.9% 9.3% 8.0% 9.1% 8.6% 11.0%
Total expenditure 28.3% 23.0% 27.0% 22.8% 26.9% 25.7% 29.8% 26.9% 31.0%
in percentage of GDP
percentage change
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09




Figure 16: Decomposition of the Budget 
 
 
 Source: MoFEA, Budget Digest 2010/11. 
 
Table 10: Budget Decomposition by Consumption and Capital Spending 
 
 
Source: MoFEA, IFMS data and author’s computation. 
 
1.51 Increased budgetary allocation for development spending finances increased 
capital investment spending. In 2010/11, approximately 50 percent of the development budget 
finances capital spending, which is 5 percent higher than in 2009/10. Capital investment 
spending increases because of increased allocation for infrastructure rehabilitation and 
construction in the roads, agriculture, water, and energy sectors. Capital investment spending 
increases to 18.5 percent of the total budget in 2010/11, up from to 15 percent in 2009/10 (Table 









2005/06 actual 2006/07 actual 2007/08 actual 2008/09 actual 2009/10 actual 2010/11 budget
Personnel Emol. (PE) Other Charges (OC) Debt Service Dev. expenditures
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total
Current 96.3      37.0      74.8      92.8      41.8      75.2      98.9         55.1           85.0           98.7      49.8      81.5
Wages and salaries 45.1       4.0         30.3       50.4       4.6         34.0       47.5          4.0              32.5            48.0       2.5         31.9      
o/w Pers. Emol. (PE) 38.0       0.3         24.4       43.6       1.1         28.3       35.2          0.4              25.5           
o/w Allowances 7.1         3.7         5.9         6.8         3.5         5.7         6.5            3.6              5.5              6.9         2.0         5.2        
Good and Services  32.2       27.0       30.3       30.4       22.8       27.8       33.2          45.7            38.0            36.4       32.6       35.1      
Maintenance 7.0         3.0         5.5         5.6         4.5         5.2         5.3            2.6              5.1              3.7         3.5         3.6        
o/w Road maintenance .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.4            0.3              3.2              3.9         0.3         2.6        
Current Transfer 4.1         3.1         3.7         1.5         10.0       4.5         4.9            2.8              4.0              5.0         11.3       7.2        
Interests 7.9         0.0 5.0         5.7         0.0 3.7         8.0            0.0 5.5              5.6         0.0 3.6        
Capital 3.7        63.0      25.2      7.2        58.2      24.8      1.1           44.9           15.0           1.3        50.2      18.5
Infrastructure 2.2         35.3       14.2       3.7         36.4       15.0       0.2            32.5            10.4            0.2         41.8       14.9      
Construction 2.1         13.1       6.1         3.1         19.9       8.9         0.0            11.1            3.9              0.0         12.8       4.5        
Rehabilitation 0.1         22.2       8.1         0.6         16.4       6.1         0.1            21.4            6.4              0.1         20.9       7.4        
Equipment 1.2         15.2       6.2         1.8         7.2         3.7         0.8            5.2              2.2              0.7         2.1         1.2        
Other Capital  0.1         12.4       4.6         0.2         14.3       5.0         0.2            7.2              2.4              0.4         6.4         2.5        
o/w Feasib. Studies  0.1         12.3       4.5         0.1         13.8       4.8         0.1            6.4              2.1              0.0         4.0         1.4        
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0       100.0         100.0         100.0  100.0  100.0
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
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1.52 Figure 17. The increased capital investment is consistent with the government policy 
of boosting economic growth as emphasized in the MKUKUTA II. However, timely and 
complete release of allocated funds is critical to ensure that planned investment programs and 
projects are fully implemented and objectives of boosting economic growth and reducing poverty 
in the country are achieved. In addition, it is important to ensure that there is enough capacity for 
executing large capital investment programs and projects in implementing agencies (MDAs and 
LGAs), because most often this is the major implementation challenge. 
 
1.53 Allocations for equipment decline in the 2010/11 budget, mainly driven by a 
decline in allocations for purchase of motor vehicles—especially four wheel drive (FWD) 
and electricity generators. While the decline in allocations for the purchase of FWD vehicles is 
consistent with the government policy of reducing spending on such cars, the decline in 
allocations for the purchase of electricity generators could be due to completion of some key 
projects in the energy sector. The decline in allocations for power generation related equipment 
is an issue of concern given the unreliability and limited accessibility of electricity in Tanzania, 
especially in rural areas. Despite the overall decline in allocations for equipment, allocations for 
medical and scientific instruments, which are critical in hospitals, remained stable. The 
government will need to consider how to reduce further spending of motor vehicles (especially 
FWD) to create more space for critical infrastructure spending, such as roads, power generators, 
and irrigation.  













2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
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1.54 The share of wage bill in the 2010/11 budget declines slightly but remains high as 
a percentage of GDP. The wage bill is about 32 percent of the total budget in 2010/11, down 
from 32.5 in 2009/10. The wage bill’s decline in budget share is driven mainly by the decline in 
share of civil service benefits (including pension and social contributions) and allowances. The 
decline in the share of allowances in the wage bill is due mainly to the reduction in allocations 
for duty facilitating allowances in MDAs. Despite wage bill’s decline in budget share, it remains 
high, at about 9.9 percent of GDP. The government will need to continue measures to reduce the 
wage bill (as percentage of GDP) to create some fiscal space for development spending, which is 
critical for achieving the MKUKUTA II strategic objectives of investing more in infrastructure 
to boost economic growth for sustained poverty reduction.  
 
1.55 Surprisingly, the share of budget allocations for maintenance declines in the 
2010/11 budget. The decline in the share of allocations for maintenance in the budget comes in 
midst of backlog of infrastructure maintenance in the roads and social sectors’ infrastructure. In 
the recent past, Tanzania has made huge investments in economic and social infrastructure that 
will need to be maintained to save the country from allocating huge amounts money for 
rehabilitation in the future. Limited budget allocations translate into delays in infrastructure 
maintenance, which in turn results in huge future costs related to rehabilitation and even new 
construction. As reliable and accessible electricity is essential if Tanzania hopes to achieve the 
MKUKUTA II strategic objectives of growth and reduction of poverty, it is critical that the 
government allocate adequate budget for maintaining infrastructure in energy sector, both for 
production and transmission of electricity. 
 
1.56 The share of allocations for goods and services in the 2010/11 budget declines, 
following a huge increase in 2009/10. Despite the decline, allocations for goods and services 
remain very high in the budget. Overall budget allocations for goods and services are down to 
35 percent in 2010/11, compared with 38 percent in 2009/10. The share of budget allocations for 
goods and services declines due to restrictions on spending related to travel tickets, training, 
-6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0
Wages and salaries







2010/11 change over 2009/10 2009/10 change over 2008/09 2008/09 change over 2007/08 
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workshops, seminars, and conference facilities. Allocations for key goods and services such as 
capitation grants in education, fertilizers in agriculture, and drugs and medicines in health remain 
unaffected by the decline, as do capacity charges in energy remains unaffected by the decline. 
The government is planning to cut spending on goods and services to close the financing gap in 
the 2010/11 budget. The government will need move cautiously in cutting spending on goods 
and services to protect key areas, such as capitation grants, medical supplies and essential drugs, 
and fertilizers. Moreover, the government will need to consider how to cut further allocations for 
goods and services to create fiscal space for infrastructure investment spending.  
 
Implementation of D by D Policy
 
1.57 Approximately 23 percent of the overall budget is allocated to LGAs spending 
programs in 2010/11. The overall share of the total budget allocated to LGAs spending 
programs in 2010/11 is approximately 2 percent higher than actual spending in 2009/10 (Table 
11). Increases are planned for both recurrent and development spending in the LGAs in 2010/11. 
On one hand, increased recurrent spending is driven by planned increases in hiring of teachers in 
secondary schools. On the other hand, increased allocations for development spending are driven 
largely by increased allocation of local funds for construction of district offices and houses as 
well as increased allocations of foreign funds through the Local Government Capital 
Development Grant (LGDG) basket, which funds different sectors, including education and 
health. There is also a notable increase in allocations for rural roads in LGAs.  
 
1.58 Despite the increased budget allocation to LGAs, quality and efficiency of 
spending programs needs further attention. The notable increase in the share of allowances in 
the 2010/11 budgets of some LGAs makes them among the highest allowance receiving votes. 
For instance, in the 2010/11 budget, Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, and Shinyanga LGAs are 
(combined) among the 17 highest allowance receiving votes. There is also a need to improve 
capacity for financial management and reporting in addition to LGAs’ capacity to plan, prepare 
and execute development projects and programs. The increased funding to LGAs in the 2010/11 
budget is subject to the measures being taken by the government to fill the budget financing gap, 
since some of the measures include cutting expenditures on goods and services and securing non-
concessional external borrowing to finance infrastructure investments. 
Table 11: Decomposition of Budget and Actual Spending in LGAs (shares) 
 
 
Source: MoFEA, IFMS data and author’s computation. 
 
1.59 Allocation for education and health spending programs and projects remained 
the main priorities in LGA budgets. Provision of basic education (primary and secondary) and 
primary health services are core activities of the LGAs, as indicated by the large share of 
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
Actual Actual Actual Budget
Recurrent 22.6% 26.9% 22.0% 25.2% 4.3% -4.9% 3.2%
Development 14.2% 15.4% 16.9% 18.5% 1.2% 1.6% 1.5%









resources allocated to these sectors in their 2010/11 budgets (Figure 19). The slight decline in 
shares of education and health in the LGAs 2010/11 budget compared with actual spending in 
2009/10 is driven by inclusion of the LGDG that funds many sectors, including education and 
health, under another spending category. The allocations for other spending categories, which 
appear to have increased in 2010/11, are driven primarily by increased allocations to the 
development budget through the LGDG and local funds that are not yet factored into appropriate 
sectors allocation. The share of resources allocated to education, health, water, agriculture, and 
roads may further increase as funds allocated for LGAs’ development budget through the LGDG 
are finally properly assigned to relevant sectors. Declining shares of budgetary allocations for 
water and roads in LGA raises some concern. For instance, the decline in the roads budget 
undermines the importance of accessible rural roads for increased production and productivity in 
agriculture, which is important for achieving the MKUKUTA II strategic objectives of economic 
growth and poverty reduction. 
 
Figure 19: Budget and Actual Spending in LGAs by Sectors 
 
 
1.60 Increased share allowance is a new feature in LGAs’ budget in 2010/11. Although 
overall share of allowances in the total budget declines, in LGAs’ share of allowances has 
increased by approximately 150 percent in the 2010/11 budget compared with 2009/10. The 
increased share of allowances in LGAs’ budget is driven by fact that salaries of teachers who are 
not yet included in payroll are paid as a training allowance. The government will need to 
continue its effort in improving equity in per capita resource allocation among LGAs to ensure 
equity in the provision of basic social services such health and education. 
Infrastructure Maintenance Policy 
1.61 Again, the 2010/11 pays even less attention to infrastructure maintenance. Other 
than in the agriculture sector, budgetary allocations for infrastructure maintenance continued to 
decline in 2010/11 (Figure 20). This is despite the recent huge increase in public investment in 
both social and economic infrastructure. Moreover, some backlogs in social and economic 
Education Health Water Agriculture Roads Others Admin Total
2007/08 Actual 47.8% 14.7% 2.9% 5.4% 5.1% 10.4% 13.7% 100.0%
2008/09 Actual 39.8% 29.6% 2.6% 5.1% 3.9% 6.7% 12.3% 100.0%
2009/10 Actual 51.4% 13.6% 2.6% 5.6% 4.6% 9.0% 13.3% 100.0%








Education Health Water Agriculture Roads Other Admin
2007/08actual 2008/09actual 2009/10actual 2010/11budget 
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infrastructure maintenance (education, health, water, roads, and energy) warrant more allocation 
of budgetary resources. Despite the unreliability and low accessibility of electricity and rural 
roads, allocations for infrastructure maintenance in energy and road sectors are low in the 
2010/11 budget.  
1.62 Decline in share of budgetary allocations for roads maintenance is of particular 
concern. In real terms, budgetary allocations for roads maintenance have remained constant 
from 2009/10 to 2010/11, but they have declined as a share of sector budget over the same 
period. This decline comes at a time when other modes of transport in the country, like railways, 
are critically unreliable and in seriously bad shape. This casts more doubt on whether the backlog 
in road maintenance, especially in rural roads, will be cleared in the near future. The other issue 
is the extent to which the new roads being constructed and rehabilitated/upgraded will face the 
same situation.  
 




1.63 In social sectors, education, and health, the 2010/11 budget has continued to pay 
no attention to infrastructure maintenance. Between zero and 1 percent is allocated for 
infrastructure maintenance in the education and health sectors. This is despite the existence of a 
huge backlog in maintenance of social infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals, in addition to 
the recent massive construction of infrastructure in the two sectors. It is important that the 
government provide guidance to sectors and LGAs on how they should prioritize infrastructure 
Education Health Water Agriculture  Roads
Ratio of sector maintenance budget 
to sector infrastructure budget 22.7% 14.1% 110.9% 33.6% 46.2%
Sector maintenance budget  as a 
share of total sector budget 0.9% 1.1% 30.1% 6.3% 25.2%
Ratio of sector maintenance budget 
to sector infrastructure budget 38.8% 31.2% 1.6% 85.0% 52.1%
Sector maintenance budget  as a 
share of total sector budget 1.7% 1.5% 1.0% 2.2% 26.1%
Ratio of sector maintenance budget 
to sector infrastructure budget 12% 18% 7% 160% 34%
Sector maintenance budget  as a 












Education Health Water Agriculture Roads
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
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maintenance in budgeting before they move ahead and budget for construction of new 
infrastructure. 
BUDGET AND ACTUAL SPENDING CONSISTENCY – 2009/10 
Recurrent Budget 
 
1.64 Actual recurrent spending deviated significantly from the approved budget in 
2009/10. Overall, actual recurrent spending deviated from the approved budget by approximately 
12 percent (Table 12). The level of deviation increases as the level of disaggregation increases. 
For example, across votes, recurrent budget deviations range from 61 percent to +139 percent. 
The main drivers of deviations are reallocation across votes as well as reallocation from 
contingency resources. In 2009/10, significant budgetary resources were set aside (contingency) 
for implementing rescue package measures that were concluded just after the budget had been 
approved. As a result, money had to be reallocated from vote 21 (contingency item) to other 
ministries to implement some of the rescue package measures falling under relevant votes 
(especially MDAs). Also, a large share of funds budgeted for recurrent spending in other MDAs 
was reallocated to the MoID to cover for shortfalls in development spending on roads. The 
budget did not allocate enough funds for roads construction contracts signed by TANROADS 
during June-December 2009; over the resulting over-commitment required additional funds that 
were raised through reallocation from recurrent budget of other MDAs to the MoID development 
budget.  
 
Table 12: Recurrent Budget Deviation 
 
 Source: MoFEA, Expenditure Flash Reports 
 
1.65 Reallocations from votes and contingency resources were the main causes of 
deviations. Approximately 15 percent of the budget was reallocated from one vote to another, 
and contingency accounted for half of the amount. Recurrent budget experienced lower 
reallocations than development budget. Reallocations in the development budget were mainly 
from the locally funded component of the development budget. In addition, greater than expected 
disbursement of general budget support grants cased the overall resource envelope to expand by 
approximately 1 percent of the total budget, which provided more room for further reallocation. 
However, the data provided by reallocation warrants do not provide enough certainty and 
accuracy in assessing fund movement. For instance, while the MoID actual spending exceeds the 
originally approved budget by TShs 73 billion, reallocation warrants show net reallocation to the 
Ministry of Infrastructure Development of only TShs 15 billion. This suggests that either a large 
share of overspending in the MoID was covered by resources that were not included in the 
budget, or reallocation warrants data are inaccurate, or arrears built up in the MoID.  
 
1.66 The major over-spenders in 2009/10 are the roads and agriculture sectors, the Electoral 
Commission, and the President’s Office (Table 13). Top under-spenders are Treasury, Public 
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2008/10
Total Recurrent -9.2% -5.0% 2.0% -13.1% -6.5% -11.6%
o/w MDAs -12.4% -7.0% 4.8% -15.5% -8.1% -12.8%
o/w Regions+LGAs 4.9% 2.8% -6.1% -5.0% -0.3% -8.0% 
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Debt, General Services, and the Ministry of Energy and Minerals. The under-spenders are also 
major sources of funds that were reallocated to over-spenders. With the exception of  Treasury 
(contingency item), huge under-spending in other MDAs points to some problems with 
absorption capacity due either to poor planning or to weak capacity in implementation of 
programs and projects.  
 
Table 13: Recurrent budget over- and under- spenders  
 
Source: MoF, Expenditure Flash Reports. 
 
1.67 The MDAs’ recurrent budget deviation index
2 is 12.9 percent in 2009/10. After 
adjusting for rescue package measures driven reallocations, MDAs’ recurrent deviation index is 
12.9 percent in 2009/10, down slightly from 13.1 percent in 2008/09 (Table 14). Approximately 
40 percent of the contingency, also equivalent to about 2 percent of total budget, was set aside 
for implementing rescue package measures associated with the global financial crisis. The rescue 
package was finalized at end June 2009, when the budget was already approved, so MDAs and 
other institutions that were to implement the rescue package measures were not known during 
                                                 
2 MDAs' recurrent budget deviation index is calculated as the sum of absolute differences between approved 
recurrent budget and actual recurrent expenditures of MDAs at vote level expressed as a percentage of total 








21 Treasury (457.8)          46 Min of Education and Vocational Training 76.6            
56 PMO, Regional  Admin. and Local Govt. (16.6)            30 President's Office and The Cabinet Secretariat 22.4            
43 Min of Agriculture, Food Security and Coop. (5.5)              38 Defense 21.1            
69 Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (4.5)              28 Ministry of Home Affairs - Police Force 11.7            
40 Judiciary (3.1)              34 Min of Foreign Affairs & International Coop. 10.1            
98 Ministry of Infrastructure Development (2.5)              22 Public Debt and General Services 6.3              
66 President Office Planning Commission (2.2)              23 Accountant General's Department  6.1              
41 Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (1.8)              52 Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 6.0              
97 Min of East African Cooperation (1.3)              32 President's Office-Public Service Mgt. 4.9              
99 Ministry of Livestock Development (1.1)              39 The National Service 4.2              








21 Treasury (369.1) 43 Min of Agriculture, Food Security and Coop. 29.6            
22 Public Debt and General Services (220.2) 50 Ministry of Finance 26.8            
29 Ministry of Home Affairs - Prison Services (25.3) 58 Ministry of Energy and Minerals 21.5            
28 Ministry of Home Affairs - Police Force (21.3) 61 Electoral Commission 16.4            
46 Min of Education and Vocational Training (17.7) 30 President's Office and The Cabinet Secretariat 6.2              
38 Defense (13.2) 37 Prime Minister's Office 5.2              
52 Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (12.2) 40 Judiciary 3.8              
69 Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (9.0) 39 National Service 3.3              
99 Min of Livestock Dev. and Fisheries (7.7) 19 District and Primary Courts 1.1              
18 High Court (7.4) 34 Min of Foreign Affairs & International Coop. 1.1              





the preparation stage. Therefore, the budget allocated for that purpose was in the contingency 
item in Treasury (vote 21). Rescue package related reallocations involved movement of funds 
from Treasury (contingency item) to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Affairs, and Ministry of Industries and Trade. The funds were spent on 
the purchase of additional maize for the NFSA, providing funds for “Agriculture Window” in 
Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) earmarked for providing credits to farmers, for compensating 
cotton farmers due to the fall in the price of cotton in the world.  
 
Table 14: MDAs Recurrent Budget Deviation Index 
 
 
  Source: MoFEA and author’s calculation. 
Development Budget 
Completeness and Timeliness of Releases 
 
1.68 Overall completeness of release of development funds in 2009/10 improved 
significantly. More than 75 percent of MDAs’ budgeted development funds were released 
(Figure 21). However, completeness of release of development funds differed across MDAs: 
some received more than 100 percent, while others received less than 40 percent of their 
budgeted funds. The improvement in completeness of releases was due mostly to significant 
improvement in the release of locally funded components of development budgets due to greater 
than expected disbursements of funds from general budget support donors. 
 
1.69  Delays in the release of development funds remained a major problem in 2009/10. 
More than half of MDAs’ development funds were released in the last quarter of 2009/10 (Figure 
21). Both foreign and local development funds were released with significant delays. The main 
reasons for delay in release of foreign development funds were slow implementation of projects 
and programs, delays in procurement, and delays in meeting disbursement conditions for donor 
funded projects and baskets. Disbursement of development funds from the treasury is triggered 
Fiscal Year  Comments Index
2003/04 No comments 23.9
2003/04 2003/04 (excl. ‘force majeur’ items, namely additional spending in votes
43/agriculture and 58/energy) 
22.6
2004/05 No comments 20.4
2005/06 No comments 17.1
2006/07 No comments 16
2007/08 No comments 16.7
2008/09 With no adjustments 18.3
2008/09 (excl. ‘force majeur’ items, namely reallocations from contingency for
the 2007/08 salary arrears following Presidential decision to raise
salaries starting from January 2008)
13.1
2009/10 With no adjustments 17.4
2009/10 (excl. ‘force majeur’ items, namely measures implemented under the
rescue package for which implementing agencies and budgets were




by submission of cash flow plans at the beginning of fiscal years as well as submission of 
implementation reports every quarter before development funds are released. In addition, the 
MoFEA has an expenditure tracking unit that also needs to verify actual implementation of 
projects and programs before the release of development funds. All these requirements have 
proved to be a big challenge for MDAs and LGAs, especially timely preparation and submission 
to Treasury of the cash flow plans and implementation status reports. Hence, the government will 
need to consider the possibility of relaxing these conditions, especially during the first quarter of 
the fiscal year. Moreover, the government will need to continue to improve planning, budgeting, 
and procurement in all spending agencies to speed up project and programs implementation.  
 
1.70 There was a significant improvement in actual spending of development funds in 
2009/10. This significant improvement in spending by the MDAs was due to improved 
completeness of releases. Nonetheless, approximately 60 percent of MDAs’ development 
spending occurred in the last quarter of 2009/10 because most of the funds were released in that 
quarter. There is also a significant spending gap (low spending compared with release) caused by 
low absorption capacity due to delays in the release of the funds. As pointed out in the past, 
release and hurried spending in last month(s) of the financial year could lead to inefficiency and 
loss of quality in expenditures. 
 
Figure 21: Trends in Release and Spending of Development Funds for MDAs 
 
Source: MoF, IFMS Data, and author’s computation. 
Source of Funding and Economic Nature of Spending 
 
1.71 Overall, development budget execution at the MDA level improved significantly 
in 2009/10. There is an approximately 23 percent increase in the execution rate in 2009/10 
compared with 2008/09. The improvement in the execution rate was driven largely by 
completeness in the release of development funds. Despite delays in realizing development 
funds, overall, MDAs were able to execute approximately 75 percent
3 of their development 
                                                 
3 Execution rate in this case is measured using the IFMS itemized expenditure data generated at end September 
2010, which has more coverage of actual spending (including direct to project funds). Using the expenditure flash 































































budgets (Table 15). However, execution differed significantly among MDAs. For example, while 
MoHSW and MoID executed more than 100 percent of their development budgets, MoEM 
executed less than 40 percent of its development budget. Significant improvement in the 
execution rate of a development budget suggests that many development programs and projects 
planned and budgeted for in 2009/10 was implemented, which is a clear sign of the government’s 
intention to achieve MKUKUTA II strategic objectives.  
 
1.72 The locally funded component of MDAs’ development budget continued to 
perform better than the foreign funded component. While overall execution of MDAs’ 
locally funded component was 116 percent in 2009/10, up from 64 percent in 2008/09, the 
overall execution rate of the foreign funded component was 52 percent in 2009/10, up from 44 
percent in 2008/09 (Table 15). Completeness in release of local development funds was the main 
reason for good performance in the execution of the locally funded component. However, it is 
important to note that the share of local funds in MDAs’ development budget was only 36 
percent of the overall development budget. Therefore, it is important that the government 
increase the local fund share in the development budget, which is easy for MDAs to execute, to 
implement planned programs and projects and achieve MKUKUTA II strategic objectives. 
Moreover, more efforts are needed to increase the execution rate of the foreign component by 
improving the completeness and timeliness funds from donor projects and basket funds.  
 
1.73 Budget execution for capital investment continues to trail behind current 
consumption, but with significant improvement in 2009/10. The larger share of capital 
spending in the development budget is associated with lower execution, while the larger share of 
current spending is associated with a higher execution rate. Overall and even in sectors, the 
larger the share of capital spending, the lower the execution rates (Table 15). This emphasizes 
the point that planning and physical implementation of large capital investment projects and 
programs requires much more capacity than large current spending projects and programs. 
Hence, it is important to improve key MDAs’ capacity to plan, prepare, procure, and physically 
implement large capital investment projects and programs such as roads, energy, and water 
projects. 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
report data generated on July 15, 2010 would make it necessary to lower the execution rate due to limited coverage 
of direct to project funds.   
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Table 15: MDAs Development Execution Rates  
 
 
  Source: MoF, IFMS data and authors’ calculation. 
1.74 Despite having a large share of capital spending, the MoID executed more than 
100 percent of its development budget in 2009/10. The high execution rate in the MoID is 
explained in part by over-commitments made on the roads contracts signed in June-December 
2010. The MoID over-committed more than TShs 100 billion in 2009/10 on new roads project 
that were severely under-budgeted. The actual payment allocated of this over-commitment, 
which was not part of the originally approved budget, has the impact of over-estimating the 
execution rate (which usually compares actual spending and approved budget). Reallocation 
warrants for 2009/10 show that only TShs 15 billion was reallocated to the MoID, which was 
well below the amount required to cover the TShs 100 billion over-commitment. This suggests 
2008/09
Sector Item
Foreign Local Total Foreign Local Total
Overall Current 35.5              25.4             61.0               49.1                56.2               52.1               
Capital 22.7              16.3             39.0               36.2                76.3               52.9               
Total 58.3              41.7             100.0             44.1                64.0               52.4               
Agriculture Current 51.3              8.5               59.8               56.3                145.4             69.0               
Capital 23.3              16.8             40.2               98.6                42.7               75.2               
Total 74.7              25.3             100.0             69.5                77.2               71.5               
Education Current 38.4              21.8             60.2               15.0                43.3               25.3               
Capital 11.4              28.3             39.8               145.2              136.6             139.0             
Total 49.9              50.1             100.0             44.9                96.0               70.5               
Health Current 85.7              4.7               90.4               81.5                69.8               80.9               
Capital 8.8                0.8               9.6                 16.3                100.4             22.9               
Total 94.5              5.5               100.0             75.4                74.0               75.3               
Energy Current 29.5              19.8             49.3               4.0                  9.3                 6.1                 
Capital 39.7              11.0             50.7               16.8                44.2               22.7               
Total 69.2              30.8             100.0             11.3                21.8               14.5               
Roads Current 7.4                38.8             46.1               23.9                75.1               67.0               
Capital 32.9              21.0             53.9               37.7                82.2               55.0               
Total 40.3              59.7             100.0             35.2                77.6               60.5               
Water Current 46.4              12.5             59.0               87.1                52.0               79.6               
Capital 19.9              21.1             41.0               60.5                122.7             92.5               
Total 66.3              33.7             100.0             79.1                96.4               84.9               
2009/10
Sector Item
Foreign Local Total Foreign Local Total
Overall Current 36.6              9.5               46.2               60.8                143.8             77.9               
Capital 27.5              26.3             53.8               40.2                105.8             72.3               
Total 64.2              35.8             100.0             52.0                115.9             74.9               
Agriculture Current 67.2              7.0               74.2               80.5                61.9               78.8               
Capital 17.7              8.1               25.8               79.9                65.0               75.2               
Total 84.9              15.1             100.0             80.4                63.6               77.8               
Education Current 17.8              21.8             39.6               94.6                71.4               81.9               
Capital 29.5              31.0             60.4               25.0                97.7               62.3               
Total 47.2              52.8             100.0             51.2                86.9               70.0               
Health Current 76.4              1.4               77.8               126.4              79.2               125.5             
Capital 15.3              6.9               22.2               50.2                65.4               54.9               
Total 91.6              8.4               100.0             113.7              67.8               109.8             
Energy Current 5.1                22.6             27.7               1.3                  58.9               48.2               
Capital 38.6              33.7             72.3               9.6                  38.0               22.8               
Total 43.7              56.3             100.0             8.6                  46.4               29.9               
Roads Current 5.0                7.0               12.0               62.3                288.9             194.0             
Capital 42.5              45.5             88.0               46.1                129.5             89.2               
Total 47.5              52.5             100.0             47.8                150.6             101.8             
Water Current 69.4              14.7             84.1               62.7                67.1               63.4               
Capital 13.2              2.6               15.9               74.2                121.1             82.0               
Total 82.7              17.3             100.0             64.5                75.3               66.4               
 Shares of total   Execution rates 
 Shares of total   Execution rates  
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that the MoID carried huge arrears into the 2010/11 fiscal year owing to the over-commitment in 
2009/10. These arrears will have a huge impact on reducing available resources for 
implementing roads projects in 2010/11 and subsequent years. Furthermore, over-commitment 
reduces the credibility of the budget as the tool for allocating resources among competing 
priorities due to unavoidable reallocation during budget implementation. This also reduces the 
credibility of the entire public financial management system, especially commitment control.  
 
1.75 In 2009/10, for the third subsequent year, the MoEM failed to execute more than 
30 percent of its development budget. Notwithstanding a huge problem of unreliability and 
inaccessibility of electricity in Tanzania, implementation of energy projects continues to face 
major challenges. In addition, unreliability and low accessibility of electricity in Tanzania 
continues to limit the potential of achieving the MKUKUTA II strategic objectives of growth and 
poverty reduction. The MoEM, which had a large share of its development budget locally 
funded, saw its development budget execution reach only 29 percent in 2009/10 (Table 15). 
Normally, the local component of the MoEM budgeted development funds are released late in 
the year, in which case the MoEM’s capacity to absorb these funds before the financial year 
closes is limited, which means the funds get reallocated to other ministries. Low execution rates 
over the last three years suggest that there is weak capacity in the MoEM to plan, prepare, 
appraise, procure, monitor, and evaluate projects, which indicates a need for huge capacity 
building in the entire public investment management. Moreover, improvement in physical 
implementation capacity of projects requires a corresponding significant improvement in 
timeliness and completeness of foreign and local development funds release. 
1.76 The MoHSW and the MoEVT achieved good execution performance of their 
development budgets in 2009/10. While a large share of the MoEVT development budget was 
locally funded, in health, the large share of the development budget was financing current 
spending; this usually is associated with high execution rates. Despite significantly improved 
execution rates in the MoEV and the MoHSW, overall execution performance in the education 
and health sectors is less complete until LGAs are included. A large share of development funds 
for these sectors is budgeted under the LGA, where most public service delivery also takes place. 
Looking at the LGAs, execution rates for almost all sectors were low due to delays and 
incompleteness of released development funds. In addition, weak capacity to plan and execute 
projects reduced the capacity to absorb funds, especially those released in the last quarter of the 
fiscal year. It is clear that with LGAs added, overall execution rates in education and health 








VALUE FOR MONEY IN EDUCATION 
 
INTRODUCTION
2.1 The budget analysis has shown that an increasingly large share of the budget continues to 
be allocated to education sector spending programs. This has allowed increased necessary inputs 
and increased access. In many ways, expansion and access were definitely the right goals to be 
focused on in the last decade: “education for all.” But “education for all” is supposed to be an 
investment in human capital, and this can work only if schooling produces useful learning 
outcomes. Learning outcomes (results) so far have received less attention in budget analyses in 
Tanzania. The inclusion of a value for money (VFM) chapter seeks to rectify this and seeks to 
move on discussion and dialogue from “education for all” towards “learning for all” as public 
spending on education continues to increase.
2.2 The programmatic VFM assessment will be carried out every year focusing on one 
sector/subsector as part of the medium term work program with the PER. The next value for 
money analysis should be in health, with roads likely next in line. There is no intention to return 
to VFM in education every year. Education is a good sector to start with because there is a 
wealth of data on educational performance in Tanzania, as well as on education spending. This 
includes administrative data on enrolment, drop-out and exam results, also household surveys 
and special, targeted surveys.
EDUCATION SPENDING AND RESULTS: NATIONAL TRENDS
Strong commitment on spending levels; current bias toward higher education  
2.3 Tanzania has a long history of continued substantial increases in education funding. The 
sector has consistently claimed the highest spending in the country’s budget. Figure 22 shows 
strong growth in overall education spending averaging 15-20 percent per year in 2007/8-
2010/11. Within this, the bill for higher education is growing fastest, so higher education is 
increasing its share. Most years, spending in the big primary and secondary schooling subsectors 
grows in real terms, but there are exceptional years. In per capita terms, spending on secondary 
education fell in real terms in 2008/09, it has since recovered. In per capita terms, spending on 
primary education fell in the 2010/11 budget. This is also expected to recover quickly. 
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Figure 22: Public Spending by Sub-sector 
Worsening primary enrollment and quality present a threat to value for money 
2.4 Learning outcomes and even enrollment rates have started to deteriorate in primary 
education. During the early 2000s, substantial gains in primary school enrollment rates were 
linked to universal primary education policies. Exam performance also improved during this 
period (figure 23), such that the numbers of children completing school and passing exams 
increased substantially—a major gain in learning outcomes. Since 2008, however, these 
performance benchmarks have been in decline. Primary school enrollment reached a plateau 
despite rapid population growth, which caused a drop in official gross enrollment rates. In 
addition, Primary School Leaving Exam (PSLE) pass rates, which had been improving until 
2007, had fallen from 70 percent to 50 percent of candidates by 2009. These factors combine to 
produce a decline in the proportion of children completing Standard VII (the final year of 
primary schooling) with a PSLE pass.  
 
2.5 Part of the explanation for deteriorating quality is linked to rapid expansion that started 
more than 7 years previously. The first universal primary education cohorts entered the primary 
system in 2002 and therefore started to exit in 2008 and 2009. These large numbers of children 
stretched resources, and most were educated in much larger class sizes than children a few years 
older, or a few grades ahead, in the same schools. So some deterioration in average quality was 
to be expected in this “universal primary education vanguard,” and this could partly explain the 
deterioration in the proportion of 13 years olds passing PSLE in 2008 and 2009. 
 
2.6 The issue of declining quality still represents a serious threat to value for money in 
education if it cannot be addressed. We can use a quality-adjusted unit cost to measure value for 
money in a very simple way – this is just the recurrent spending in education divided by the 
number of exam passers in a given year, and approximates to “cost per passer.”
4 The decline in 
                                                 
4 This unit cost is selected partly because it is simple, also because it relies on spending and exam results data. A 
theoretically superior indicator can be created using enrollment data and attrition rates to estimate costs of pupil-
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PSLE pass rates have been sufficient to raise the cost per passer, in real terms, 40 percent higher 
in 2009 than in 2007 (figure 24), which represents a substantial decline in value for money.  
Figure 23: Primary School Leavers Pass Rates  Figure 24: Public Expenditure per PSLE Passer 
(“cost per passer”) 
 
  
Outcomes deteriorated in 2007-2009, but the level of outcomes achieved in Tanzania was 
too low even in 2007. 
2.7 There is evidence that the quality of Tanzania’s primary education is low compared with 
that of neighboring countries and that the level of achievement is fundamentally inadequate as 
well as deteriorating. A forthcoming report by Uwezo
5 shows Tanzanian students performing 
much worse than students in Uganda and Kenya on comparable English, numeracy, and Swahili 
tests designed to represent a Standard II (8-9 year old) level of learning. It shows that many 
Tanzanian pupils take seven years to acquire the skills they should have acquired in two years. 
Figure 25, below, shows mathematics results. In Tanzania, only 18 percent of children in 
Standard III could pass the Standard II level test. Even by Standard VII, when children are at 
least 13 years old, only 68 percent pass the Standard II level test.  Learning outcomes at this level 
mean that near-universal access to primary school will not generate the benefits associated with a 
much stronger basic skills set in the population. In the worst case scenario, very poor quality in 
primary education has the potential to undermine the demand for education and threaten 
universal primary education gains. (Uwezo notes that the tests results are not good in any of the 
three countries, but they are worst in Tanzania). 
  
                                                 
5 “Learning Across East Africa,” Dorica Andrew and Hans Hoogeveen, Uwazi at Twaweza housed by Hivos 
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Figure 25: Results of Uwezo’s Standard-II (8-9 year old level) Mathematics Test in Pupils from Standard III 
to Standard VII (9-14 year olds) 
 
  
Secondary education sees impressive expansion, but also suffers severe quality problems 
2.8 Historically, participation in post-primary education in Tanzania has been low by any 
standards, certainly by the standards of the East African Cooperation. In 2000, just 47,000 
students—approximately 5 percent of 17 year olds in the country—were candidates for Form 4 
exams
6. It was vital to address this very low level of post-primary education which would form a 
real constraint to labor-using, poverty reducing growth in the country.  This has been addressed 
very impressively. In 2005, there were 355,000 students enrolled in government secondary 
schools; another 65,000 were enrolled in private schools. By 2010, the numbers had grown to 1.4 
million in government schools and 237,000 in private schools, which represents an annual 
growth rate of 31 percent; with that growth rate, the secondary GER rose from 9.4 percent to 
32.4 percent in five years. Even higher enrollment rates are already built into the system because 
of student numbers in Forms 1 and 2 (first two years of secondary school). 
2.9 During this period of enrollment expansion, public spending grew fast at 19 percent per 
annum in real terms, but at a rate that failed to keep up with the expansion of the school 
population. As a consequence, by 2008/09, real expenditure per student had fallen to half the 
2005/06 level. There was some recovery in 2010/11, but spending rates continue to fall short of 
increased rates of enrollment. 
2.10 Severe quality problems in Tanzania’s secondary education sector pose serious current 
and future challenges with regard to value for money. Quotation of pass rates is hampered by the 
existence of “Division IV,” which is the lowest division in the Form 4 CSEE (Certificate of 
Secondary Education Exam) above a fail and is not sufficient to allow entry to Form 5. 
Therefore, a useful pass is one in Divisions I to III. If Division IV is treated as a pass in the main 
Form 4 exam, public spending per CSEE passer is now increasing: the cost per CSEE passer rose 
from TShs 826,000 in 2008 to TShs 1.04 million in 2009.  Since 2007, the number of Division 
IV passes has been increasing to the point where a majority of students fail CSEE and the 
majority of the rest get a Division IV, quasi-fail. Division I-III fell from 27 percent in 2008 to 18 
                                                 
6 Most secondary school students leave at Form 4, but some stay on into “6




















































































percent of students in 2009, and in 2010 this has fallen to just 9 percent of candidates. Therefore, 
a better measure of value for money looks at “costs per passer,” including only Division I-III 
passes. This cost per passer is high and increasing fast—from TShs 3.8 million in 2008 to TShs 
8.2 million in 2010—a clear indicator of current value for money problems. For comparison, 
recall that cost per passer in primary is only TShs 1.6 million.  
Figure 26: Children in Secondary School  Figure 27: % CSEE Candidates at Grade 
   
2.11 There are other signs that severe quality problems are pervasive in secondary schools. In 
2009, approximately 4 percent of secondary schools had an average grade point average (GPA) 
score of 3 or less (in Tanzania, GPA equates to average “division” so 4 is average Division IV, 
while 1 represents the best, Division I pass achieved in everything). This means that the average 
candidate in 96 percent of schools scored either Division IV or Fail on the CSEE exam. Without 
attention to quality, Tanzania risks producing large numbers of very poorly educated and 
unemployable Form 4 “graduates.” This would not represent value for money. 
2.12 There are also signs that secondary school teachers in the hugely expanded system may 
not be equipped to teach the course. A study on service delivery indicators
7 tests teachers against 
the curriculum they are teaching. In mathematics, less than 50 percent of teachers passed the 
tests necessary to teach for CSEE, and in English language, which is the language of instruction 
in Tanzanian secondary schools, only 25 percent of teachers passed the test. This suggests that 
overstretched resources and the lack of available staff could be causing serious quality problems.  
 
                                                 
7 “Delivering Service Indicators: Pilot in Education and Health Care in Africa,” AERC/Hewlett Foundation/World 
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Key issues are different in higher education: unit costs are under control, but without 
student loan reflows, affordability is in doubt 
2.13 Historically, Tanzania has had very, very low participation in higher education, but as 
with secondary education, the country has made great strides in the last five years, with 
enrollment growth the same as in secondary education, 31 percent per annum. Error! Reference 
source not found. shows that Tanzania now approaches neighboring countries in terms of higher 
learning enrollment rates. There is no evidence of a collapse in quality in tertiary education. 
Public spending in higher education has been increasing faster than that for secondary education, 
but spending per enrollee has still fallen so unit costs are under control.  
2.14 There is a cost-recovery instrument for higher education, but currently it generates very  2.14 There is a cost-recovery instrument for higher education, but currently it generates very 
little revenue – higher education is becoming very expensive for government. Since 2005 a large 
and increasing share of the higher education budget has been financed through the student loans 
scheme. This is intended to reduce the burden of higher education on the public purse, and in fact 
the public spending per student other than the loan has decreased substantially since 2005 (figure 
25). Cost-recovery is important because by 2010, higher education was taking 28 percent of the 
education budget, compared with just 16 percent for secondary and 40 percent for primary 
(figure 20 above). A major challenge for the whole education sector, therefore, is how to 
generate reflows (repayments) under the student loan scheme.  
2.15 Student loan reflows are more about affordability than value for money. They are also an 
issue for equity, since the majority of higher education students are from, and stay within, the top 
20 percent of Tanzania’s income spectrum, and the individual education subsidy they enjoy 
under current arrangements is unjustifiably high (without loan repayments). Public expenditure 
per 20-23 year old in higher education is higher than public expenditure per 7-13 year old in 
primary education, despite the fact that there is only 4 percent enrollment of 20-23 year olds and 
near universal enrollment of 7-13 year olds. Having tertiary education is a very good predictor of 
having a high income. 
Table 16: Trend in Tertiary Gross Enrollment Rates 
(%GER) in East African Countries 
Figure 28: Public Expenditure per University 
Student per year, TShs 2010 Prices 








































BEYOND THE AVERAGES: UNEQUAL FUNDING, UNEQUAL OUTPUTS, AND LOCAL INEFFICIENCIES
At district level, funding, social conditions, and educational outcomes are persistently 
unequal
2.16 This report draws on analysis of district level data gathered from the EMIS system, 
Necta, various household surveys, and financial data from MoF and President Office Regional 
Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG). It is already well known that there is 
persistent high inequality across districts in Tanzania in terms of public spending per capita 
(figure 26), educational outcomes, and social conditions. This produces a lot of variation in the 
“universal” service offered: in some districts, there are fewer than 30 children for each primary 
school teacher, while in others the number is closer to 80 (figure 27). This variation carries 
through to outcomes: in some districts, 15 percent of 13 year olds can expect to pass PSLE, 
while in others over 90 percent can expect to pass (figure 28). In general, the worst served 
districts tend to have worse social conditions. This is probably because it is more difficult to 
attract teachers to these remote, poor areas
8. Figure 29 shows higher poverty in districts with 
least education spending. 
 
Figure 29: Primary Education Budget per Capita 
across Districts – Persistent Inequality 
Figure 30: Children per Primary School teacher – 
District Average Ranges from 30 to 80 
                                                 
8 There is strong evidence already available that the high variation in expenditure per capita on education (and other 
services) in each district mainly occurs in wage expenditure and is driven by very unequal deployment of staff. 
Annual efforts to redeploy staff to underserved areas are defeated by in-year transfers to other areas. There are no 
effective limits on the recruitment of staff in highly staffed districts, and there is very little scope for creating 
incentives for staff to remain in districts with recruitment and retention difficulties. See “Equity and Efficiency in 
Service Delivery: Human Resources,” Background Analytical Note for the Annual Review of GBS 2008 (Tanzania); 
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per cent of the population below the poverty line
Figure 31: PSLE Passes per 13 Year Old – District 
Average Ranges from 0.2 to 1.1 in 2008 
Figure 32: Higher Poverty Rates in Districts with 
Less Spending 
 
Social conditions affect outcomes 
2.17 We would expect poor social conditions to make learning outcomes more difficult to 
achieve, and we know that poor social conditions tend to mean less resources, too, so it is no 
surprise that poor social conditions are strongly correlated with worse educational performance 
(Figures 33-35). 
Figure 33: Poverty and Passers per 13 Year  Olds, 
2008 
(-32% correlation) 
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Figure 35: Adult Literacy and Passers per 13 Year 
Old, 2008 
(60% correlation)  
A strong relationship can be observed between different levels of spending and different results, so 
unequal spending patterns really matter  
2.18 There are strong theoretical reasons to think that, all else being equal, increased resources 
should produce improved results in education. This is why we have public spending in education. 
However, it is often difficult to find empirical evidence for this relationship. In many 
international settings, usually where average levels of resources are higher and the differences 
between resource levels in different schools and districts is less pronounced, it is difficult to see 
this relationship or confirm this theory. Other factors seem to dominate: things like the children’s 
ability, the unobserved quality of teachers, and managerial effectiveness/teacher incentives, 
which are also very hard to observe. All these other factors exist in Tanzania too, so it is not 
obvious that we will see a strong relationship between resources and outcomes in Tanzania. 
2.19 By modeling educational outcomes as a function of resources, controlling for social 
factors, we do in fact see a strong correlation between resources and outcomes in Tanzania. This 
actually explains 72 percent of the wide variation in outcomes (PSLE passes) in primary 
education in Tanzania. The relationship is also observable in secondary education, but weaker 
(40 percent fit). The plot in Figure 36 gives an idea of the strong relationship between an input 
(teachers) and exam passes looking across districts in Tanzania. This is an important result 
because it means the highly unequal resource allocation in Tanzania is at least significantly 
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Figure 36: More Teachers Means More Exam Passes (controlling for social 
conditions) 
 
There is also strong evidence that uneven spending patterns are inefficient 
2.20 The level of spending in a given setting relates to efficiency if there are diminishing 
returns or variable scale economies; in Tanzania, there is clear evidence that this is the case.  
Without using too many economic terms, we might theorize that an extra teacher or other input 
would have a lot more impact in very underserved areas (where there are hardly any teachers) 
than in other areas where there are already many teachers. In fact the standard
9 estimation 
supports this. Estimates of exam-passers against expenditures show decreasing returns at all 
levels, which means that all else being equal, the cost per passer is lower in underserved districts 
than better served districts and that the expected impact of an additional teacher or more 
resources would be greater in underserved districts than in much better served districts
10. There 
was little additional return on any investment made in excess of TShs 18,000 per capita. Thus, 
efficiency and equity would be served by the same incremental changes to resource allocation, 
and a more equitable distribution of resources might also be more efficient.
Social conditions and resources don’t explain it all: there is substantial inefficiency in some 
districts, which must have a local cause, and this is a critical value for money issue 
2.21 Social conditions and resources have an important impact on school system performance, 
but local managerial effectiveness and/or local teacher incentives seem to cause very significant 
variations in performance too. For example, there is evidence of substantial absenteeism in 
Tanzania: a recent study
11 shows that teachers spend only about a third of their contracted hours 
in class, and therefore that on average, children can expect only two hours of contact per day 
                                                 
9 Standard Cobb-Douglas or log-linear production function gives decreasing returns 
10 Variation in functional form, such as polynomial function, confirms decreasing returns nature of the production 
function 
11 “Delivering Service Indicators: Pilot in Education and Health Care in Africa,” AERC/Hewlett Foundation/World 













































teachers per 7-13 year old  (log scale)
coef = 1.1398165, se = .10883653, t = 10.47 
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with a teacher in a classroom in primary school. If the rate of absenteeism is highly variable (the 
study shows much worse absenteeism in urban areas), it would be likely to have an impact on 
learning outcomes. This effect might be completely separate from the effects of level of 
resources and social conditions. The previous paragraphs describe the estimation of a simple 
production function that seemed to explain 50-70 percent of the variation in performance, but 
this leaves out the determinants of local managerial effectiveness and/or teacher incentives. They 
may well be as important as the other factors in explaining performance.  
2.22 An examination of unit cost (cost per passer) shows extraordinary variation across 
Tanzania, from approximately TShs 0.5 million to over TShs 2.0 million (figure 37). This alone 
suggests that local managerial effectiveness and/or local teacher incentives have a major impact 
on value for money in Tanzania, because it is impossible for such a variation in cost per passer to 
arise because of diminishing returns to scale alone. 
 
Figure 37: Distribution of average unit cost: 
Recurrent expenditure per PSLE passer: district average 
ranges from TShs 0.5m to 2.5m in 2008  
2.23 We can create a better measure of efficiency that allows for the impact on unit cost of 
other factors like social conditions and the level of spending/diminishing returns. Previous 
paragraphs described the relationship between resources and outputs from an estimate that 
controlled for social conditions. This relationship makes it possible to estimate the level of exam 
performance each district should be producing with average efficiency for Tanzania. The ratio of 
actual and predicted performance is then a measure of efficiency—an efficiency ratio, such that a 
ratio of actual: predicted performance greater than one means high efficiency, and a ratio below 
one means low efficiency. Unlike cost per passer, this measure controls for other cost factors (in 
this case, social conditions and diminishing returns). Overall the efficiency measure is correlated 
(63 percent) with cost per passer, but in some cases high cost per passer is expected because of 
social conditions and isn’t measured as particularly inefficient, and in other cases, low cost per 
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We can identify specific districts with very high efficiency and low unit cost 
 
2.24 The following group of seven districts did very well on unit cost (cost per passer) and on 
the efficiency measure (table 17). They are not necessarily the most efficient districts in 
Tanzania, but they are certainly among them on both unit cost and technical efficiency ratio 
measures. On average, the unit cost of producing a PSLE passer in this group is TShs 659,000 in 
2008. This is 38 percent below the national average of TShs 1,062,499 per passer in the same 
year.  
2.25 The group has social indicators and spending levels which are close to the national 
average. In fact, social indicators are slightly better than average: only 87 percent of the national 
average for poverty; average (though variable) mortality rates for children under the age of five; 
and above average adult literacy rates. Education spending is about 5 percent above the average 
level. In view of these indicators, this set of districts should perform modestly better than the 
national average in terms of learning outcomes and costs per passer. (Note there is variation 
within the group: Njombe Rural, for example, has a low level of spending.) 
Table 17: Some of the Most Efficient Primary School Districts in Tanzania 
 






























URBAN  690,360  1.36  15,657  45.3  100.2 27.4  138.0  77.2 
LUDEWA  722,647  1.37  19,195  37.8  117.3 24.1  159.5  81.6 
KYELA 736,148  1.43  18,020  42.0  108.1 23.8  172.0  74.4 
NJOMBE RURAL  718,514  1.46  10,499  43.0  88.6 25.0  165.5  79.0 
KILOMBERO 574,287  1.47  11,581  46.6  89.1 29.0  160.0  75.2 
MUFINDI  624,326  1.54  15,128  40.7  107.0 32.3  159.5  76.0 
MBULU 553,223  1.76  12,332  40.1  98.5 49.3  107.0  66.6 
Average this group  659,929  1.48  14,630  42.2  101.3 30.1  151.6  75.7 
Average district  1,062,499   0.99  13,869  45.6  64.5 34.3  151.0  68.5 
 
2.26 In fact this group has far better learning outcomes than could be expected given social 
conditions and spending levels, and this is why their efficiency measure is so high. The 
background factors mean that in comparison with the national pattern, these districts should be 
able to generate an above average rate of 69-72 passes per 100 13 year olds. These districts 
manage to achieve more than 100 PSLE passes per 100 estimated 13 year olds in the district. 
This puts them on Tanzania’s productivity “frontier.” This provides a useful benchmark group by 










We can also describe a group with very low efficiency and high unit costs 
2.27 The next group comprises 16 districts that perform badly both on simple unit cost 
measures (cost per passer) and the efficiency measure; they are far from Tanzania’s efficient 
production frontier (table 18). 
Table 18: Some of the least Efficient Primary School Districts in Tanzania 
 




























KONDOA 1,489,672  0.60  12,581  50.5  37.3  20.9  110.0  68.6 
MASASI  2,278,683  0.61  12,344  52.0  33.0  37.4  225.0  68.7 
UKEREWE 1,488,731  0.61  12,522  50.1  37.2  48.4  176.0  78.1 
RUANGWA  1,729,542  0.62  11,352  58.5  29.0  29.7  249.5  58.4 
SHINYANGA RURAL  1,719,680  0.63  11,941  62.4  30.7  42.7  145.0  56.6 
KASULU 1,475,025  0.63  11,236  62.4  33.7  40.4  109.0  64.4 
KIBONDO 1,519,330  0.63  10,376  87.2  30.2  39.4  136.0  59.0 
KISHAPU 1,541,079  0.64  10,679  67.1  30.6  45.7  147.0  60.9 
SIKONGE 2,390,588  0.64  20,467  66.0  37.8  42.5  139.0  48.6 
LINDI URBAN  1,686,152  0.67  20,354  46.5  53.3  18.3  159.0  70.9 
MPANDA RURAL  1,608,936  0.69  10,098  67.6  31.3  37.6  164.0  58.0 
SAME  1,371,369  0.69  21,743  33.4  70.0  34.1  84.0  89.8 
MEATU 1,609,327  0.69  10,886  64.6  29.9  52.9  172.0  54.5 
NACHINGWEA  1,389,183  0.70  12,439  52.4  39.6  41.4  197.5  71.0 
KAHAMA 1,413,736  0.71  10,883  68.8  34.0  37.3  127.0  56.7 
KONGWA 1,342,471  0.79  11,105  62.2  36.5  40.2  195.0  57.5 
Average this group  1,628,344  0.66  13,188  59.5  37.1  38.1  158.4  63.9 
Average district  1,062,499  0.99  13,869  45.6  64.5  34.3  151.0  68.5 
 
2.28 Again, social conditions are close to average in this group, as is the level of public 
spending on education. If anything, these districts are slightly disadvantaged, compared with the 
national average, and there is much variation within the group. They are also funded slightly 
worse, on average. Relative to the national pattern, this group of districts is predicted to achieve 
only slightly worse than average results of about 56-57 passers per 100 13 year olds.  
2.29 This group has performed much worse, however, than the national pattern would predict 
given local conditions.  Exam performance is very poor—just 37.1 passes per 100 13 year olds 
on average—which means a 13 year old from these districts has one half the normal chance of 
passing PSLE. The efficiency scores are all low: averaging 66 percent compared with 148 
percent in the previous group. As a result, unit costs/costs per passer are also very high; these 
districts manage to spend TShs 1,628,344 for each PSLE passer produced in 2008, 60 percent 







Unfortunately, most districts are quite far from the “efficiency frontier” in Tanzania 
 
2.30 Figure 38 shows that most of Tanzania’s districts are far from the green “efficiency 
frontier” and that some are extremely inefficient. The graph plots expenditure per capita against 
PSLE passers per 13 years old in each district. The most efficient districts are highlighted in 
green, most inefficient in red. Districts in vertical alignment have the same public spending per 
capita, including those near the red and green lines. At around TShs 12,000 per capita (purple 
vertical dashed line) there are clusters near the green line and the red line, where spending is very 
similar but where exam performance is about three times better on the green line than the red 
line. Far to the right of the panel, there is also a sub-group of three inefficient districts (Sikonge, 
Lindi Urban, and Same) that are well resourced and have mostly good social conditions. These 
districts’ primary education spending rises above TShs 20,000 per capita, and they have achieved 
below average poverty rates and above average adult literacy rates. They are predicted to 
generate over 80 PSLE passes per 100 13 year olds but actually they manage only 53, which 
demonstrates that even districts that enjoy relative advantages can be inefficient. 
Figure 38: “Frontier” Group Circled in Green – Highly Inefficient Districts Circled in Red 
 
2.31 The evidence documents how some seriously underperforming districts in Tanzania have 
unexplained high local costs and/or are wasting resources. This sometimes has nothing to do 
with insufficient resources or poor social conditions but is due to much more local factors. In 
some ways, this is good news, because managerial or teacher inefficiency should be a more 
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WHAT IS THE SCALE OF INEFFICIENCY?
Potential efficiency savings, if causes can be identified, could be up to TShs 310 billion per 
annum in primary education alone; this is 1 percent of GDP 
2.32 What is the potential for savings if laggard districts can be made more efficient? How 
much the 16 most would identified high cost districts save were they to achieve average 
efficiency? What if all 40 below average districts achieved average efficiency? Or what if all 
Tanzania’s districts achieved the same sort of efficiency as exhibited by the green group of 
districts close to the efficiency frontier?  
Table 19: If these 14 Districts Achieved Normal Efficiency, they would save TShs 38 billion 














achieve given PSLE (from 
normal prediction) 




KONDOA   1,489,672       12,581  37.3  4,518   4.10 
MASASI    2,278,683       12,344  33.0  4,549   2.96 
UKEREWE   1,488,731       12,522  37.2  4,688   2.43 
RUANGWA    1,729,542       11,352  29.0  4,360   1.03 
SHINYANGA RURAL    1,719,680       11,941  30.7  4,723   2.37 
KASULU   1,475,025       11,236  33.7  4,501   5.01 
KIBONDO   1,519,330       10,376  30.2  4,211   3.03 
KISHAPU   1,541,079       10,679  30.6  4,374   1.79 
SIKONGE   2,390,588       20,467  37.8  8,427   1.90 
LINDI URBAN    1,686,152       20,354  53.3  9,195   0.54 
MPANDA RURAL    1,608,936       10,098  31.3  4,771   2.30 
SAME    1,371,369       21,743  70.0  10,352   2.86 
MEATU   1,609,327       10,886  29.9  5,165   1.69 
NACHINGWEA    1,389,183       12,439  39.6  6,123   1.21 
KAHAMA   1,413,736       10,883  34.0  5,466   3.82 
KONGWA   1,342,471       11,105  36.5  6,929   1.23 
MEAN   1,628,344       13,188  37.1  5,851  
TOTAL SAVINGS  TShs38.3bn
 
2.33 If the 16 districts in tables 18 and 19 were to move to average efficiency, they would save 
TShs 38.3 billion(table 19). For example, Kasulu should be able to achieve 33.7 passers per 100 
13 year olds for an outlay of just TShs 4,501 per capita, whereas the district now spends TShs 
11,236 per capita, wasting TShs 6,735 per person or TShs 4.14 billion per annum in total. 
Current waste in these districts totals TShs 38.3 billion (Table 19). 
2.34 Finally, what would be the cost savings if all districts achieved a similar unit cost to the 
“frontier” districts? This would be an average TShs 660,000 per passer compared with the 
average (in 2008) of TShs 1,062,000, or a 38 percent saving across the entire recurrent primary 
education budget. For 2008, this would have meant saving over TShs 250 billion. By 2010, this 
saving could rise to an estimated TShs310 billion, equal to nearly 1 percent of GDP being wasted 
on inefficiency in primary education each year.  
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Potential performance and equity gains if efficiency savings, or new resources, are deployed in 
different sets of districts:- it’s equitable and efficient to direct resources to the least served districts 
2.35 Section 1 recounts how Tanzania’s very unequal distribution of resources for primary 
education is persistent over time. Somehow, the system continues to deliver the bulk of 
discretionary resources to districts that are already well served and may not be very efficient. The 
finding was that additional resources for the best served districts had hardly any impact, whereas 
much greater impact would be predicted, in general, in less well served districts. However, this is 
a stylized finding, holding other things equal. The finding might be mitigated by the fact that less 
well served areas are often those with worse social characteristics and higher poverty that could 
be underlying causes of higher costs. Many of them might also have severe management 
problems causing inefficiency. Factoring all this in, is it still a good idea to try to direct resources 
to the worst served districts? 
2.36 This question can be examined by estimating the impact of an additional TShs 50 billion 
in primary education spending in different groups of districts: quintiles arranged according to 
2008 primary education spending per capita. In figure 38, underserved districts are shown on the 
left and better served districts on the right.  
Figure 39: Estimated PSLE Passers for an Extra TShs 50 billion Spent in Each of Five Groups of Districts, 




2.37 Figure 39 shows the TShs 50 billion spent in underserved/middling or better served 
districts under two different sets of assumptions. The first assumption is constant unit cost. This 
is just a comparison of the average unit costs in underserved and better served areas. In fact, they 
don’t differ very much, so the TShs 50 billion produces about 50,000 new PSLE passers 
regardless of which quintile receives it. Poorer social conditions in the underserved areas aren’t 
enough to push up the unit cost very much, on average. However, this assumption is not realistic, 
as unit costs are not constant. Rather, costs increase with scale. The constant unit cost 
assumption produces very significant overestimates. This itself is instructive: this is why we 


































































































2.38 The second set of assumptions produces the bars highlighted in red because it should 
produce the best estimates. Here, the assumption is that the managerial/teaching inefficiencies 
observed with current resources are preserved in the use of the new resources in each district, 
and the Cobb-Douglas production function described above is used to estimate the impact of an 
extra TShs 50 billion in each set of districts, holding social conditions and efficiency constant. 
This assumption has a great impact on individual districts because some are so much more 
efficient than others. Across quintiles, however, the effect is greatly muted. Results are similar to 
the constant unit cost estimates except that far less extra performance is estimated. However, also 
note that the least well served areas get more out of an extra TShs 50bn than the rest.  
2.39 Overall, this is strong evidence in favor of distributing incremental resources, or the 
proceeds from efficiency savings, to the worst served districts, although this presents difficulties 
in administration and implementation.  
District level information could be used to target incremental resources in an even better 
way 
 
2.40 In the interests of equity and efficiency, the authorities could try to target districts that are 
both underserved and efficient. If resources could be absorbed in those districts (which would 
require that staff could be persuaded to stay in them) then very good learning impact could be 
expected. Table 20 shows twelve districts with very low levels of spending but reasonable or 
good efficiency and with average or low cost per passer. It would be good for equity and 
efficiency to target these districts for extra resources using the current education system, but with 
measures to make sure staff could be retained (an exception might be Njombe Rural, which is so 
efficient that it manages to achieve great results even with meager resources). The list in table 20 
excludes underserved districts that are very inefficient. 
Table 20: Underserved Districts with Good Efficiency 
 
(2008 data and prices)  expenditure per 
capita   cost per passer  efficiency score  passes per 13 year old 
BIHARAMULO  4,794  810,584  2.18  74% 
MONDULI  9,046  1,077,606  1.48  68% 
NAMTUMBO 9,735  871,840  1.03  54% 
MVOMERO  9,747  673,216  1.22  70% 
BUKOBA RURAL  10,065  1,181,949  1.07  68% 
GEITA 10,255  945,251  1.07  53% 
NJOMBE RURAL*  10,499  718,514  1.46  97% 
TEMEKE  10,631  699,482  0.99  74% 
NGARA  10,647  913,169  1.00  57% 
SIMANJIRO  10,660  837,316  1.01  62% 
KILOLO 10,697  758,269  1.08  69% 
MTWARA RURAL  10,842  929,555  1.29  57% 
 
2.41 In very inefficient districts, underserved or otherwise, outcomes are bad but extra 
resources cannot be expected to help very much unless something is done to address the chronic 
inefficiency. This might involve management innovations or new service delivery models. The 





2.42 The findings below propose strategies for improving value for money in the Tanzanian 
system. This should not detract from the fundamental finding that Tanzania’s bold changes in 
education policy in the last decade have been highly beneficial and have either represented value 
for money already or should represent good value for money in the future. Tanzania has virtually 
achieved the primary education MDG at low cost, overall. There is room for efficiency gains in 
primary education but there is still need for more resources in that subsector. The rapid 
expansion of post-primary education is overdue and developmentally strategic. It is going well in 
higher education, although cost recovery needs to be improved. In secondary education, quality 
problems are undermining the benefits so far, but that doesn’t mean the expansion was a mistake; 
enrolling only 5 percent of the age group in secondary education would be disastrous for 
Tanzania’s future growth and poverty reduction. In secondary education, the expansion policy 
needs to be followed up, not reversed.  
x It is essential to find a way to shift incremental resources for primary education to the 
worst served areas. Inequalities are pronounced, and there is strong evidence that shifting 
incremental resources to the worst served areas is likely to improve efficiency rather than 
reduce it (this is the new finding from this note). District specific knowledge could be 
used to target underserved yet efficient districts, with different treatment for highly 
inefficient districts. 
 
x There is a strong need to examine what’s going on in districts identified as highly 
inefficient, unrelated to the level of resources or social conditions, but probably related to 
local management effectiveness or teacher incentives (“governance” issues). These 
districts might be able to generate efficiency gains or greatly improve their performance. 
More resources with no other change probably won’t improve things much in these 
districts. 
 
x Overall, there is a major problem with quality in primary education. Given that Tanzania 
now spends significant sums on primary education, poor quality is a value for money 
issue across the system. Moreover, at a national level, poor quality could undermine the 
demand for education among poor groups in the future.  
 
x Secondary education is both a triumph and a problem. The triumph is that the speed of 
expansion has been extraordinary and has made great progress in rectifying Tanzania’s 
historic deficit in post-primary education. The corresponding problem is that resources 
are spread more and more thinly over the increasing numbers of pupils, which is creating 
a critical quality problem in secondary education outside a small group of excellent 
schools. This destroys value for money, as in 2010, Tanzania spent more than TShs 8 
million for every DIV I-III CSEE passer. Part of the cause is probably the low availability 
of suitably skilled teachers.  
 
x Higher education is too expensive without more cost recovery. Evidence presented in this 
report does not indicate a collapse in quality in higher education. It seems that the 
expansion, as rapid as that in secondary education, has taken place in higher education  
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with reasonable cost control. However, costs were high to start with and the strategy for 
recovering more of them from graduates via the loan scheme cannot work unless the loan 
scheme starts to generate reflows. At the moment, tertiary education is on course to 
overtake primary education as the largest share of the education budget, but only 4 
percent of the population will go to university, and this cohort derives largely from the 











3.1 Reforms undertaken to strengthen strategic planning, budget processes, service 
delivery, and public financial management have achieved varied degrees of success, but all 
are moving in the right direction. Overall, however, national program efforts have not given 
sufficient attention to the need to link national priorities to public investment or to monitoring 
and evaluating program results. Consequently, there is no central mechanism or process in place 
to guide translation of national strategic plans into policy reforms and expenditure programs 
(including, and most important, public investment).  
 
3.2 Strategic plans, like MKUKUTA II and Tanzania Development Vision (TDV) 2025, 
are developed and linked to strategic plans related to energy, education, health, and other 
sectors, but the Tanzanian government has no systemic monitoring and evaluation 
mechanism in place to ascertain whether the desired results are achieved. In fact, the 
process for systematically gathering information about the impact of public expenditures and 
public investment and analyzing their relevance and impact remains weak. Neither the Ministry 
of Finance (MoF) nor the President’s Office Planning Commission (POPC) collects information 
about public investment project outputs and outcomes, nor has the government established 
whose responsibility it would be to do so. Information is collected solely at the line ministerial 
level.  
 
3.3 Also lacking is a process for collecting information about social and economic cost 
and benefits during project preparation. This makes it virtually impossible to analyze each 
proposed project’s
12 relevance to growth and poverty reduction and hampers the 
government’s ability to compare projects. Without a process that collects relevant project 
information, it is impossible to prioritize projects and arrive at an efficient allocation of 
resources. Individual sectors do make an effort to prioritize their expenditures in their respective 
sectors, but this does not guarantee an efficient and effective allocation of resources at the 
national level.  
 
3.4 It is time to connect the dots and combine the various sectoral strategic plans into 
one national, cross-sectoral implementation strategy. It is encouraging that the POPC has 
been tasked with such an exercise. However, to bear its intended fruits, this exercise must 
employ a system for examining uniform and comparable data on projects and expenditure 
programs, which will provide a basis for comparing project effectiveness across the whole of 
government. Again, it is encouraging that the MoF has recognized this and is in the process of 
setting up a unit to monitor the effectiveness of programs and projects supported through the 
                                                 
12 A project should be seen as a specific activity with given starting and ending points, intended to accomplish 
specific objectives. Projects can involve current expenditure, such as a technical assistance project, but some 
investment expenditures may not be done as a project, as with routine procurement of administrative equipment. 
Most investment spending, though, consists of projects (see Allen 2001).    
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budget. However, it is unclear how each of these tasks will interact with one another as they are 
housed in different institutions. 
MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT OF TANZANIA’S PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAM
 
3.5 Tanzania’s economy performed strongly over the past decade, backed by economic 
liberalization between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, sound macroeconomic policy 
management, and an expanding public sector. GDP growth accelerated from 3.5 percent on 
average in the 1990s to approximately 7 percent over the past decade, outpacing the average for 
sub-Saharan Africa. While drought conditions had significant adverse impact on the agriculture 
sector, GDP maintained at approximately 6.5 percent in years with poor rainfalls. Far-reaching 
structural reforms between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, prudent macroeconomic policies, a 
favorable global environment, and debt relief provided the foundation for this success. 
Government spending had experienced extraordinary growth since 2001, financed by a 
significant broadening of the revenue base and scaled-up donor assistance. 
 
3.6 Despite sustained high economic growth, Tanzania is on track to meet only half of 
the MDGs by 2015. On the positive side, increased government spending and lower relative 
import prices led to improvements in consumer durables (mobile phones, televisions, and bed 
nets), housing quality, and access to education and healthcare, as indicated by increased 
enrollment in primary education, lower infant and under-five mortality, and reduced HIV 
prevalence. On the negative side, progress has been very limited in terms of basic needs income 
poverty, ownership of productive assets in rural areas, maternal mortality, and access to safe 
water. While Tanzania has seen marked progress on access to education and healthcare, the 
quality of social services, especially education, is low. Moreover, social services vary among 
districts, owing to inequity in allocations of resources and infrastructure gaps that block access to 
services. 
 
3.7 To pursue more inclusive and sustainable growth, the government has recognized 
the need to invest in complementary public investment that can help to unleash private 
sector potential. The private sector contribution to growth and poverty reduction has been 
subdued, curtailed by serious supply constraints. The costs of basic inputs for private business 
(transport, power, water, contract enforcement, and legal protection) remain very high, while 
inefficient factor markets and undue regulatory burdens undermine investment incentives. The 
government has called for a shift toward a greater role of the private sector in the Second 
National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (known by its Kiswahili acronym, 
MKUKUTA II), endorsed by the newly elected government in November, 2010. 
 
3.8 MKUKUTA II prioritizes investment in infrastructure development as a catalyst for 
private sector led growth. However, a potential substantial financing gap in Tanzania’s budget 
and the lack of an implementation plan may adversely affect implementation. MKUKUTA II 
identifies infrastructure sectors, including transportation, energy, and water supply, as “drivers of 
growth.” To scale up investment in these sectors, MKUKUTA II aims to limit growth of 





3.9 Development expenditures are projected to increase by 5.5 percent of GDP during 
MKUKUTA II between FY2009/10 and FY2014/15. In the last five years, though, 
development expenditure expanded by a modest 1.3 percentage points as a percentage of GDP 
(Table 21). This expansion was supported mainly by improved domestic revenue mobilization 
and increased external financing. Recurrent expenditure and financing through grants reduced 
the ability over the last five years to increase development expenditures. Going forward, a 5.5 
percent of GDP increase in development expenditures is to come mainly from a large increase in 
domestic revenue collection and controlled growth in recurrent expenditures. Indeed, 
MKUKUTA II is to absorb a significantly higher share of domestic revenue over time: from 60.7 
percent in 2010/11 to 84.4 percent in 2014/15. If domestic revenue expansion is less than 
projected and/or recurrent expenditure is not contained, implementation of infrastructure 
investment is likely to be jeopardized. At the same time, the government wants to reduce its 
dependency on donor funding and reduce its domestic borrowing.  
 
Table 21: Additional Availability of Resources for Development Expenditure (changes in % of 
GDP) 
2004/05 - 2009/10  2009/10 - 2014/15 
Domestic revenue/1  3.5  5.6 
Recurrent expenditure  -1.1  2.3 
Grants -3.2  -0.9 
Financing 
Foreign (net)  1.6  -0.7 
Domestic (net)  0.7  -0.9 
     
Development expenditure  1.3  5.5 
Source: IMF, MKUKUTA II or MoFEA, World Bank staff calculations 
/1: including adjustments  
 
3.10 While foreign aid grants have fallen and stalled recently, external borrowing has 
increased to support development expenditure expansion. As a percentage of GDP, foreign 
grants fell over 3 percent in the last five years. Both budget support and project support have 
declined (figure 37). While project support spiked to 2.8 percent of GDP in 2007/08, it has 
reduced to around 1.5 percent in 2009/10. Similarly, budget support, including basket support, 
has dropped to 3.1 percent of GDP in 2009/10 from 3.6 percent in 2007/08. In contrast, external 
borrowing rose by 1.6 percent of GDP in the last five years and was the main source of the 
deficit financing. Most recently, both budget and project related borrowing registered small 
increases in 2009/10, which compensated the declines in foreign grants (figure 38).  
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Figure 40: Foreign Aid Grants (% of GDP)  Figure 41: Foreign Borrowing (% of GDP) 
Source: RBA 2010, World Bank Staff calculation     Source: RBA 2010, World Bank Staff calculation 
Note: data for 2010/2011 are budget, and data for all other years are actual spending.
TANZANIA’S DEVELOPMENT BUDGET
3.11 Even though infrastructure remains a main bottleneck in Tanzania, capital 
expenditure remains a small portion of overall development expenditure in the 
government’s budget (figure 42). Development expenditure as a share of Tanzania’s total 
budget declined from 36.3 percent in 2007/08 to 30.5 percent in 2009/10, though it improved to 
35.5 percent in 2010/11. However, capital expenditure as a share of development expenditure has 
declined from over 60 percent to a little above 50 percent (figure 43). As a result, capital 
expenditure stands for less than one fifth of total public expenditure in 2010/11, or at 5.5 percent 
of GDP. This trend is inconsistent with the government’s commitment to make infrastructure 
investment a priority for a broader-based growth.  
 
Figure 42: Composition of the Budget 
(in % of GDP) 
Figure 43: Composition of the Budget 
(in % ) 
Source: MoF, World Bank Staff calculation 











2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11*
Project



























































3.12 The low percentage of the actual capital component of development expenditures 
indicates that a large part of development expenditures is spent on current expenditure 
components of Tanzania’s development programs or on programs that are of a technical 
assistance or of a recurrent nature. A holistic approach to the development budget and its 
linkage with growth and poverty reduction (for example, including all program related 
expenditures) is not undesirable, but it is important to present clearly what is capital investment, 
what is technical assistance, and what is of a service delivery nature (figure 41).  
 
3.13 Clearly, the development budget has evolved to include projects and programs that 
have a long lasting impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the government’s own 
internal operations (technical assistance); those that provide growth enhancing services to 
its population (service delivery), like extension services; and projects and programs that 
are of a capital investment nature. Consequently, it will be important for the public financial 
management systems in use in Tanzania to define and code more clearly what types of programs 
are to be considered as part of the development budget and subsequently of Tanzania’s public 
investment program. The current IFMIS and Tanzania’s system of accounts should be the 
starting point.  
 
Figure 44: Different Types of Public Expenditures 
 
 
Figure 45: Execution of Development Budget 
 
 
Source: Government of Tanzania – Draft Medium    Source: RBA 2010, World Bank Staff calculation 
Term Strategic Planning and Budgeting Manual     
 
3.14 The actual spending of the development budget still deviates significantly from the 
approved budget, particularly the foreign-funded component (figure 44). Overall, execution 
of capital budget at MDAs remains poor in 2009/10. Actual spending of capital budget 
accounted for a little more than 72 percent of the approved budget in 2009/10, a significant 
improvement from 53 percent in 2008/09. The poor performance is attributable mainly to the low 
execution rate of the foreign-funded component. The execution rate of the foreign-funded capital 
budget was as low as 40 percent in 2009/10, which represents little progress. Conversely, the 
execution rate of the local-funded component rose to 105 percent in 2009/10 from 76 percent in 
2008/09, underscoring the overall change in performance. A more detailed analysis of 



















even though most execution rates stagnated during the period under investigation, the execution 
rates for infrastructure markedly improved from a meager 39 percent for FY2007/08 to 78 
percent for FY2009/10 (figure 45).  
 
3.15 The Development Budget has addressed some of the pressing needs in road 
infrastructure and health but has reduced its allocations to the energy sector. Figure 46 
shows how the resources to six priority sectors have changed over the last four years. The 
reductions to the energy sector are striking and clearly create a bottleneck in Tanzania’s 
development, given the frequent blackouts. While this is a well known constraint to growth, the 
allocations under the development budget to the energy sector were actually reduced. If 
investments in the sector had been taken on by the private sector then this would not necessarily 
have been an issue. However, this does not seem to be the case (annex 2), which points to a 
likely coordination failure at the center of government wherein priorities are well known but 
budgetary resources needed to address the problems have not been allocated. The existing MTEF 
process and use within government could be used to better link national priorities with multi-year 
budgetary resources.  
 
Figure 46: Sectoral Execution of Development 
Budget 
Figure 47: Composition of Development Budget by 
Priority Sectors (% of GDP) 
Source: RBA 2010, World Bank Staff calculation 
 
ISSUES IN BUDGETING FOR DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA
Institutional arrangements 
3.16 MKUKUTA II emphasizes the need for stronger focus on prioritization of public 
interventions, both projects and programs. This will critically depend on the establishment 
of new procedures and processes and strong coordination among the various institutions 
involved. Currently, there is no clear definition of the roles of the various stakeholders at any 
level, whether the central (such as MoF and POPC); sectoral (such as sector ministries); or local 
(such as local government authorities) in public investment management. An essential first step 
to overcoming potential coordination failures is to agree on an institutional set up that will allow 
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In practice, governments should take a holistic approach when introducing PIM that takes into account the 
existing institutional framework. Approaches that emerge from PIM theories can be grouped in three broad 
categories, each with a different focus on institutional versus functional changes: 
1. The first approach is to create a new PIM institution to ensure that investment management functions are 
centralized and delivered with clear leadership and accountability. For example, the Canadian government 
set up a new department, Infrastructure Canada, in 2002 to better implement its infrastructure development 
plan. 
2. The second is to create a new PIM institution whose aim is to guide the strategic directions of investment 
management while reinforcing the coordination mechanisms of existing agencies responsible for investment 
management. Ireland adopted this approach by establishing the Economic and Social Research Institute for 
central planning while charging line ministries with the implementation. 
3. The final approach is to create a new PIM function for an existing entity, empowering the entity with 
extended responsibilities in investment management. The Gateway function of the UK Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) is a case in point.  
Approach I: Infrastructure Canada  
1. The reform has been centered around the encompassing infrastructure plan “Building Canada,” as a 
country-wide, well-funded program that addresses “the nation's most important economic and 
environmental priorities.”  
2. All work in the infrastructure area has aimed to foster knowledge and build capability in the key sectors of 
project design and management, including appraisal, evaluation and monitoring.  
3. Infrastructure Canada has appropriately developed and systematically promoted the methodology of project 
evaluation, providing detailed instructions, enforcement rules, and appropriate incentives.  
4. Through the leadership provided by Infrastructure Canada, the government has promoted information, 
participation and deliberative democracy of all relevant stakeholders. Such a promotion has been pursued 
itself via specific mechanisms led by the “National Roundtable on Sustainable Infrastructure.”  
5. This has been sustained through successful IT programs such as the Shared Information Management 
System for Infrastructure.  
Approach II: A new PIM institution for PIM strategic directions in Ireland 
1. ESRI and the National Plan: The Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) was founded with the 
objective to analyze the Irish socio-economic situation and to formulate a realistic and feasible strategy to 
achieve the country’s development and economic goals in a sustainable framework. For that purpose, it 
prepared the 2007-2013 National Development Plan, an independent and comprehensive study. 
2. Specialized Government authorities: The implementation of the plan actions remains the responsibility of 
the specialized government authorities, including two regional assemblies.  
3. A broad consensus building process with social and business partners on the strategy implementation and 
monitoring is guaranteed by the National Economic and Social Council (NESC).  
4. The council reports directly to the Prime Minister on issues regarding analysis and formulation of socio-
economic development strategies.  
Approach III: Gateway function of UK MoF  
Gateway function is an expanded and enhanced version of the Ministry of Finance’s traditional role of ensuring 
fiscal discipline and public financing control. Its goals are: 
1. delivery of value for money from third parties;  
2. delivery of projects to time, quality, and cost, realizing benefits;  
3. getting the best from the government's estate;  
4. improving the sustainability of the government estate and operations through stronger performance 
management and guidance;  
5. helping achieve delivery of further government policy goals, including innovation, equality, and support for 
small and medium enterprises; and  
6. driving forward the improvement of central government capability in procurement, project and program 
management, and estates management through the development of people skills, processes and tools. 
 
Based on Pasquale Scandizzo and Mauro Napodano 2010, “Public Investment Management: Linking Global  
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3.17 In the current literature on Public Investment Management, three broad models, 
each with a different institutional and functional organization, can be identified.
13 One 
model focuses on centralization of the PIM functions in a new central institution (the case of 
Canada); one model assigns the full PIM functions to an existing entity (the UK model); and the 
third model creates a new PIM institution that guides the strategic directions of public investment 
management while reinforcing the coordination mechanisms among existing stakeholders (the 
Irish model). Each of these models assigns different functions to different stakeholders (box 1). 
 
3.18 With the assignment of the planning function to the POPC in 2008, the government 
of Tanzania has de facto gone the route of the Irish model. Shortly after the elections in 2010, 
the President tasked the POPC with (i) review implementation of TDV 2025 to determine if its 
goals, objectives and targets are still relevant today, and subsequently improve upon the vision 
where necessary, and (ii) prepare a roadmap (Long Term Plan 2011-25) to implement the TDV 
2025, subdivided into three FYDPs, with time bound targets and indicators of progress to be 
delivered by each sector.  However, clear demarcation of responsibilities among the various 
stakeholders, in particular between MoF and POPC, still must be established. 
 
3.19 The government should first agree on a clear separation of functions in the PIM 
process between MoF and POPC. Even though other stakeholders, such as PMO, line 
ministries, and local governments, have important roles to play as well, it is important to agree 
first on the functions that MoF and POPC will undertake. MoF and POPC play critical roles in 
project appraisal and capital budgeting. The scope and intensity of their engagement can vary, 
depending on the degree of decentralization and performance budgeting and management being 
employed. However, even under a high degree of decentralization, these central agencies should 
take on a number of key functions (see box 2).
14  
 
3.20 The MoF and POPC should jointly design and agree on a decision making process 
that every public investment project will need to undergo before it will be considered for 
funding from the budget and/or through public private partnerships (PPPs). This gate 
keeping process should be an integral part of the project cycle through which each project will 
need to go. Such a process
15 should include the submission of standardized project information, 
and it should be rule based. A process like this is currently absent from the project cycle and 
would allow for better prioritization of projects. MoF and POPC could usefully form a small 
secretariat that would handle this process.  
 
3.21 Project monitoring is delegated directly to MDAs and local government authorities, 
while parliament is in charge of reviewing the public sector accounts, including 
development expenditures. Parliament is organized in three core committees: the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC), responsible for central government ministries, departments, and 
agencies (currently there are 43); the Local Authorities Accounts Committee (LAAC), 
responsible for local government authorities (currently there are 133); and a total of twenty one 
Public Organizations Accounts Committees (POAC), responsible for public and parastatal 
                                                 
13 See Scandizzo and Napodano (2010).  
14 Partly based on Graham Glenday (2010).  
15 The next section discusses the rational for a public investment program and the various stages of a project cycle. 
See also World Bank (2010)  
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companies (currently about 400). The parliament also comprises 18 subcommittees in charge of 
scrutinizing sector-wide audit reports and recommendations issued by the Controller and Auditor 
General (CAG). 




Public Investment Programming 
3.22 Tanzania has no Public Investment Program (PIP) that aims to enhance strategic 
consistency and coordination of public investments within a program based approach. 
Tanzania could usefully develop a national public investment program that brings together all the 
investment projects that fit within its national and sectoral strategies to avoid proliferation of 
low-impact, unrelated, and small sized projects. A PIP also provides a framework for interaction 
with donors and channeling aid flows to priority areas.  
 
In all governments, the ministries of finance and/or economic planning play critical roles in project appraisal 
and capital budgeting.  
Ministry of Finance (MoF) is responsible for: 
1.  Overall budget system and coordination of the selection, approval, and financing of all capital and 
current items entering the budget. This would include the methods for appraising, selecting, and 
budgeting capital expenditures. Guidelines for project appraisal may be established by MoF either 
independently or in conjunction with the economic planning agency. These guidelines should cover the 
local government or private partner or contractor. These guidelines also should cover in sufficient detail 
the criteria and conduct of the financial, economic, and distributive analysis, including the treatment of 
risks, social and environmental costs, and benefits. This would include approaches to estimating 
economic or shadow prices; valuing public sector services and environmental costs and benefits; 
assessing costs of risk; and handling real price changes, inflation, and exchange rates over a project life. 
Special guidelines are required for: 
(a)  appraising public private partnership arrangements with a particular focus on the benefit or cost 
of private participation in a concession, and  
(b)  costing services for regulated sectors or long-term service contracts. 
2.  Forecasting and raising tax and non-tax revenue, managing debt finance and foreign aid grants. Public 
revenue forecasting is critical to establishing the availability of funding for both the investment period 
and the operating and maintenance period of projects and programs.  
 
Economic planning commission/ministry should be responsible for:  
1. Macroeconomic and growth forecasting and planning (in conjunction with ministries of finance and 
central bank);  
2. Monitoring, analyzing, and reporting on progress with implementation of a country’s national 
development strategy. The exact modalities of monitoring arrangements should be prepared in 
conjunction with the central agency responsible for overall economic monitoring and effectiveness of the 
overall government’s budget/program. Often this includes the country’s statistical office, Prime 
Minister’s office or its equivalent, and MoF.  
3.  Coordinating sector plans for projects and programs across sectors; 
4.  Creating guidelines for strategic planning;  
5.  Creating guidelines appraisal, implementation, and regulation of projects and programs, whether 
implemented by a government department, authority, local government, or private partner or contractor. 
As stated above, MoF should take the lead in preparing these guidelines.   
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3.23 Typically, a PIP includes the following elements (Allen and Tomasi, 2001): A PIP 
shows for a period of three to four years the capital and recurrent cost of selected projects, 
together with the balance of funds required to complete the projects after the PIP period. It is 
prepared annually on a rolling basis. The selection criteria are as follows:  
x The first year of the PIP includes only projects that are included in the budget. The 
later years provide an indicative list of projects and their estimated cost. 
x For externally financed projects, the first year of the PIP includes only projects for 
which financing has been secured or where negotiations are very well advanced. The 
second year includes projects for which the financing has been clearly identified, and 
the third year also includes projects for which the financing source has not yet been 
identified but is likely to be found.
The PIP covers investment projects financed from domestic sources, externally-financed 
projects, as well as PPPs.  
 
3.24 There are a number of risks to the PIP approach. First, the PIP may contribute to a 
fragmentation in the budget between recurrent and capital spending and an overemphasis on 
investments at the expense of recurrent expenditure. Second, unless properly controlled, the PIP 
can become a wish list of projects, especially in the outer years, with little meaning as a 
framework for investment budgeting. This also creates a risk that poor projects that were 
included in the PIP in earlier years move to the implementation stage without effective scrutiny 
or analysis.  
 
3.25 To minimize these risks, the PIP should be fully integrated with the MTEF. In 
essence, the PIP would be a list of the projects that underpin the MTEF. That implies that the PIP 
includes only projects that the government expects to undertake. This does not mean that 
financing should be secured for all projects, even in the outer years. For the first year, the PIP 
would coincide with the budget and thus be fully financed. For the second and third years, the 
PIP would correspond to the financing the government expects to be available. Full consistency 
between the PIP and MTEF would mitigate risks of budget fragmentation and facilitate an 
integrated assessment of the budget by policy makers, parliament, and the public. A credible 
MTEF will also provide an increased degree of predictability of resources for the investment 
projects given its multi-year nature.  
 
3.26 The inclusion of a so-called project bank for storage of priority project ideas  for 
which funding is not yet available can greatly improve the PIP’s effectiveness. Many 
countries have institutionalized a project bank that consists of projects that do not fall within the 
sectoral MTEF ceiling/overall budget envelope but are considered highly relevant for growth and 
development. If additional financial resources become available, these projects
16 are the first to 
be included in the PIP and, therefore, in the annual budget. The institutionalization of a project 
bank would also require a revision of information that needs to be provided to MoF and POPC 
or, as proposed, its secretariat, which would handle the PIP to be able to analyze its relevance 
(box 3).  
                                                 
16 This would also facilitate the ability to seek financing through Public Private Partnerships, as they have the ability 
to tap capacity of private sector experts in addition to private sector financing.   
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Aim and objective  Discuss link with national strategy and sector strategy; 
define development objective. 
 
Economic and social impact 
 on  growth 
 on  equity 
 on  poverty 
 on  employment 
  on balance of payments and 
      forex reserves 
 on  gender 






Identify total investment needs. 
Indicate cash flow over the lifespan of the project. This 
should include an estimate of recurrent cost after the 
project closes. 
Calculate net present value (NPV),
3 if possible, or cost-
effectiveness indicators. 
 
Staffing  implications  Identify the implications for staffing at the central, 
provincial, or district level, including needed skill level. 
 
Expected results and impacts: monitoring 
and evaluation 
Propose outcome, output, and input indicators through 
which the project can by monitored and evaluated. 
 
Time scale of the project  Time needed for pre-appraisal. 
Time needed for appraisal. 
Time needed for implementation. 
Time needed for impact evaluation. 
 
Need for any changes in laws and 
regulations
Identify changes in business climate/ environment   
Proposed project team and implementation 
arrangements 
Discuss team composition and its needed competencies   
Who  are  the  stakeholders/beneficiaries  Identify beneficiaries and group them by direct and 
indirect beneficiaries 
 
Alternatives  Discuss why proposed project is the most appropriate 
way of achieving the project objective  
 
Positive or negative externalities  For example, discuss any impact on the environment.   
Risk and mitigation  Identify risk and mitigating measures.   
 
1 If various options are considered for achieving a given set of objectives, each option can be described and assessed in separate 
columns. 
2 Ratings could go from ++, +, 0, -, -- at the profile stage, reflecting the limited and qualitative nature of the information available 
at that stage. After pre-appraisal and appraisal, the matrix can be updated and more specific and quantitative criteria can be used 
to assess the project. These can be developed with further technical assistance.  
3 The internal rate of return (IRR) can be misleading and should not be used, see H.M. Treasury (2003) 
 
3.27 The PIP and the related project bank would be helpful in discussions with donors 
on aid commitments. The PIP would be a selection of screened and prioritized projects that fit 
within the government’s absorptive capacity. The PIP would not be a source of project ideas for 
unexpected resources in addition to what is expected under the MTEF. This should not result in 
missed opportunities because of a lack of bankable projects. First, unexpected additional aid 
typically takes some years to materialize, in which case new projects can be developed and the 
PIP can be adjusted in subsequent years to reflect the additional aid. Second, a project bank  
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would be a source of ideas for additional projects if the government is confronted with a sudden 
increase in available resources.  
 
3.28 Although some procedures are in place to guide the preparation of investment 
projects, these are different across ministries. (Annex 1 offers a discussion on of the budget 
process and PIM within the Ministry of Energy and Minerals.) The proposed PIP and its 
management structure are an important first step toward establishing a rules-based process of 
public investment programming. An essential next step is to develop a PIP policy that should aim 
to ensure (i) quality of public investments; (ii) coordination among the various actors/institutions 
involved; (iii) availability of adequate resources to execute the program; and (iv) increased 
coordination in financing between public and private sources, including the use of PPPs
17. In 
addition, it should translate the policy into implementation regulations that effectively deal with 
the aims identified in the policy.   
 
3.29 Critical components of a successful PIP implementation plan include the 
establishment of new institutions and their respective functions (see above), capacity 
building and training, and the development of specific procedures and tools for investment 
budgeting. The government could usefully establish a secretariat, which would consist of staff 
of MoF and POPC and would provide oversight and guidance to the investment programming 
process. It could also usefully set up an investment technical team to provide technical support to 
the secretariat in collaboration with the already established PPP unit. Capacity building and 
training is needed to enhance skills of government staff involved in investment project 
development and implementation. Finally, to implement the proposed investment programming 
process, specific guidance and manuals need to be drafted. 
The Public Investment Project Cycle 
3.30 The well developed FYDP and MKUKUTA II, are linked to various sectoral 
strategies but has no central process to review project proposals’ alignment with 
Tanzania’s national and sectoral objectives. Each sector ministry develops its public 
investment priorities on its own without clear guidance from MOF or POPC and allocates its 
resources accordingly. In addition, the absence of an integrated project database prevents central 
budgeting authorities at MoF from keeping track of ongoing, completed, and/or stopped projects; 
therefore, it is virtually impossible to provide standardized project information that could be used 
to evaluate the impact of projects across the whole spectrum of government.  
 
3.31 The absence of an integrated project database prevents MoF and POPC from 
assessing operating expenses of public works, maintaining good programming of purchases 
and contracting out of public works, and determining the programming of operational and 
maintenance (O&M) expenditures of projects delivered as well as staffing requirements. 
Currently, sector ministries keep project information in separate manual records without a 
harmonized information system and array of monitoring indicators. An effort should be made to 
start collecting standardized project information, as an up-to-date record and status of public 
investment projects provides the information necessary for budgetary authorities to be able to 
                                                 
17 The Government has prepared PPP regulations that include detailed evaluation procedures. Many of them overlap 
with the procedures proposed in this PER.  
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prioritize and reallocate budget allocations across sectors and MDAs and reconcile any gaps in 
information during the elaboration of budget ceilings.  
 
3.32 A good planning process and organization in a sector, its programs, and 
institutional activities is steered by sector ministries and carried down across implementing 
units. Sector strategy plans and policy papers are translated into an MTEF. Sector ministries 
prioritize public expenditure (inputs) according to their respective sector strategies and align to 
policy objectives (planned outputs) and programmatic goals (outcomes). A decentralized 
planning organization is carried through regions and district levels with implementing units 
reporting to a higher level up to the respective program manager responsible for overseeing 
performance. These capabilities are in place for the ministries of health, education, and 
agriculture.  
 
3.33 Tanzania’s central agencies responsible for planning and budgeting, POPC and 
MoF, could usefully put in place an evaluation and monitoring arrangement for projects 
that build on sectoral experiences. This process should allow the government to better observe 
what its projects are accomplishing and lead to a more rule-based and standardized manner of 
scrutinizing the relevance of proposed and ongoing projects. Various countries, among them 
Chile
18 and South Korea, have developed elaborate processes for this purpose. Tanzania might 
aim for such high quality institutional arrangements, but it should start out simply taking into 
account its own capacity limitations and build up its processes as its capabilities improve.  
 
3.34 A first step would be to agree on a project cycle that would allow appropriate 
scrutinizing of projects. Shows a suggested project cycle for Tanzania. The proposed cycle 
would vary by size and may need to be adjusted for the specific character of the sector or project. 
An indicative time for projects to go from initial concept to implementation is two to three years 
for large projects. The cycle and all its stages should be clearly laid out in MoF and POPC 
regulations and guidelines, including possible variations related to size or characteristics.  
 
3.35 The project cycle starts with a line ministry, agency, district, or public enterprise 
formulating a concept for a project.
19 The concept for the project should meet several criteria, 
including: 
x Meeting needs consistent with sectoral and national objectives. In particular, the project ideas 
should reflect the MKUKUTA II and Sectoral Investment Plans (SIPs).
x Negative side effects (for example, on the environment) should not exceed the benefits of the 
project.
3.36 It is good practice to consider a range of options to meet the stated objectives, in 
particular the option that requires the least action (and therefore, typically, cost) to achieve them 
(see the H.M. Treasury, 2003). A short list of options may then be created.  
                                                 
18 A note outlining the appraisal process in Chile is attached as Annex 2. 
19 For a public enterprise, the motivation for the project may be commercial, that is, achieving a profit.  
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3.37 The next step is to develop a project profile in the structure of a project 
assessment form and include the project in the project database. To be included in the 
project database, a standard form (box 3) is completed that spells out the objectives of the 
project, how they will be met, the expected timing of the project, the budgetary cost, the 
profile of cost and any revenue over time, needs for any changes in laws and regulations, 
impact on staffing (for example, need to hire a project team), an estimate of the recurrent cost 
after completion of the project, and any positive or negative side effects of the project (for 
example, on the environment). 
 
3.38 The project profile should be included in a project database that lists all projects 
under consideration and implementation. The project database is a critical instrument for 
managing public investment projects. It will reveal, from inception, which projects are under 
consideration and implementation, and at which stage of development the projects are. This 
will provide analytical information on projects and their characteristics, but also will enable 
MoF, POPC, and other stakeholders to track the pipeline of projects as it moves toward 
completion. To reiterate, the project database is more extensive than the PIP and includes 
projects that are not yet approved for the PIP, as well as projects that have moved into the 
implementation stage.  
 
3.39 For all projects, MoF and POPC jointly should assess whether the project meets 
the criteria when the profile is completed. In other words, MoF and POPC jointly verify 
whether the project meets the target criteria, the appropriateness of stated objectives, 
affordability and cost-effectiveness, and absence of substantial negative side effects. This is 
just a preliminary and qualitative assessment the project has not yet been fully appraised. But 
such an assessment at an early stage will prevent poor projects from moving on to the 
appraisal stage, which can be quite costly for large projects. If a project is rejected, it can 
again go to the concept stage or be abandoned and dropped from the project database.  
 
3.40 A large project requires diligent pre-appraisal while a smaller project can 
directly move to the appraisal stage. An appropriate threshold for large projects seems to 
be US$5 million (the typical cost of a hospital is US$6 million
20). It may be appropriate to 
vary thresholds by sector. Care should be taken that projects are not designed to escape the 
threshold for large projects in particular, MoF should issue regulations against trenching of 
projects.  
 
3.41 In case of a large project, if MoF and POPC jointly allow it to pass through, it 
moves on to the pre-appraisal stage and resources should be centrally allocated to 
undertake pre-appraisal. Upon approval, an allocation will be released from a study fund to 
finance the pre-appraisal. (There is no study fund at present, but establishing one using 
government resources or donor aid should be considered
21.) Currently, this stage is typically 
undertaken by a contractor. If the pre-appraisal is concluded successfully and the project 
                                                 
20 It seems that a project of such complexity should be subject to a higher form of scrutiny than a clinic, which 
costs less than US$5 million, and construction of which has become standardized.  
21 A concept note outlining how and when this study fund would be used should be prepared as a guide to 
replenishing and ensuring proper use of its available resources.   
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continues to meet the criteria, MoF includes it in the MTEF and PIP.
22 This implies that the 
project is considered affordable over the three- to five- year planning period. Both the capital 
and recurrent cost of the project are to be included in the MTEF and PIP. In addition, special 
care should be taken to ensure that the MTEF accurately reflects the recurrent cost of 
operating the investment asset after completion of the project (that is, once a hospital is 
finished, it needs to be staffed, equipped with medical disposables such as syringes and 
medication, and have water and electricity).   
 






                                                 
22 Cabinet approves the MTEF but not the specific projects underlying the projection for capital spending. 
Therefore, the proposed PIP is, in effect, an agreement between MoF and line ministries, agencies, and public 
enterprises of how the sectoral ceilings on capital spending in the MTEF are to be met. 
Cost-benefit analysis assesses the costs and economic benefits of a project and reduces them to a common 
denominator. If benefits exceed costs, both expressed in terms of present value, then the project is acceptable; if 
not, the project is rejected. Benefits are defined relative to their effect on the fundamental objectives, while costs 
are defined relative to their opportunity cost, which is the benefit forgone by not putting these resources to the best 
alternative use. By doing so, cost-benefit analysis seeks to ensure that no alternative use of the resources 
consumed by the project would secure a better result from the perspective of a country's objectives. Thus, if X 
defines the benefit from the project in year t, C defines the cost today, r is the discount rate, and n the number of 
years that the project is expected to deliver benefits, then in very simple terms, a project is selected if:  
Ȉ X(t) /( 1 + r )
t í C > 0 
 
Economic analysis is similar in form to financial analysis in that both assess the profit of an investment. The 
concept of a financial profit, however, is different from that of a social profit of economic analysis. The former 
identifies the money profit accruing to the project-operating entity, whereas the latter measures the effect of the 
project on the fundamental economic and social objectives. These different concepts are reflected in the different 
items considered to be costs and benefits and in their valuation. Thus, a money payment made for wages is by 
definition a financial cost, but it will be an economic cost only to the extent that the use of labor in this project 
implies some sacrifice elsewhere in the economy with respect to output and other objectives. Conversely, if the 
project has an economic cost which does not involve a financial flow—for example, because of environmental 
costs—this does not constitute a financial cost. Economic costs and benefits are measured by "shadow prices," 
which may approximate market prices in well functioning market systems. However, imperfect markets—like 
those characterizing economies in transition—typically reflect a divergence between them. The key requirements 
for social cost-benefit analysis are: (i) specification of the costs and benefits; (ii) valuation of costs and benefits; 
(iii) choice and formulation of constraints; (iv) treatment of risk and uncertainty; (v) choice of the rate of interest 
for discounting future costs and benefits; and (vi) choice of a decision rule for accepting or rejecting projects.  
 
It is, however, important to realize that not all projects warrant a full cost-benefit analysis or lend themselves well 
to cost-benefit analysis. For example, traditional investment projects, such as electricity generation plants, 
hospitals, and or water treatment facilities, are good examples for which cost-benefit analysis is an excellent tool 
to assist the decision maker regarding the project net economic benefits. However, it is often seen as too difficult 
to carry out cost-benefit analysis for technical assistance projects, or it is not seen as cost-efficient to do cost-
benefit analysis for projects below a certain size.  
 
Source: Lyn Squire and Herman van der Tak, 1975, Economic Analysis of Projects, Baltimore and London, in the World Bank 
report “Russia: Towards Improving the Efficiency of Public Expenditures” (2001).  
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3.42 For all pre-appraised large projects and small projects that have passed 
preliminary assessment, the next stage is appraisal. For large projects, this includes 
extensive cost-benefit analyses (box 4) or cost-effectiveness studies as well as technical 
feasibility studies, environmental impact assessments, and so on. Costly appraisals should be 
funded by their own line item in the budget for enhanced transparency and scrutiny by 
parliament. Since large projects will be under development for several years, this requirement 
should not delay the project. For smaller and more routine projects, such as a health clinic, 
the appraisal may consist of a detailed design and cost estimate based on standards and 
similar projects implemented previously. Appraisals for smaller projects can be paid out of 
the study fund and do not need a separate budget line item.  
 
3.43 At the moment, almost all projects lack an in-depth feasibility or appraisal 
phase. Various ministries do make an attempt to rationalize and prioritize their projects, but 
methods used are often indicator-based and do not allow for cross-sectoral comparisons. This 
makes it necessary to standardize methods used to appraise projects, in particular the 
methods used to analyze the benefits and costs of a project. The importance of the appraisal 
process should not be underestimated. There is abundant evidence, in particular from World 
Bank projects, that adequate quality at entry, which covers identification, pre-appraisal, and 
appraisal, is critical for successful project outcomes (box 5).  
 
Box 5: Importance of quality at entry and economic analysis for the success of a project 
 
 
An important question to ask when undertaking project appraisals is: What are key determinants of project 
performance? The World Bank undertook various studies to assess the effectiveness of its own portfolio
1. In the 
1990s, to evaluate the impact of quality of entry on project performance, the World Bank’s Independent 
Evaluation Group (IEG
2) examined over one thousand projects and analyzed the impact of quality at entry on 
project performance. (Quality at entry includes satisfactory completion of a project’s identification, preparation 
and appraisal phases of a project for a precise definition of these concepts). Clearly, projects that had adequate 
quality at entry processes fared much better than projects that did not (see World Bank (1997) (table 1).  














Further econometric analysis, which focused on the appraisal part of quality at entry, shows that if economic 
appraisal of a project has been poorly done prior to approval, the probability that a project will perform 
unsatisfactorily by the third year after implementation has commenced is seven times higher than that of a 
project with adequate economic analysis. By the fourth year, the probability of failure of a poorly analyzed 
project is 16 times higher than the corresponding probability for a project that has undergone adequate economic 
evaluation (Belli and Pritchett, 1995).  
1 See for example Belli and Pritchett (1995); World Bank (1996, 1997, and 2010); Vawda, Mock, Gittinger, and Patrinos 
(2003); and Jenkins (1997).  
2 At the time the studies quoted were undertaken, this group was called Operations and Evaluations Department (OED). 
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3.44 After the project successfully completes the appraisal stage, MoF assesses 
whether it can be included in the following year’s budget. If more projects have 
completed the appraisal stage than can fit into the budget, a choice has to be made as part of 
the overall budget allocation process, based on which projects meet the most urgent needs. 
After the project is included in the budget, it will move on to implementation and, after it is 
completed, to the operation and evaluation stage. The proposed database should also allow 
for the monitoring of progress with each project and be able to flag when projects are 
delayed. A first step could be to take stock of ongoing projects and just completed projects to 
understand better issues of implementation. Currently, this information seems to be scattered 
around the various line ministries responsible for implementation and not available at the 
center of government, for example within MoF and POPC.  
 
3.45 The responsibility for the project cycle rests largely with the relevant line 
ministry, agency, district, or public enterprise. MoF and POPC have an important task in 
operating the “gateways” (for large projects, the gateways are: (i) before the pre-appraisal 
stage, (ii) at inclusion in the MTEF and PIP, and (iii) at inclusion in the budget; for smaller 
projects, only the second and third gateways are operated by MoF and POPC). In addition, 
MoF and POPC will need to provide guidance, as well as technical and capacity building 
support, to the organizations implementing the proposed project cycle.  
 
3.46 A phased approach for improving quality at entry is necessary given the current 
level of capacity at the central and line ministries and their agencies. At the moment, a 
significant number of projects are prepared by donors. However, this can be expected to 
decline as domestic resources are financing an ever increasing part of the development 
budget and thus projects. In addition, many line ministries outsource the preparation and 
sometimes even the evaluation of those projects to consultants. It is important to rebuild this 
capacity, but this will require time and a revision of the current guidance provided to teams 
preparing projects. These guidelines should also take into account the fact that many 
proposals are being prepared and evaluated by external consultants whose reports are to be 
examined by government officials. 
CONCLUSIONS AND KEY MESSAGES
 
3.47 Tanzania has launched several well thought through strategic plans, notably 
TDV 2025, FYDP, and MKUKUTA II, but it is unclear what role each of them is to play 
within the national and sectoral planning processes. MKUKUTA II serves as the new 
MoF poverty reduction strategy, and the ministry’s poverty eradication department is 
working out an implementation plan. At the same time, the President recently instructed the 
POPC to develop a 15-year strategic plan (and, within that, a five-year strategic plan) for his 
administration as a means to reach the goals set forth in Vision 2025. In addition, most 
sectoral ministries have developed their own medium-term strategic plans. It is important to 








Strengthen the strategic planning processes 
PRIORITYPOLICY RECOMMENDATIONS SEQUENCING 
Define clearly the role of each strategic plan, Vision 
25, MKUKUTA II, Medium Term Development Plan 
(5 years), Long Term development Plan (15 years), 
and MKUKUTA II strategic implementation plan 
and their roles in the various sectoral development 
plans.   
Sequencing: As soon as possible, but no later than 
June 2012. 
 
Much of this could be resolved during the 
discussions on the role of POPC versus MoF, and 
communicated by the Planning and Budget 
Guidelines 20112/13 to the sector ministries and 
other levels of the government. 
 
 
3.48 Even though a web of national strategies exists, no central public agency was 
seen, until recently, as in charge or taking charge of its implementation. Recently 
though, the President has tasked the National Planning Commission with making these 
strategic plans operational. This is a welcome development. However, without a uniform 
public investment management process for the whole of government and data on each 
project, it will be extremely complicated to ensure that the high impact projects will be 
undertaken and have their intended impact on growth and poverty reduction. The government 
has realized this shortcoming and intends strengthen its ability to prioritize its interventions.  
 
3.49 To be successful in the intended sharper focus on prioritization across the whole 
of government, the authorities need to assign clear roles for the various central 
agencies, MoF and POPC that have a role to play in this process. Currently, each of these 
three agencies is acting on its own mandate, issued directly by the President or embedded in 
Tanzania’s laws and regulations. It will be important to agree on the roles and responsibilities 
of POPC and MoF, respectively, in the PIM process and come to a common understanding of 
what these two key institutions will and will not do. In addition, it could be worthwhile to set 
up a secretariat in which both MoF and POPC are represented, that will coordinate the 
overall process of project selection, evaluation (ex ante and ex post), and monitoring of 



















Strengthen the PIM institutional set up
PRIORITYPOLICY RECOMMENDATIONS SEQUENCING 
Agree on responsibilities of MoF and 
POPC, respectively, regarding planning, 
evaluation of projects, and monitoring their 
progress. 
Sequencing: As soon as possible, but no later than June 2012, 
given the need to start fully implementation of the new FYDP 
in FY 2012/13.  
 
The two institutions could usefully lay down the arrangements 
in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). However, note 
that this might require legal changes as well. 
Reorganize MoF and POPC in accordance 
with the agreed mutual responsibilities. 
Sequencing: Between June 2012 and September 2012. This 
might require some of the units within MoF to move to POPC; 
the Poverty Eradication Department might be better placed 
within POPC. 
 
Note that this might require legal changes as well. 
Agree on (i) how to structure the project 
cycle that each public investment projects 
will have to go through and (ii) the creation 
of a secretariat handling this process.  
Sequencing: Between June 2012 and September 20112. First 
agree on the structure of the project cycle (figure 9) and how 
POPC and MoF will jointly support it (preferably through a 
joint secretariat). Second, agree on the form of the project 
profile and assessment form. Third, agree on what type of 
project will go through the simpler cycle and which will go 
through the extensive cycle. Fourth, agree on how to fund the 
feasibility studies and the (pre-) appraisals of the projects going 
through the extensive cycle.  
 
3.50 To be able to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of Tanzania’s public 
investment program (PIP), basic information about its costs, its outputs, and its 
outcomes must be collected and analyzed centrally. Currently, the MoF collects 
expenditure data on the development budget, but no other information about Tanzania’s 
public investment program is available centrally at the MoF, the POPC, or at the Office of 
the Prime Minister (PMO). The line ministries, most of which do collect information of their 
projects, receive little or no guidance from central ministries on how to prepare, evaluate (ex 
ante or ex post), or monitor their projects.  
 
3.51 Standardized and uniform information needs to be centrally collected on each 
project to allow for prioritization of Tanzania’s scarce public resources across the 
whole of government. This could be greatly facilitated through the instigation of a process 
that each public investment project will need to complete before being incorporated in the 
country’s MTEF and annual budget. Such a process should allow for various evaluation 
points at which its viability is checked by the central agencies and, when it is found to lack 
the required impact or the information needed to make such a judgment, is sent back. This 
process could vary with the size of the projects, but the central agencies will need to make an 
explicit decision about the viability of the project before it is granted inclusion in the MTEF 
and annual budget. Currently, these decisions are basically left to the line ministries, which 








Strengthen the information gathering to allow for prioritization of projects across the 
whole of government
PRIORITYPOLICY RECOMMENDATIONS SEQUENCING 
Design a project database that collects information throughout 
the whole project cycle: (i) collects information on inputs, 
outputs, and outcomes so as to be able to analyze efficiency 
and effectiveness of each project, and (ii) collects information 
about duration of each project such that judgments about 
value for money of each project can also be made
Sequencing: Once the structure of the 
project cycle has been decided, this 
database should be designed ASAP and 
should and could usefully build on 
existing reporting taking place at the 
sector level. 
 
3.52 Last but not least, it will be important to phase the implementation of the 
proposed improvements as capacity gets built and to focus initially on those projects or 
sectors where larger projects are taking place and/or where large improvements in 
effectiveness can be expected through a more rule based system of project appraisal. The 
reader should be aware that this policy note has focused squarely on how to improve the 
coordination and decision making process at the center and as such on the quality at entry 
part of the project cycle. It has not delved into the implementation and ex post evaluation 
phases of the public investment cycle, not because they are not important, but because one 
expects that once uniform information has been gathered, these issues can be better analyzed 
and more informed improvements proposed
23.  
 
Design and implement a capacity building program that supports the updated PIM processes
PRIORITYPOLICY RECOMMENDATIONS SEQUENCING 
Design a capacity building program that (i) 
prepares manuals that inform the various steps 
in the new project cycle; and (ii) builds capacity 
at the center first, then at the line ministries 
and central agencies, and last but not least at 
the decentralized level of government.  
Sequencing: This capacity program should be initiated once 
the project cycle’s structure has been defined, the 
delineation of MoF and POPC responsibilities is clear, and 
the consequences for project information to be provided 
and analysis to be undertaken are determined. This could 













                                                 
23 Clearly MoF is aware of these issues, as it has recently set up a productivity unit that is to gather information 
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Annex 1: Budget Process and PIM Within The Ministry of Energy and Minerals 
Summary 
Good PIM practices and processes within the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) are 
hampered by drastic cuts in annual budgets, more predominantly in public investments in rural 
electrification. This has led to slow budget implementation, and uneven access to power services 
and economic growth rates and little impact in poverty reduction across Tanzania. 
Background 
 
Tanzania’s economic management reforms have improved economic performance markedly, 
with growth exceeding 7 percent in recent years and end-year inflation kept in single digits 
despite the global downturn. Demand of electricity has increased sharply by 12 percent on 
average every year and Eskom and other cash-strapped power generation companies seek to 
build new infrastructure to meet the country’s electricity demand and prevent a repeat of the 
2008 power crisis, which cost the economy billions of shillings. 
 
Budgetary reforms, on the other hand, have improved resource allocation and fostered better 
management and accountability of public resources within the Ministry of Energy and Minerals 
(MEM). The introduction of cash budgeting, coupled with ministry-wide use of an Integrated 
Financial Management System (IFMS), has improved fiscal discipline. Expenditure 
management has improved within MEM, and budget execution can be monitored now almost in 
real time with the IFMS. Further improvements are needed, however, to make cash budgeting 
more flexible, especially by making quarterly releases to all projects and spending units as 
opposed to the priority sectors only. Integration of all donor assistance to the budget should also 
enhance transparency and accountability of all budget resources through government processes. 
The budget reforms undertaken through the introduction of Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs) 
and Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) have been particularly useful in fostering 
wide participation of stakeholders in the budget process. These reforms have strengthened the 
links between energy sector policies and resource allocation, providing valuable analysis and 
feedback on budget execution that has improved resource use. These processes, however, can be 
improved further by enhancing government ownership of the processes and expanding their 
coverage to include all sectors of the economy and improve budget formulation, execution and 
oversight at MOF. 
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KEY BUDGETARY REFORMS 
Three main budgetary reforms have been enunciated in the past decade: cash budgeting, public 
expenditure reviews (PERs) and Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). 
 
Cash Budget – Reform aimed at improving expenditure management 
 
Tanzania has maintained a cash budget system for expenditure management since FY 
1997/1998. The system, which is managed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), limits aggregate 
expenditure in a month to average revenue collection in the previous three months plus 
program aid. Ministry exercises this control by allowing vote holders to spend monies from 
their votes only to the amount it releases every month. Priority sectors get their releases every 
quarter. 
 
The cash budget system has improved fiscal discipline by allowing continuous adjustment of 
expenditures on other non-salary expenditure items to the resource stream. Monthly ex ante 
control is still desirable since information on budget execution is not timely enough for 
adjustment and the cash budget system helps to prevent over-commitment and overspending 
(above the appropriation amounts) by spending units. The cash budget system is also credited 
with imparting realism to the budget-making process by taking away incentives to inflate revenue 
estimates
24. In addition, according to the FY 2007/08 Public Expenditure Review (PER), the 
cash budget system has led to increased realism in MEM’s expenditure estimates. The PER FY 
2007/08 found, for example, that the gap between actual and budgeted expenditures on 
operations and maintenance (O&M) decreased after the institution of cash budget. Further, 
given government policy to move toward a balanced budget, cash budgeting has been a 
useful instrument for controlling deficits. According to IMF and World Bank observations, 
cash budget has been a credible indicator of government’s intentions to run a responsible fiscal 
policy. 
 
Despite notable improvements discussed above, cash budgeting has several weaknesses. First, 
the cash budget has well known costs arising from low predictability of resources for the vote 
holders. Usually, the resource envelope faces large unpredictability, particularly with 
regard to external assistance. Domestic revenue levels have been fairly predictable. 
 
Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs) 
 
The budgeting process is open and participatory in nature. The PER process began in 1997. Its 
main objective is twofold: First, to provide support to the budget process and budget 
management. Second, to provide feedback on public expenditure and management issues to 
government and other stakeholders through external evaluation. The PER working group, 
chaired by the Ministry of Finance, provides overall leadership to the process. The external 
evaluation work is carried out under the World Bank leadership. 
                                                 
24 Budget makers would inflate revenue estimates when they want to theoretically provide for all demands (often 
inflated) of spending units. Against the fictitious high revenue, units could spend during the year thus resulting in 
higher than designed deficit when revenue did not materialize.  
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The PER has opened up the budget process to a wider participation by government, non-state 
actors and donors. Evaluations and studies conducted under the PER process shows that the 
dialog between the MEM, donors, civil society, and the Ministry of Finance during the budget 
formulation process has been significantly enhanced. The PER process provides a forum for 
exchange of views among key stakeholders at the sector as well as at the macro levels. At the 
grassroots level, the local government budget process begins at the community/village level 
where plans and resource requirements are developed in a participatory framework. 
Community plans and resource requirements are synthesised at the ward level and onward to 
the district level. 
 
The PER is partly achieving its intended objectives in that it plays a critical role in enhancing 
efficiency and accountability in the use of budgetary resources. The PER has instilled 
transparency in the budget process and is acting as an arm’s length watchdog for any 
malpractice by spending units. However, the PER process has often been criticized for being a 
donor-driven process. Critiques allude to the observation that whoever funds the PER studies 
and evaluations, controls the process. Since donors play key role in funding the studies and 
evaluations, the PER process appeared to be donor-driven. In recent years, however, 
government ownership has increased notably with GBS and SPSP funds had become more under 
the control of Accountant General monitoring and reporting authorities, thereby implying higher 
prospects for its sustainability. 
 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
 
MTEF in the Ministry of Energy entails planning in a three-year perspective. The MTEF 
links the budget process to MKUKUTA and Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and is aligned 
to the sector’s performance budgeting, whereby the cash management systems make quarterly 
allocations to identified priority activities as identified by the sector strategy plan
25. In this 
regard, the sector strategy is focused on priority projects and activities and reflects funding 
constraints. The mainstreaming of the sector strategy plan in the MTEF has facilitated higher 
expenditure shares to be directed toward priority areas such as power generation and 
transmission projects. 
 
In a systematic framework, the sequence of activities in the MTEF process is as follows: 
x Formulation of the Budget Guidelines Committee 
x Revenue and expenditure estimates preparation 
x Final phase of budget preparation 
x Budget execution 
x Monitoring and control 
 
The MTEF process has included councils with effect since 2003/04 after the harmonization of 
the central and local government’s financial years. Tanzania’s first MTEF covered Fiscal 
Years 1999/2000-2001/02. A previous initiative, the Rolling Plan and Forward Budget 
(RPFB), introduced in 1992/93, had sought to strengthen linkage between development 
                                                 
25 Performance budgeting was introduced in 1998, and was first applied to the PRS-related MDAs. It was 
subsequently made a legal requirement through the Public Finance Act 2001 (Article 18.1(b)).  
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planning and the budget process. Although MOF credits the RPFB with having introduced 
multi-year budgeting linked to a macro-fiscal framework, in practice it had suffered from a 
number of limitations, including: 
 
Recommendations regarding the resource envelope and resource allocations were frequently 
overridden during subsequent preparation of the Budget. 
 
It was hampered by the institutional separation of responsibility for planning of the 
Development Budget (still with uncertainties after the separation of economic affairs formerly 
under the MOFED and the redefining of the Planning Commission) and the Recurrent Budget 
(under the MOF). 
 
Because the Planning Commission led the RPFB exercise, it was perceived as being focused 
primarily on the Development Budget and consequently failed to contribute to better 
prioritization of recurrent spending. 
 
By the time the MTEF was introduced, Tanzania had already made considerable progress 
toward fiscal stabilization and developing a realistic macroeconomic framework for budget 
planning—in part due to reforms that began in mid-1980s. This was aided by the operation of a 
cash budget, which resulted in in-year corrections if the framework proved unrealistic. 
 
The main objectives of introducing of MTEF in Tanzania were: 
 
x To provide a broad budgetary strategy within which the annual budget could be 
prepared; 
x To strengthen links between sector policies and resource allocations; and 
x To provide a mechanism through which analysis of budgetary performance could be fed 
back into the budget planning process. 
 
The MTEF has achieved credibility with Cabinet, line ministries, and other stakeholders. The 
MTEF is also seen as a key instrument in ensuring effectiveness in the use of public resources. In 
this regard, the MTEF has fostered a strong link with the PER process. It has facilitated 
consolidation of responsibilities for public expenditure planning and management, particularly 
under the strong leadership of the Ministry of Finance. In addition, the introduction of 
Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) has greatly enhanced MTEF viability by 
strengthening budget execution and accountability of resource use. 
 
Lately, the MTEF process has been comprehensive enough in that it extended its coverage to all 
sectors, including energy and minerals. This entailed the establishment of Sector Working Groups 
(SWGs) under MTEF. It is recommended, however, to commence the preparation of MTEF 
much earlier in the first half of the fiscal year so as to give ample opportunity for Cabinet and 
Parliamentary Committees to review the MTEF documents and provide feedback. Also, 
proposed MTEF Sector Expenditure Strategies should incorporate detailed guidance to Local 
Governments on resource allocation and management that is consistent with the realization 
of sector policies and strategies. 
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KEY REFORMS IN PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT PROCESSES 
Project screening 
 
Problems concerning strategic guidance persist in the energy sector: MKUKUTA II lacks focus 
on electricity and related activities necessary so that economic growth and poverty reduction can 
be tackled on a sustained manner. A sector working group (SWG), however, exists as well as a 
comprehensive sector strategy plan. 
 
Energy projects are screened on the basis of a master plan (such as the Backbone Project for 
Electricity V) within a multi-DP funding arrangement. 
Project selection 
 
A Development Committee exists within the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM), which is 
responsible for determining the relative importance of projects recommended in terms of 
prioritization and financing. 
 
Cost benefit analyses and other similar studies are undertaken for most projects (for example, 
rural electrification). 
 
A project database exists. as well. It is organized by sub-sectors (petroleum, electricity, TEDAP, 
rural energy), and provided with information on source of funding, budget estimates and actual, 
stage of projects (ongoing, completed, stopped). 
Project implementation 
 
Throughout the year, at the beginning of every quarter, MEM prepares and submits to MOF 
progress reports on financial commitments entered into and activities undertaken. This includes 
progress toward target achievement in the previous quarter together with an action plan for the 
quarter. Likewise, MEM presents these reports together with the next quarter action plan in 
support of its release requests. 
 
An overview of MEM’s budget for the past few years presents low rates of budget releases and 
budget execution with respect to expenditure estimates. Foreign financing planned in the budget 
is noticeably lower. One major concern is MEM project investments being less of a priority to 
public investments in economic infrastructure over the past three years (annex table 1). However, 
a project breakdown of the figures helps explain a significant proportion of it. 
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Annex Table 1: Budget Execution within the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) 
 
  FY 2007/08  FY 2008/09  FY 2009/10 
 Budget  outturn  (%) 
Total 19%  31%  61% 
Recurrent 94%  90%  98% 
Development      
 Total  9%  19%  36% 
 Domestic  3%  99%  85% 
 Foreign  20%  11%  1% 
  % of economic infrastructure 1/ 
MEM investments, total  31%  28%  12% 
 Domestic  40%  6%  9% 
 Foreign  22%  42%  15% 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
1/ Includes development expenditure in the ministries of Infrastructure Development, Energy and Minerals, and 
Water and Irrigation. 
Procurement
 
Sound procurement practices in the energy sector: Joint Energy Sector Review (JESR) 
consultants are of the view that systemic issues in procurement reform are being addressed 
adequately within the energy sector. Procurement procedures are well defined, national 
procedures set by PPRA are consistent with good international practice, institutional capacities 
are being strengthened, there is a strong contracting role at MEM’s Procurement Management 
Unit (PMU), procurement plans and action plans are aligned accordingly, and PMU is beingt 
adequately trained, among others. 
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Annex 3: Statistical Appendix Tables 
















Indicator Unit 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Population (Mainland)/2 Millions 31.9 32.9 33.6 34.2 35.3 36.2 37.5 38.3 39.4 42.9 43.7
Per capita Income/2 US$ 294.9 294.0 299.2 313.0 334.9 358.6 354.0 403.8 483.0 483.4 505.9
GDP Growth/2 % 4.9 6.0 7.2 6.9 7.8 7.4 6.7 7.1 7.0 6.0 7.0
Gross Domestic Savings/2 (as a % of GDP) 9.2 8.8 12.9 12.2 13.6 11.7 10.2 10.2 16.2 17.0 16.9
Gross Investments/2 (as a % of GDP) 16.4 17.0 18.7 20.0 19.0 19.2 20.4 22.3 22.3 24.5 24.3
Inflation/2 (period average) % 6.0 5.2 4.3 5.4 4.7 5.0 7.2 7.0 10.3 11.9 10.5
Exchange Rate/1 (period average) TZS/US$ 800.4 876.4 966.6 1038.4 1089.3 1128.9 1251.9 1245.0 1196.3 1320.3 1410.2
External Sector
Exports - Goods & Services/1 Mil. US$ 1307.1 1430.7 1800.0 2034.1 2310.2 2843.4 3192.5 3750.7 4834.0 5086.4 5695.0
Imports - Goods & Services/1 Mil. US$ -2063.9 -2232.2 -2185.1 -2279.4 -2991.7 -3852.7 -4679.6 -5684.4 -7541.9 -7875.9 -8274.5
Current Account Balance/1 Mil. US$ -932.1 -480.9 -324.4 -23.9 -296.2 -518.6 -1,065.3 -1,523.3 -2,114.4 -2,130.1 -1,955.0
Balance of Payments (Overall balance)/1 Mil. US$ 56.9 -66.8 59.4 361.8 105.1 55.5 346.2 232.6 500.2 18.1 478.4
Foreign Reserves/1 Mil. US$ 1,183.8 1,670.4 1,877.5 2,137.2 1,968.6 2,247.4 1,863.2 2,157.3 2,660.0 2,929.8 3,482.6
External Debt/2 Bil. US$/1 6.9 6.2 6.8 7.0 7.8 8.3 4.2 4.7 5.8 7.0 8.2
Foreign Direct Investment/1 Mil. US$ 411.9 335.4 388.2 347.9 319.4 689.0 669.3 492.3 490.8 407.8 423.8
Tourism Earnings/2 Mil. US$ 739.1 725.0 730.0 731.0 746.0 823.6 862.0 1037.0 1198.8 1354.0 --
Monetary Sector
Average Deposit Rate/1 % 7.4 4.8 3.3 3.0 4.2 4.7 6.7 8.7 8.3 8.0 6.6
Average Lending Rate/1 % 21.6 20.1 16.4 14.5 14.1 15.2 15.7 16.1 15.0 15.0 14.5
Growth in Money Supply (M2)/1 % 15.1 14.9 21.3 16.9 19.1 27.5 16.7 27.2 24.4 20.8 20.9
Government Finance
Total Domestic Revenue/1 (as a % of GDP) 10.5 10.8 10.8 11.1 11.6 11.8 12.5 14.1 15.9 16.2 15.8
Tax Revenue/1 (as a % of GDP) 9.3 9.5 9.6 10.0 10.6 10.7 11.4 13.0 14.7 15.3 14.6
Non-Tax Revenue/1 (as a % of GDP) 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.2
Total Expenditure/1 (as a % of GDP) 15.2 15.2 16.5 18.6 20.7 21.7 22.8 23.9 24.4 25.8 26.9
Recurrent Expenditure/1 (as a % of GDP) 9.9 11.5 13.1 13.6 15.1 14.6 17.2 17.0 14.9 17.66 18.8
Development Expenditure/1 (as a % of GDP) 5.3 3.7 3.4 5.0 5.6 7.1 5.6 6.1 8.0 8.4 8.6
Grants/1 (as a % of GDP) 4.5 3.7 4.5 6.2 6.1 7.7 5.4 4.9 6.9 5.1 4.6
Fiscal Balance/1 (as a % of GDP) -7.3 -5.0 -5.6 -7.7 -9.3 -9.9 -10.3 -9.4 -8.3 -7.4 -8.4
Note
/1 Fiscal year is used, and it ends June 30th of the mentioned year
/2 Calendar year is used, and it ends in mentioned year December 31th. 
Source: Tanzania Authorities (MoF, BoT, NBS, and MPEE). 
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Appendix 2: Balance of Payments (in millions of US dollar) 
Source: Tanzania Authorities and IMF 
 
2000 2001 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10
1. Current Account -437.8 -506.2 -324.4 -24.0 -296.3 -521.1 -1,083.6 -1,523.3 -2,114.4 -2,130.1 -1,955.0
A.  Goods and services                                            -756.8 -801.5 -385.2 -245.3 -681.5 -1,009.2 -1,487.0 -1,933.7 -2,707.8 -2,789.5 -2,579.5
a.  Goods -704.6 -786.3 -665.4 -541.7 -879.5 -1,124.3 -1,640.5 -2,299.0 -3,104.9 -2,952.0 -2,816.1
Exports f.o.b. on BOP basis 663.3 776.4 888.6 1,085.9 1,303.9 1,607.4 1,795.9 2,036.6 2,915.9 3,268.5 3,754.2
Exports f.o.b. in trade returns 663.3 776.4 888.6 1,085.9 1,303.9 1,607.4 1,752.1 1,851.4 2,583.3 2,842.1 3,264.5
Traditional 292.8 231.1 194.3 221.7 220.5 327.3 363.9 281.7 411.5 509.9 456.6
Nontraditional 370.5 545.3 694.3 864.1 1,083.4 1,280.0 1,388.1 1,569.7 2,171.8 2,332.2 2,807.8
o/w gold 311.2 386.9 582.3 666.2 686.7 815.0 1,041.2 924.8 1,493.0
Unrecorded trade 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.8 185.1 332.5 426.3 489.7
Imports f.o.b. on BOP basis -1,367.9 -1,562.7 -1,554.0 -1,627.6 -2,183.4 -2,731.6 -3,436.4 -4,335.6 -6,020.8 -6,220.5 -6,570.3
b.  Services -52.2 -15.3 280.2 296.4 198.0 115.0 153.5 365.3 397.1 162.5 236.6
Credit 643.8 654.3 911.3 948.2 1,006.3 1,236.1 1,396.7 1,714.2 1,918.2 1,818.0 1,940.8
Transportation 56.8 68.4 106.9 133.7 152.2 199.2 287.8 333.8 410.3 322.3 353.8
Passenger services 4.2 11.3 7.8 4.2 12.0 10.1 21.8 34.8 39.2 21.6 22.4
Freight 40.7 39.7 85.8 91.6 102.5 131.0 205.3 229.9 324.6 263.5 302.5
Other 11.9 17.4 13.2 37.9 37.7 58.1 60.6 69.1 46.5 37.2 28.9
Travel 376.7 412.8 623.7 640.0 689.6 806.5 898.1 1,076.9 1,189.7 1,163.0 1,238.5
Debit -696.0 -669.6 -631.1 -651.8 -808.3 -1,121.0 -1,243.2 -1,348.8 -1,521.1 -1,655.4 -1,704.2
Transportation -205.7 -194.3 -188.9 -185.8 -236.2 -288.9 -374.2 -450.4 -600.4 -629.3 -673.3
Passenger services -32.4 -36.3 -33.1 -20.4 -23.6 -18.3 -35.0 -30.6 -22.6 -29.7 -41.8
Freight -167.3 -149.7 -149.3 -156.0 -206.5 -262.1 -329.7 -412.6 -573.7 -596.5 -627.4
O t h e r - 5 . 9- 8 . 3- 6 . 6- 9 . 4- 6 . 1- 8 . 5- 9 . 6- 7 . 2- 4 . 1- 3 . 0- 4 . 1
B.  Income -73.0 -119.6 -108.4 -123.0 -115.6 -122.9 -89.0 -107.3 -92.4 -74.7 -35.8
Credit 50.4 55.4 66.1 73.7 88.9 82.9 74.6 89.0 128.4 124.6 160.3
Compensation of employees 8.0 10.0 8.0 6.8 7.3 9.3 9.3 5.0 9.9 7.9 12.0
Investment income 42.3 45.4 58.2 66.9 81.6 73.6 65.3 84.0 118.5 116.7 148.3
Debit -123.3 -175.0 -174.5 -196.7 -204.5 -205.8 -163.6 -196.2 -220.8 -199.3 -196.1
Compensation of employees -20.3 -22.1 -22.4 -18.2 -21.5 -32.6 -17.7 -28.7 -31.9 -35.1 -38.6
Investment income -103.0 -152.9 -152.1 -178.5 -183.0 -173.2 -145.9 -167.5 -188.9 -164.2 -157.5
C. Current transfers (net) 391.9 414.9 169.2 344.3 500.9 611.0 492.5 517.8 685.8 734.1 660.3
Credit 464.8 484.9 256.8 407.4 563.4 677.5 559.6 589.9 762.8 800.7 732.5
General government 429.9 433.8 200.9 343.8 483.9 595.6 463.9 496.3 659.3 702.5 623.4
Multilateral HIPC relief 42.7 41.9 65.1 62.7 71.5 83.5 66.8 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other sectors 34.9 51.1 55.9 63.6 79.4 81.9 95.7 93.6 103.5 98.1 109.1
Debit -72.9 -70.0 -87.6 -63.1 -62.5 -66.5 -67.1 -72.1 -77.0 -66.5 -72.3
General government 0.0 0.0 -2.6 -4.3 -4.0 -5.2 -2.7 -4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other sectors -72.9 -70.0 -85.0 -58.8 -58.5 -61.3 -64.4 -68.0 -77.0 -66.5 -72.3
2. Capital and Financial Account 862.5 657.7 848.1 903.6 839.4 1,151.7 1,330.8 1,493.6 2,145.7 1,684.8 2,235.0
A. Capital account 330.4 365.2 912.8 738.6 519.6 301.4 587.9 4,795.3 679.9 379.2 607.9
Capital transfers 330.4 365.2 912.8 738.6 519.6 301.4 587.9 4,795.3 679.9 379.2 607.9
General government: credit  314.7 342.9 884.7 704.9 480.9 259.9 542.3 4,746.4 622.4 317.2 544.7
B.  Financial account  532.1 292.5 -64.7 165.0 319.8 850.3 742.9 -3,301.6 1,465.8 1,305.7 1,627.1
Direct investment 463.4 327.2 472.4 357.0 380.5 689.0 669.3 492.3 490.8 407.8 423.8
Abroad 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
In Tanzania 463.4 327.2 472.4 357.0 380.5 689.0 669.3 492.3 490.8 407.8 423.8
Portfolio investment  0.0 0.0 5.2 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.1
Assets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Liabilities 0.0 0.0 5.2 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.1
Other investment  68.6 -34.7 -542.3 -194.4 -63.2 158.8 71.1 -3,796.6 972.2 894.9 1,200.1
Assets -134.0 -76.7 -37.2 -19.5 44.3 19.0 -197.8 4.2 -39.6 -6.3 -300.5
Trade credits 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Loans 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Currency and deposits -134.0 -76.7 -37.2 -19.5 44.3 19.0 -197.8 4.2 -39.6 -6.3 -300.5
Banks -134.0 -76.7 -37.2 -19.5 44.3 19.0 -197.8 4.2 -39.6 -6.3 -300.5
Other sectors 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Liabilities 202.7 42.0 -505.1 -174.9 -107.5 139.8 268.9 -3,800.8 1,011.8 901.2 1,500.6
Trade credits 12.8 13.0 23.8 26.2 14.2 1.2 5.6 9.9 10.0 10.1 10.2
Loans 186.0 52.3 -440.6 -202.4 -118.8 122.8 306.0 -3,703.7 1,002.2 892.1 1,490.9
Bank of Tanzania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 249.0
SDR Allocation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 249.0
General government 188.3 -63.6 -481.1 -213.8 -107.9 59.5 105.7 -3,814.1 724.1 718.9 1,058.5
Drawings 386.7 157.0 326.1 325.7 306.3 306.3 565.2 832.8 834.3 739.6 1,087.2
Repayments -198.4 -220.6 -807.2 -539.4 -414.2 -246.9 -459.5 -4,646.9 -110.2 -20.8 -28.7
Scheduled paymen -188.4 -89.2 -200.4 -108.7 -120.3 -107.7 -67.8 -20.9 -38.4 -20.8 -28.7
Rescheduled debt -10.0 -131.4 -70.6 -48.3 -43.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Debt forgiveness -536.2 -382.4 -250.4 -139.2 -391.8 -4,626.0 -71.8 0.0 0.0
Banks -0.9 2.0 4.0 2.2 0.8 3.9 18.4 3.0 60.6 -3.1 -19.5
Other sectors -1.4 113.9 36.5 9.2 -11.7 59.5 181.9 107.4 217.5 176.3 202.9
Drawings 2.5 171.6 95.4 75.5 57.9 117.3 189.7 137.2 253.9 338.8 304.9
Repayments -3.9 -57.7 -58.9 -66.3 -69.7 -57.9 -7.8 -29.8 -36.4 -162.5 -102.0
Scheduled paymen -3.9 -57.7 -58.9 -66.3 -69.7 -57.9 -7.8 -29.8 -36.4 -162.5 -102.0
Currency and deposits 3.9 -23.3 -88.3 1.3 -2.9 15.8 -42.6 -107.0 -0.5 -1.0 -0.5
Net errors and omissions -367.8 -218.2 -464.3 -517.8 -438.0 -575.1 99.0 262.2 468.9 463.3 198.4
Overall balance 56.9 -66.8 59.4 361.8 105.1 55.5 346.2 232.6 500.2 18.1 478.4
Financing -56.9 66.8 -59.4 -361.8 -105.1 -55.5 -346.2 -232.6 -500.2 -18.1 -477.6
Reserve assets -197.4 -186.4 -251.4 -460.2 -196.9 -80.7 20.5 -236.8 -501.5 -264.4 -570.1
Use of Fund credit and loans 49.4 15.6 20.8 4.6 -3.1 -38.3 -366.7 4.2 1.3 246.3 92.5
Exceptional financing 91.1 237.5 171.2 93.8 94.9 63.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rescheduled debt 10.0 131.4 70.6 48.3 43.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Debt forgiveness
Interest arrears 48.8 53.3 33.8 32.8 16.2 43.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Principal arrears 32.3 52.8 66.8 12.7 35.3 20.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Memorandum items
Gross international reserves (stock) 1,183.8 1,670.4 1,877.5 2,137.2 1968.6 2,247.4 1,863.2 2,157.3 2,660.0 2,929.8 3,482.6
In months of imports (current year) 6.4 8.3 7.5 6.9 6.1 6.2 4.8 4.6 4.2 4.5 5.1
GDPmp ( Bill Tshs) 7,687.7 8,626.5 9,772.4 11,275.8 13039.3 14,968.4 16,953.3 19,444.8 22,865.0 26,497.2 30,321.3
GDPmp ( Mill USD) 10,185.8 10,383.6 10,505.2 11,273.9 12,101.6 13,724.0 14,331.7 15,185.2 19,028.4 20,956.4 22,670.9 
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Appendix 3: Budget Frame – Analytical (in Billion TShs.) 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance.  
 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
  Budget Projections Projections
Domestic Revenue 6,003.6 6,904.1 7,939.7
o/w  Fuel Levy and transit fees 286.9 315.6 353.5
LGAs Own Sources 172.6 181.2 190.3
Total Expenditure 10,769.6 11,000.8 12,080.5
Recurrent expenditure 6,950.6 7,386.4 7,973.2
Interest on external debt 129.4 146.0 215.4
Interest on domestic debt 235.0 368.0 358.4
Wages/salaries 2,205.4 2,379.1 2,685.5
Goods/services/transfers 4,380.7 4,493.3 4,714.0
  o/w    Fuel Levy and Transit Fee 286.9 315.6 353.5
   Special Expenditure 318.5 334.4 351.1
   CFS  (Others)  551.6 527.4 606.0
   Parastatal PE 461.4 441.6 498.5
   Retention Scheme 129.7 136.2 143.0
   LGAs Own Sources 172.6 181.2 190.3
   Other Charges  2,459.9 2,556.8 2,571.5
Development expenditure 3,819.1 3,614.4 4,107.3
Projects 3,819.1 3,614.4 4,107.3
Local 1,366.1 1,552.0 1,881.1
Foreign 2,452.9 2,062.4 2,226.2
o/w MCC (MCA-T) 268.8 408.3 188.9
Overall Deficit - before grants -4,593.4 -3,915.5 -3,950.5
Grants 2,020.9 1,811.6 1,897.6
   Budget Support 631.8 502.2 466.4
   Project grants 1,389.1 1,309.4 1,431.2
      o/w  Development Projects 898.8 523.7 784.1
      o/w  MCC (MCA-T) 268.8 408.3 188.9
      o/w  Basket Support 221.6 377.4 458.2
MDRI (IMF) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall Deficit - after grants -2,572.5 -2,103.9 -2,052.9
Financing 2,572.5 2,103.9 2,052.9
   Foreign 1,942.5 1,707.6 1,602.0
      Budget Support loans  189.8 301.9 315.6
      Project support  1,063.8 753.0 795.0
         o/w Project Loans 807.6 477.0 501.0
         o/w Basket Support Loans 256.2 276.0 294.0
      Amortization    -42.3 -102.0 -175.7
   Domestic (net) 630.0 396.3 450.9
      Bank (net) 600.0 396.3 450.9
      Non-bank (Rollover) 797.6 561.0 605.0
      Amortization of Contingent Debt 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Domestic Amortization (Rollover) -797.6 -561.0 -605.0
memo:
GDPmp 34,749.8 39,625.1 45,087.2
OC for distribution 3,829.0 3,965.9 4,107.9
Primary Deficit(checks issued) -4,401.6 -3,582.7 -3,567.0
Government Saving(checks issued) -947.0 -482.3 -33.5
% of GDP Saving -2.7 -1.2 -0.1 
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Appendix 4: Budget Frame – Analytical (in % of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Appendix 3. 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
Budget Projections Projections
Domestic Revenue 17.3 17.4 17.6
o/w  Fuel Levy and transit fees 0.8 0.8 0.8
LGAs Own Sources 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Expenditure 31.0 27.8 26.8
Recurrent expenditure 20.0 18.6 17.7
Interest on external debt 0.4 0.4 0.5
Interest on domestic debt 0.7 0.9 0.8
Wages/salaries 6.3 6.0 6.0
Goods/services/transfers 12.6 11.3 10.5
  o/w    Fuel Levy and Transit Fee 0.8 0.8 0.8
   Special Expenditure 0.9 0.8 0.8
   CFS  (Others)  1.6 1.3 1.3
   Parastatal PE 1.3 1.1 1.1
   Retention Scheme 0.4 0.3 0.3
   Rescue Package 0.0 0.0 0.0
   LGAs Own Sources 0.5 0.0 0.0
   Other Charges  7.1 6.5 5.7
Development expenditure 11.0 9.1 9.1
Projects 11.0 9.1 9.1
Local 3.9 3.9 4.2
Foreign 3.8 2.9 2.5
o/w MCC (MCA-T) 7.1 5.2 4.9
Overall Deficit - before grants -13.2 -9.9 -8.8
Grants 5.8 4.6 4.2
   Budget Support 1.8 1.3 1.0
   Project grants 4.0 3.3 3.2
      o/w  development projects 2.6 1.3 1.7
      o/w  MCC (MCA-T) 0.8 1.0 0.4
      o/w  Basket Support 0.6 1.0 1.0
MDRI (IMF) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall Deficit - after grants -7.4 -5.3 -4.6
Financing 7.4 5.3 4.6
   Foreign 5.6 4.3 3.6
      Budget Support loans  0.5 0.8 0.7
      project support 3.1 1.9 1.8
         o/w Project Loans 2.3 1.2 1.1
         o/w Basket Support Loans 0.7 0.7 0.7
      amortization 2.1 1.9 1.5
   Local (net) -0.1 -0.3 -0.4
      Bank (net) 1.8 1.0 1.0
      Non-bank 1.7 1.0 1.0
      Amortization of Contingent Debt 2.3 1.4 1.3
memo:
OC for distribution 11.0 10.0 9.1
Primary Deficit(checks issued) -12.7 -9.0 -7.9
Government Saving(checks issued) -2.7 -1.2 -0.1 
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Appendix 5: Budget Frame – Accounting (in Billion TShs.) 
 
 




I. Total Resources 11,609.6 11,663.8 12,861.2
Domestic revenue 6,003.6 6,904.1 7,939.7
LGAs Own Sources 172.6 181.2 190.3
Programme loan and grants 821.6 804.1 782.0
Project loans and grants 1,706.4 1,000.7 1,285.1
Basket Support Loans 256.2 276.0 294.0
Basket Support Grants 221.6 377.4 458.2
MCC (MCA-T) 268.8 408.3 188.9
Non Bank Borrowing (Rollover) 797.6 561.0 605.0
Bank Borrowing 600.0 396.3 450.9
Non Concessional Borrowing 731.2 754.7 667.1
Privatisation Funds 30.0 0.0 0.0
II. Total Expenditure 11,609.6 11,663.8 12,861.2
     Recurrent Expenditure 7,790.5 8,049.4 8,753.9
CFS 1,756.0 1,704.4 1,960.5
Debt service 1,204.4 1,177.0 1,354.5
Interest 364.5 514.0 573.8
Amortization 839.9 663.0 780.7
Others 551.6 527.4 606.0
Recurrent Exp (excl. CFS) 6,034.5 6,345.0 6,793.4
o/w  Salaries & wages 2,205.4 2,379.1 2,685.5
Designated Items 318.5 334.4 351.1
Parastatal PE 461.4 441.6 498.5
LGAs Own Sources 172.6 181.2 190.3
Other  Charges 2,876.6 3,008.7 3,068.1
Development  Expenditure 3,819.1 3,614.4 4,107.3
Local 1,366.1 1,552.0 1,881.1
Foreign 2,452.9 2,062.4 2,226.2
o/w  MCC (MCA-T) 268.8 408.3 188.9 
90 
 
Appendix 6: Budget Frame – Accounting (in % of GDP) 
 
 





I. Total Resources 33.4 29.4 28.5
Domestic revenue 17.3 17.4 17.6
LGAs Own Sources 0.5 0.5 0.4
Programme loan and grants 2.4 2.0 1.7
Project loans and grants 4.9 2.5 2.9
Basket Support Loans 0.7 0.7 0.7
Basket Support Grants 0.6 1.0 1.0
HIPC relief-Multilateral 0.0 0.0 0.0
MDRI (IMF) 0.0 0.0 0.0
MCC (MCA-T) 0.8 1.0 0.4
Non Bank Borrowing (Rollover) 2.3 1.4 1.3
Bank Borrowing 1.7 1.0 1.0
Non Concessional Borrowing 2.1 1.9 1.5
Adjustment to cash 0.0 0.0 0.0
Privatisation Funds 0.1 0.0 0.0
II. Total Expenditure 33.4 29.4 28.5
     Recurrent expenditure 22.4 20.3 19.4
CFS 5.1 4.3 4.3
Debt service 3.5 3.0 3.0
Interest 1.0 1.3 1.3
Amortization 2.4 1.7 1.7
Others 2.4 1.7 1.7
Recurrent Exp (excl. CFS) 1.6 1.3 1.3
o/w  Salaries & wages 17.4 16.0 15.1
Designated Items 0.9 0.8 0.8
Parastatal PE 1.3 1.1 1.1
LGAs Own Sources 0.9 0.8 0.8
Rescue Package 1.3 1.1 1.1
Other  Charges 0.5 0.5 0.4
Development expenditure 11.0 9.1 9.1
Local 3.9 3.9 4.2
Foreign 3.9 3.9 4.2
o/w  MCC (MCA-T) 0.8 1.0 0.4 
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Appendix 7: Government Expenditure by Strategic Allocation 
(in Billion TShs.) 
 
 




All Sectors 2009/10 2010/11
Recurrent Development Total Recurrent Development Total
D-L D-F Total D-L D-F Total
A. By Strategic Classification: MKUKUTA (transfer to LGA not included)
MKUKUTA 1,775.9        778.8        1,634.8      2,405.3      4,234.8      3,258.6      848.2       1,960.5      2,808.8      6,067.4      
Cluster I 694.3           551.5        737.2         1,279.4      1,862.5      1,333.6      692.0       1,246.7      1,938.8      3,272.3      
Cluster II 632.0           173.6        560.0         734.0         1,430.5      1,227.7      97.8         641.7         739.5         1,967.2      
Cluster III 449.5           49.9          112.0         163.1         644.4         697.3         55.7         59.2           114.9         812.2         
Cross Cutting -               3.8            225.7         228.9         297.4         -            2.7           12.9           15.6           15.6           
Non-MKUKUTA 2,675.0        180.3        36.8           226.2         2,846.8      2,772.8      273.6       31.4           305.0         3,077.8      
Total 4,451.0        959.1        1,671.6      2,631.6      7,081.6      6,031.4      1,121.9    1,991.9      3,113.8      9,145.2      
B. By Strategic Classification: MKUKUTA (Including transfer to LGAs)
MKUKUTA 4,465.9        816.0        1,494.1      2,310.1      6,776.0      5,017.7      1,054.1    2,422.5      3,476.5      8,494.2      
Cluster I 1,295.0        577.4        782.8         1,360.2      2,655.2      1,611.8      823.6       1,375.0      2,198.6      3,810.4      
cluster II 2,201.5        211.9        479.7         691.6         2,893.1      2,384.0      113.7       877.2         990.9         3,374.9      
Cluster III 908.5           26.8          83.1           109.8         1,018.3      1,022.0      82.7         77.0           159.7         1,181.6      
Cross Cutting 60.9             0.0            148.5         148.5         209.4         -            34.0         93.3           127.3         127.3         
Non-MKUKUTA 2,222.7        151.5        366.7         518.2         2,740.9      2,772.8      311.1       31.4           342.5         3,115.3      
Total 6,688.6        967.5        1,860.8      2,828.3      9,516.9      7,790.5      1,365.2    2,453.9      3,819.1      11,609.6    
C. By Major Sectors
Education 1,487.0        - - 229.5         1,716.5      1,907.4      162.8       157.1         319.9         2,227.3      
Health 483.7           - - 303.5         787.2         582.2         60.6         563.0         623.7         1,205.9      
Water 37.7             - - 309.6         347.3         45.2           38.2         294.9         333.1         378.3         
Agriculture 220.3           - - 252.0         472.3         448.9         141.1       313.7         454.9         903.8         
Roads 374.9           - - 721.7         1,096.6      400.0         381.4       723.8         1,105.1      1,505.1      
Judiciary 67.1             - - 30.3           97.4           76.9           29.7         32.8           62.5           139.4         
HIV-AIDS 10.7             - - 151.9         162.6         - - - - -
Energy 55.3             - - 230.2         285.5         65.9           124.9       136.3         261.3         327.2         
Others 3,951.7        - - 599.7         4,551.3      4,261.5      415.9       226.1         641.9         4,903.4      
Grand Total 6,688.3        - - 2,828.4      9,516.7      7,787.9      1,354.6    2,447.8      3,802.4      11,590.3    
D. By Broad Functions
Administration 1,539.3        136.0        473.1         609.1         2,148.4      1,873.6      336.8       518.8         855.6         2,729.2      
CFS 1,523.0        - - - 1,523.0      1,756.0      - - - 1,756.0      
Defense and Security 678.0           66.4          6.0             72.4           750.4         789.3         57.7         4.0             61.7           850.9         
Economic Services 347.5           439.1        315.1         754.2         1,101.7      390.9         500.5       577.3         1,077.8      1,468.7      
Production Services 244.4           32.6          145.4         178.0         422.4         277.0         28.7         139.1         167.8         444.8         
Social Services 2,356.3        293.4        921.2         1,214.6      3,571.0      2,703.8      441.5       1,214.6      1,656.1      4,359.9      
Grand Total 6,688.6        967.5        1,860.8      2,828.3      9,516.9      7,790.5      1,365.2    2,453.9      3,819.1      11,609.6     
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Appendix 8: Government Expenditure by Strategic Allocation 
(In percentage shares) 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
  
All Sectors
Rec Total Rec Total
D-L D-F Total D-L D-F Total
A. By Strategic Classification: MKUKUTA (transfer to LGA not included)
MKUKUTA 39.9            81.2            97.8            91.4          59.8       54.0            75.6            98.4          90.2          66.3      
Cluster I 15.6            57.5            44.1            48.6          26.3       22.1            61.7            62.6          62.3          35.8      
Cluster II 14.2            18.1            33.5            27.9          20.2       20.4            8.7              32.2          23.7          21.5      
Cluster III 10.1            5.2              6.7              6.2            9.1         11.6            5.0              3.0            3.7            8.9        
Cross Cutting -              0.4              13.5            8.7            4.2         -              0.2              0.6            0.5            0.2        
Non-MKUKUTA 60.1            18.8            2.2              8.6            40.2       46.0            24.4            1.6            9.8            33.7      
Total 100.0          100.0          100.0          100.0        100.0     100.0          100.0          100.0        100.0        100.0    
B. By Strategic Classification: MKUKUTA (Including transfer to LGAs)
MKUKUTA 66.8 84.3 80.3 81.7 71.2 64.4 77.2 98.7 91.0 73.2
Cluster I 19.4 59.7 42.1 48.1 27.9 20.7 60.3 56.0 57.6 32.8
Cluster II 32.9 21.9 25.8 24.5 30.4 30.6 8.3 35.7 25.9 29.1
Cluster III 13.6 2.8 4.5 3.9 10.7 13.1 6.1 3.1 4.2 10.2
Cross Cutting 0.9 0.0 8.0 5.3 2.2 0.0 2.5 3.8 3.3 1.1
Non-MKUKUTA 33.2 15.7 19.7 18.3 28.8 35.6 22.8 1.3 9.0 26.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Education 22.2 0.0 0.0 8.1 18.0 24.5 12.0 6.4 8.4 19.2
Health 7.2 0.0 0.0 10.7 8.3 7.5 4.5 23.0 16.4 10.4
Water 0.6 0.0 0.0 10.9 3.6 0.6 2.8 12.0 8.8 3.3
Agriculture 3.3 0.0 0.0 8.9 5.0 5.8 10.4 12.8 12.0 7.8
Roads 5.6 0.0 0.0 25.5 11.5 5.1 28.2 29.6 29.1 13.0
Judiciary 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 2.2 1.3 1.6 1.2
HIV-AIDS 0.2 0.0 0.0 5.4 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Energy 0.8 0.0 0.0 8.1 3.0 0.8 9.2 5.6 6.9 2.8
Other sectors 59.1 0.0 0.0 21.2 47.8 54.7 30.7 9.2 16.9 42.3
Grand Total 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
D. By Broad Functions
Administration 23.0 14.1 25.4 21.5 22.6 24.0 24.7 21.1 22.4 23.5
CFS 22.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.0 22.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.1
Defense and Security 10.1 6.9 0.3 2.6 7.9 10.1 4.2 0.2 1.6 7.3
Economic Services 5.2 45.4 16.9 26.7 11.6 5.0 36.7 23.5 28.2 12.7
Production Services 3.7 3.4 7.8 6.3 4.4 3.6 2.1 5.7 4.4 3.8
Social Services 35.2 30.3 49.5 42.9 37.5 34.7 32.3 49.5 43.4 37.6
Grand Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0





Appendix 9: Government Expenditure by Economic Allocation (In Billion TShs) 
 
 
PE refers to Public Enterprises. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
Recurrent Development Total Recurrent Development Total
Total budget in billions
MDA 4,999.6       2,301.7          7,301.4        6,026.8         3,049.3             9,076.1        
LGAs+Regions 1,689.0       526.5             2,215.5        1,763.7         769.8                2,533.5        
Total 6,688.6       2,828.3          9,516.9        7,790.5         3,819.1             11,609.6      
Recurrent Development Total Recurrent Development Total
Current 6607.2 1300.9 7908.1 6,905.3         2,023.9             8,929.2        
PE 2359.8 13.2 2373.0 2,839.4         28.0                  2,867.4        
Basic Salaries (incl Public  1784.7 11.7 1796.3 2,159.6         3.3                    2,162.9        
Pension 525.3 1.6 526.9 0.3                0.1                    0.3               
Good and Services (incl. PE) 1930.8 781.8 2712.6 2,172.7         1,329.4             3,502.1        
o/w Allowances 265.5 60.6 326.1 364.5            25.4                  389.9           
Maintenance 337.1 142.7 479.8 256.0            217.6                473.7           
Current Transfer 940.6 363.2 1303.8 1,245.6         448.8                1,694.4        
Interests 1039.0 0.0 1039.0 391.6            -                   391.6           
Capital 81.4 1527.3 1608.7 87.6                1,795.2             1,882.8          
Infrastructure 11.9 1086.3 1098.1 14.1              1,434.1             1,448.2        
Construction 2.3 437.4 439.7 3.3                502.3                505.6           
Rehabilitation 9.6 648.9 658.5 10.8              931.7                942.6           
Equipment 57.0 172.9 230.0 48.4              95.5                  144.0           
Other Capital 6.9 32.6 39.5 22.4              108.4                130.8           
Studies 5.6 235.6 241.2 2.6                157.2                159.9           
Total  6688.6 2828.3 9516.9 6,992.9         3,819.1             10,812.0      
Recurrent Development Total Recurrent Development Total
Current  4840.2 1031.3 5871.5 5,058.7         1,497.9             6,556.6        
PE 1207.0 10.3 1217.3 1,535.7         14.3                  1,550.0        
Basic Salaries (incl Public  681.9 9.0 690.9 867.6            0.0                    867.6           
Pension 525.1 1.3 526.4 0.3                0.1                    0.3               
Good and Services 1459.9 592.8 2052.7 1,740.0         1,006.8             2,746.8        
o/w Allowances 215.6 23.4 239.1 260.1            14.4                  274.5           
Maintenance 244.5 71.0 315.5 234.2            45.6                  279.8           
Current Transfer (incl PE) 889.8 357.2 1247.1 1,160.5         431.1                1,591.6        
Interests 1039.0 0.0 1039.0 388.3            -                   388.3           
Capital 74.2 1270.4 1344.6 55.5                1,566.2             1,621.7          
Infrastructure 10.2 919.9 930.2 7.7                1,254.2             1,262.0        
Construction 2.2 314.1 316.4 1.5                466.8                468.4           
Rehabilitation 8.0 605.8 613.8 6.2                787.4                793.6           
Equipment 51.8 146.9 198.7 29.0              77.7                  106.8           
Other Capital 6.8 23.8 30.6 17.0              90.0                  107.0           
Studies 5.4 179.8 185.2 1.7                144.3                146.0           
Total  4914.4 2301.7 7216.1 5,114.2         3,064.1             8,178.3        
Recurrent Development Total Recurrent Development Total
Current  1767.1 269.6 2036.7 1,846.6         526.0                2,372.6        
PE 1152.8 2.9 1155.7 1,303.6         13.7                  1,317.3        
Basic Salaries (incl Public  1102.8 2.6 1105.4 1,292.0         3.3                    1,295.3        
Pension 0.2 0.3 0.5 -               -                   -              
Good and Services 470.9 189.1 660.0 432.7            322.6                755.3           
o/w Allowances 49.9 37.2 87.0 104.4            11.0                  115.4           
Maintenance 92.6 71.6 164.2 21.8              172.0                193.8           
Current Transfer 50.7 6.0 56.7 85.1              17.7                  102.8           
Interests 3.3                -                   3.3               
Capital 7.2 256.9 264.1 32.1                228.9                261.1             
Infrastructure 1.6 166.3 168.0 6.4                179.9                186.2           
Construction 0.1 123.3 123.3 1.8                35.5                  37.3             
Rehabilitation 1.6 43.1 44.7 4.6                144.4                149.0           
Equipment 5.3 26.0 31.3 19.4              17.8                  37.2             
Other Capital 0.0 8.8 8.9 5.4                18.4                  23.7             
Studies 0.2 55.8 56.0 0.9                12.9                  13.9             
Total  1774.2 526.5 2300.8 1,878.7         755.0                2,633.7        
2009/10 2010/11
Overall Government = MDAs + LGAs : expenditure in billions
Overall Government = MDAs : expenditure in billions
Overall Government = LGAs : expenditure in billions
2009/10 2010/11
Overall Government Budget billions 
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Appendix 10: Government Expenditure by Economic Allocation (In shares) 
 
 
Source: Appendix 9. 
   
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total
MDA 74.8          81.4              76.7  77.4           79.8          78.2  
LGAs+Regions 25.3          18.6              23.3  22.6           20.2          21.8  
Total 100.0        100.0            100.0 100.0         100.0        100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total
Current  98.8 55.1 85.0 98.7 53.0 82.6
PE 41.0 0.4 28.1 40.6 0.7 26.5
Basic Salaries (incl Public  37.0 0.3 25.4 30.9 0.1 20.0
Pension 4.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services (incl. Public  39.7 49.3 42.7 31.1 34.8 32.4
o/w Allowances 6.5 0.8 4.7 5.2 0.7 3.6
Maintenance 5.3 2.6 4.4 3.7 5.7 4.4
Current Transfer 4.9 2.8 4.2 17.8 11.8 15.7
Interests 8.0 0.0 11.9 5.6 0.0 3.6
Capital 1.2 44.9 15.0 1.3 47.0 17.4
Infrastructure 0.2 32.5 10.4 0.2 37.6 13.4
Construction 0.0 11.1 3.5 0.0 13.2 4.7
Rehabilitation 0.1 21.4 6.9 0.2 24.4 8.7
Equipment 0.8 5.2 2.2 0.7 2.5 1.3
Other Capital 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.3 2.8 1.2
Studies  0.1 6.4 2.1 0.0 4.1 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total
Current  98.6 55.1 83.1 98.9 48.9 80.2
PE 23.6 0.4 15.3 30.0 0.5 19.0
Basic Salaries (incl Public  13.3 0.3 8.7 17.0 0.0 10.6
Pension 10.3 0.0 6.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services (incl. Public  30.9 21.0 27.4 34.0 32.9 33.6
o/w Allowances 4.2 0.8 3.0 5.1 0.5 3.4
Maintenance 0.9 2.5 1.5 4.6 1.5 3.4
Current Transfer  22.9 31.2 25.9 22.7 14.1 19.5
Interests 20.3 0.0 13.1 7.6 0.0 4.7
Capital 1.4 44.9 16.9 1.1 51.1 19.8
Infrastructure 0.2 32.5 11.7 0.2 40.9 15.4
Construction 0.0 11.1 4.0 0.0 15.2 5.7
Rehabilitation 0.2 21.4 7.7 0.1 25.7 9.7
Equipment 1.0 5.2 2.5 0.6 2.5 1.3
Other Capital 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.3 2.9 1.3
Studies 0.1 6.4 2.3 0.0 4.7 1.8
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total
Current  99.5 73.3 99.0 98.3 69.7 90.1
PE 80.7 1.9 79.2 69.4 1.8 50.0
Basic Salaries 77.2 0.5 75.7 68.8 0.4 49.2
Pension 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services 14.7 44.8 15.3 23.0 42.7 28.7
o/w Allowances 3.5 1.5 3.5 5.6 1.5 4.4
Maintenance 0.5 24.1 1.0 1.2 22.8 7.4
Current Transfer 3.6 2.3 3.5 4.5 2.3 3.9
Capital 0.5 26.7 1.0 1.7 30.3 9.9
Infrastructure 0.1 21.1 0.5 0.3 23.8 7.1
Construction 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.1 4.7 1.4
Rehabilitation 0.1 19.2 0.5 0.2 19.1 5.7
Equipment 0.4 2.4 0.4 1.0 2.4 1.4
Other Capital 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.3 2.4 0.9
Studies 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.1 1.7 0.5
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Overall Government = MDAs : expenditure in % shares
Overall Government = LGAs : expenditure in % shares
2009/10 2010/11
Overall Government Budget % shares
2009/10 2010/11
Overall Government = MDAs + LGAs : expenditure in % shares 
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Appendix 11: Government Expenditure – Agriculture Sector 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Sector share in total budget 5.04 11.65 7.01 5.76 11.91 7.78 0.78
Shares of Sectoral budget
MDA 63.83 68.07 65.93 65.64 67.43 66.54 0.61
LGAs+Regions 36.17 31.93 34.07 34.36 32.57 33.46 -0.61
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Current  80.3 48.0 65.2 81.8 75.0 78.4 13.2
PE 41.8 1.3 22.8 19.7 0.4 9.9 -12.9
Basic Salaries (incl Public Ent.) 41.8 1.0 22.7 19.2 0.0 9.5
Pension 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services (incl. Public Ent.) 35.1 30.9 33.1 43.6 53.6 48.7 15.6
o/w Allowances 5.8 12.6 9.0 1.7 0.9 1.3
o/w National Food Security and 
Fertilizer 15.5 0.1 8.3 15.2 11.5 13.3 5.0
Maintenance 1.2 12.0 6.3 0.7 3.5 2.1 -4.2
Current Transfer 2.3 3.8 3.0 17.8 17.5 17.7 14.7
Capital 19.7 52.0 34.8 18.2 25.0 21.6 -13.2
Infrastructure 15.7 21.9 18.6 16.4 10.0 13.2 -5.4
Construction 0.0 15.7 7.4 0.0 4.7 2.4
Rehabilitation 15.7 6.2 11.3 16.4 5.3 10.8
Equipment 1.0 9.8 5.1 0.8 10.1 5.4 0.3
Other Capital 2.6 2.6 2.6 0.9 3.2 2.1 -0.5
Studies  0.4 17.7 8.5 0.1 1.7 0.9 -7.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Current  83.2 88.0 85.6 97.5 63.3 80.0 -5.6
PE 13.2 0.3 6.6 11.6 0.5 5.9 -0.7
Basic Salaries (incl Public Ent.) 13.2 0.3 6.6 10.9 0.0 5.3
Pension 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services (incl. Public Ent.) 51.2 40.6 45.8 58.0 57.2 57.6 11.8
o/w Allowances 2.9 6.4 4.7 1.8 1.3 1.5
o/w National Food Security and 
Fertilizer 32.8 16.8 24.6 23.1 17.0 20.0 -4.6
Maintenance 1.1 41.7 3.2 0.8 5.2 3.0 -0.2
Current Transfer  17.8 5.3 30.0 27.2 0.3 13.5 -16.5
Capital 16.8 12.0 14.4 2.5 36.7 20.0 5.6
Infrastructure 0.0 3.8 1.9 0.2 14.8 7.7 5.7
Construction 0.3 3.7 2.0 0.0 7.0 3.6
Rehabilitation 1.1 4.7 2.9 0.2 7.9 4.1
Equipment 2.1 4.9 3.5 0.8 14.9 8.0 4.5
Other Capital 0.5 3.3 2.0 1.3 4.8 3.1 1.1
Studies 14.1 0.0 6.9 0.2 2.3 1.2 -5.7
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Current  99.9 38.9 71.7 51.8 99.3 75.1 3.4
PE 14.7 0.4 8.1 35.1 0.0 17.9 9.8
Basic Salaries  14.7 0.4 8.1 35.0 0.0 17.8
Pension 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services 84.9 22.7 56.1 16.2 46.2 30.9 -25.2
o/w Allowances 1.1 9.7 5.1 1.5 0.1 0.8
o/w National Food Security and 
Fertilizer 12.9 0.2 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -7.0
Maintenance 0.2 15.3 7.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 -7.0
Current Transfer 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.0 53.1 26.0 25.7
Capital 0.1 61.1 28.3 48.2 0.7 24.9 -3.4
Infrastructure 0.0 31.4 14.5 47.4 0.1 24.2 9.7
Construction 0.0 27.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rehabilitation 0.0 4.4 2.0 47.4 0.1 24.2
Equipment 0.1 12.3 5.7 0.6 0.1 0.4 -5.3
Other Capital 0.0 3.3 1.6 0.2 0.0 0.1 -1.5
Studies 0.0 14.1 6.5 0.0 0.5 0.3 -6.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 MDAs: Share of total sector expenditure
LGAs : Share of total sector expenditure
2009/10 2010/11
Agriculture Sector Budget Shares
2009/10 2010/11
Agriculture Sector = MDAs + LGAs : Share of total sector expenditure 
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Appendix 12: Government Expenditure – Road Sector 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance.  
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Sector share in total budget 5.6            25.5          11.5      5.1            28.9          13.0      1.4       
Shares of Sectoral budget
MDA 72.2          92.0          85.2      76.6          85.4          83.1      -2.2
LGAs+Regions 27.8          8.0            14.8      23.4          14.6          16.9      2.2       
Total 100.0        100.0        100.0    100.0        100.0        100.0    100.0   
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Current  99.5 11.3 41.5 99.1 11.1 34.5 -6.9
PE 4.4 0.0 1.5 4.1 0.0 1.1 -0.4
Basic Salaries (incl Public  0.9 0.0 0.3 3.9 0.0 1.0 0.8
Pension 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services (incl. Public  3.1 10.4 7.9 4.5 7.2 6.5 -1.5
o/w Allowances 0.6 0.4 0.5 1.1 0.0 0.3 -0.2
Maintenance 76.2 0.9 26.6 67.7 3.9 20.8 -5.8
Current Transfer 15.8 0.0 5.4 22.9 0.1 6.1 0.7
Capital 0.5 88.7 58.5 0.9 88.9 65.5 6.9
Infrastructure 0.1 86.3 56.8 0.4 86.2 63.4 6.5
Construction 0.0 26.5 17.4 0.0 30.6 22.5 5.0
Rehabilitation 0.1 59.7 39.4 0.3 61.6 45.3 6.0
Equipment 0.3 1.4 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.6 -0.4
Other Capital 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Studies  0.0 1.0 0.7 0.0 2.0 1.4 0.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Current  99.7 11.4 37.0 99.8 9.5 31.7 -5.3
PE 1.2 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.2 -0.1
Basic Salaries (incl Public  1.2 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.2 -0.1
Pension 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services (incl. Public  2.9 11.2 8.8 3.1 8.4 7.1 -1.8
o/w Allowances 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.2 -0.4
Maintenance 73.8 0.1 21.4 65.9 1.1 17.0 -4.5
Current Transfer (incl PE) 21.9 0.0 6.4 29.9 0.1 7.4 1.0
Capital 0.3 88.6 63.0 0.2 90.5 68.3 5.3
Infrastructure 0.1 86.5 61.5 0.1 87.5 66.1 4.6
Construction 0.0 28.2 20.1 0.0 30.4 23.0 2.9
Rehabilitation 0.1 58.3 41.4 0.1 64.2 48.5 7.1
Equipment 0.1 1.4 1.1 0.1 0.8 0.6 -0.4
Other Capital 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Studies 0.0 0.7 0.5 0.0 2.1 1.6 1.1
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Current  99.0 11.1 67.5 97.0 20.7 48.6 -18.9
PE 12.8 0.1 8.3 14.2 0.0 5.2 -3.0
Basic Salaries 0.0 0.1 0.0 13.8 0.0 5.0 5.0
Pension 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services 3.6 1.1 2.7 9.3 0.2 3.5 0.8
o/w Allowances 0.0 0.4 0.1 2.4 0.0 0.9 0.7
Maintenance 82.6 9.8 56.5 73.5 20.5 39.9 -16.6
Current Transfer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Capital 1.0 88.9 32.5 3.0 79.3 51.4 18.9
Infrastructure 0.2 83.2 29.9 1.3 78.0 49.9 20.0
Construction 0.0 6.7 2.4 0.2 31.8 20.2 17.8
Rehabilitation 0.0 76.5 27.4 1.1 46.2 29.7 2.3
Equipment 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.5 0.1 0.6 -0.2
Other Capital 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2
Studies 0.0 4.6 1.7 0.0 0.9 0.6 -1.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
MDAs : Sector expenditure in Shares
LGAs : Sector expenditure in Shares
2009/10 2010/11
Roads Sector Budget in Shares
2009/10 2010/11
Roads Sector = MDAs + LGAs : Sector expenditure in Shares 
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Appendix 13: Government Expenditure – Energy Sector 
 
 











Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Sector share in total budget 0.8            6.1            2.4        0.8            6.8            2.8        0.4       
Shares of Sectoral budget
MDA 100.0        100.0        100.0    100.0        100.0        100.0    -       
LGAs+Regions 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -       
Total 100.0        100.0        100.0    100.0        100.0        100.0    100.0   
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Current  95.7 27.7 44.3 97.6 11.1 34.5 -9.7
PE 9.4 0.2 2.4 5.3 0.0 1.1 -1.4
Basic Salaries (incl Public  0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 1.0 1.0
Pension 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services (incl. Public  49.2 9.0 18.8 44.8 7.2 6.5 -12.3
o/w Allowances 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.3 0.3
Maintenance 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.5 3.9 20.8 19.5
Current Transfer 35.6 17.2 21.7 46.0 0.1 6.1 -15.5
Capital 4.3 72.3 55.7 2.4 74.6 60.1 4.3
Infrastructure 0.3 3.2 2.5 0.4 20.7 16.6 14.2
Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.4
Rehabilitation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 20.2 16.2 16.2
Equipment 3.4 32.7 25.6 1.9 41.1 33.2 7.6
Other Capital 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2
Studies  0.6 36.0 27.4 0.0 12.8 10.2 -17.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 85.8 100.0
Energy Sector = MDAs + LGAs : Sector expenditure in Shares
2009/10 2010/11




Appendix 14: Government Expenditure – Education Sector 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Total
Sector share in total budget 22.6     8.8       18.5        24.5      8.4        19.2      4.0       
Shares of Sectoral budget
MDA 33.2     59.8     36.9        34.5      56.6      37.6      0.7       
LGAs+Regions 66.8     40.2     63.1        65.5      43.4      62.4      -0.7
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0      100.0    100.0  100.0    100.0   
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Current  99.6 43.1 91.7 99.6 30.7 89.7 -2.0
PE 64.8 0.0 55.7 65.4 0.0 56.0 0.4
Basic Salaries (incl Public  63.3 0.0 54.4 65.4 0.0 56.0 1.6
Pension 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services (incl. Public  31.4 21.9 30.1 31.2 20.0 29.6 -0.5
o/w Allowances 4.8 4.7 4.8 2.7 0.8 2.4 -2.4
o/w Education materials 13.4 11.6 13.1 12.3 8.4 11.7 -1.4
Maintenance 0.3 15.5 2.4 0.2 10.1 1.6 -0.8
Current Transfer 3.1 5.6 3.5 2.8 0.6 2.5 -1.0
Capital 0.4 56.9 8.3 0.4 69.3 10.3 2.0
Infrastructure 0.0 48.5 6.8 0.1 52.9 7.6 0.8
Construction 0.0 20.3 2.9 0.0 32.6 4.7 1.8
Rehabilitation 0.0 28.2 4.0 0.0 20.3 2.9 -1.0
Equipment 0.3 1.6 0.5 0.3 2.0 0.6 0.1
Other Capital 0.0 2.5 0.3 0.0 1.8 0.3 -0.1
Studies  0.0 4.4 0.6 0.0 12.6 1.8 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Current  99.3 39.6 85.7 99.7 34.5 85.6 -0.1
PE 36.9 0.0 28.5 48.4 0.0 38.0 9.5
Basic Salaries (incl Public  32.4 0.0 25.0 48.4 0.0 38.0 12.9
Pension 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services (Public  52.4 13.0 43.4 43.4 29.1 40.3 -3.1
o/w Allowances 6.9 5.6 6.6 1.3 1.4 1.3 -5.3
o/w Education materials 9.3 1.0 7.4 0.2 8.7 2.1 -5.3
Maintenance 0.5 17.3 4.4 0.1 4.3 1.0 -3.3
Current Transfer 9.5 9.3 9.4 7.7 1.1 6.3 -3.1
Capital 0.7 60.4 14.3 0.3 65.5 14.4 0.1
Infrastructure 0.0 52.5 12.0 0.0 42.7 9.2 -2.7
Construction 0.0 6.6 1.5 0.0 6.9 1.5 0.0
Rehabilitation 0.0 45.9 10.5 0.0 35.8 7.7 -2.7
Equipment 0.7 2.7 1.1 0.3 3.6 1.0 -0.1
Other Capital 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Studies 0.0 5.2 1.2 0.0 19.1 4.1 3.0
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Current  99.8 48.2 95.2 99.6 25.8 92.2 -3.0
PE 78.6 0.0 71.6 74.4 0.0 67.0 -4.6
Basic Salaries  78.6 0.0 71.6 74.3 0.0 66.8 -4.7
Pension 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services 21.0 35.2 22.3 24.7 8.1 23.1 0.8
o/w Allowances 3.8 3.4 3.7 3.5 0.0 3.1 -0.6
o/w Education materials 15.4 27.3 16.5 18.6 8.1 17.5 1.1
Maintenance 0.1 12.9 1.3 0.2 17.8 2.0 0.7
Current Transfer 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2
Capital 0.2 51.8 4.8 0.4 74.2 7.8 3.0
Infrastructure 0.0 42.4 3.8 0.1 66.1 6.7 2.8
Construction 0.0 40.5 3.6 0.0 66.1 6.6 3.0
Rehabilitation 0.0 1.9 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2
Equipment 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.1
Other Capital 0.0 6.1 0.6 0.0 4.0 0.4 -0.1
Studies 0.0 3.2 0.3 0.0 4.0 0.4 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Education Sector = MDAs : Sector expenditure in Shares
Education Sector = LGAs : Sector expenditure in Shares
2009/10 2010/11
Education Sector Budget Shares
2009/10 2010/11
Education Sector = MDAs + LGAs : Sector expenditure in Shares 
99 
 
Appendix 15: Government Expenditure – Health Sector 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Sector share in total budget 7.4            10.7            8.4             7.5      16.3       10.4     4.0       
Shares of Sectoral budget
MDA 50.1          51.9            50.7           51.1    75.5       63.7     13.0     
LGAs+Regions 49.9          48.1            49.3           48.9    24.5       36.3     -13.0
Total 100.0        100.0          100.0         100.0 100.0     100.0  100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Current  98.2 80.5 91.5 99.0 82.9 90.7 -0.8
PE 54.1 0.3 33.7 51.9 0.4 25.3 -8.4
Basic Salaries (incl Public Ent.) 0.0 0.1 0.0 41.9 0.0 20.2 20.2
Pension 7.5 0.2 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.7
Good and Services (incl. Public Ent.) 28.5 55.8 38.9 21.5 78.9 51.2 12.3
o/w Allowances 2.9 2.5 2.7 3.0 0.1 1.5 -1.2
o/w Medical supplies 9.4 47.1 23.7 10.7 67.9 40.3 16.6
Maintenance 1.2 3.2 2.0 1.0 0.2 0.6 -1.4
Current Transfer 14.3 21.2 16.9 24.6 3.5 13.7 -3.2
Capital 1.8 19.5 8.5 1.0 17.1 9.3 0.8
Infrastructure 0.1 15.5 6.0 0.1 10.5 5.5 -0.4
Construction 0.0 6.4 2.4 0.0 6.0 3.1 0.7
Rehabilitation 0.1 9.1 3.5 0.1 4.5 2.4 -1.1
Equipment 1.6 2.9 2.1 0.8 6.2 3.6 1.5
Other Capital 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Studies  0.1 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.2 -0.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Current  97.4 70.7 87.0 99.4 80.0 55.8 -31.3
PE 36.7 0.4 22.6 27.0 0.6 6.9 -15.8
Basic Salaries (incl Public Ent.) 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 0.0 2.0 2.0
Pension 15.0 0.4 9.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -9.3
Good and Services (incl. Public Ent.) 30.6 25.9 28.8 23.4 74.8 35.0 6.2
o/w Allowances 3.2 0.4 2.1 1.5 0.0 0.4 -1.7
o/w Medical supplies 17.2 16.1 16.8 14.7 60.8 27.4 10.6
Maintenance 1.6 3.6 2.4 0.8 0.1 0.3 -2.1
Current Transfer (incl PE) 28.5 40.8 33.3 48.1 4.6 13.7 -19.6
Capital 2.6 29.3 13.0 0.6 20.0 7.9 -5.0
Infrastructure 0.0 23.8 9.2 0.0 11.7 4.6 -4.7
Construction 0.0 8.0 3.1 0.0 6.2 2.4 -0.7
Rehabilitation 0.0 15.9 6.2 0.0 5.5 2.2 -4.0
Equipment 2.4 4.2 3.1 0.6 8.2 3.3 0.3
Other Capital 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.2
Studies 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Current  99.0 91.0 96.0 98.6 91.9 96.3 0.2
PE 71.6 0.2 45.1 77.8 0.1 50.7 5.6
Basic Salaries 0.0 0.2 0.1 77.0 0.0 50.1 50.1
Pension 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services 26.5 88.0 49.3 19.5 91.5 44.6 -4.7
o/w Allowances 2.6 4.7 3.4 4.6 0.2 3.1 -0.3
o/w Medical supplies 1.5 80.5 30.8 6.5 89.8 35.6 4.8
Maintenance 0.9 2.7 1.6 1.2 0.3 0.9 -0.6
Current Transfer 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Capital 1.0 9.0 4.0 1.4 8.1 3.7 -0.2
Infrastructure 0.2 6.6 2.6 0.3 6.9 2.6 0.0
Construction 0.0 4.7 1.8 0.1 5.5 2.0 0.2
Rehabilitation 0.2 1.8 0.8 0.2 1.4 0.6 -0.2
Equipment 0.8 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.1 0.6 -0.4
Other Capital 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
Studies 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.1 1.1 0.4 0.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Health Sector = MDAs : Sector expenditure in Shares
Health Sector = LGAs : Sector expenditure in Shares
2009/10 2010/11
Health Sector Budget Shares
2009/10 2010/11
Health Sector = MDAs + LGAs : Sector expenditure in Shares 
100 
 
Appendix 16: Government Expenditure – Water Sector 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Sector share in total budget 0.6            10.9            3.6           0.6          8.7             3.3         -0.4
Shares of Sectoral budget
MDA 44.4          78.7            75.0         35.1        77.2           72.2       -2.8
LGAs+Regions 55.6          21.3            25.0         64.9        22.8           27.8       2.8      
Total 100.0        100.0          100.0       100.0      100.0         100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Change
Current  96.0 79.9 81.7 95.6 61.9 65.9 -15.7
PE 46.7 0.4 5.4 43.1 0.6 5.6 0.2
Basic Salaries (incl Public  23.4 0.0 2.6 42.4 0.0 5.0 2.5
Pension 3.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3
Good and Services (incl. Public  38.5 6.3 9.8 28.9 5.4 8.2 -1.6
o/w Allowances 0.0 0.4 0.3 5.7 0.0 0.7 0.4
Maintenance 7.4 11.9 11.4 21.1 3.2 5.4 -6.0
Current Transfer 3.3 61.3 55.1 2.5 52.7 46.8 -8.3
Capital 4.0 20.1 18.3 4.4 38.1 34.1 15.7
Infrastructure 1.5 9.4 8.5 2.7 32.8 29.2 20.7
Construction 0.0 4.9 4.3 0.5 22.9 20.3 15.9
Rehabilitation 0.0 0.5 0.5 2.2 9.9 8.9 8.5
Equipment 1.8 5.2 4.9 1.0 0.6 0.6 -4.2
Other Capital 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2
Studies  0.7 5.2 4.7 0.5 4.7 4.2 -0.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Total
Current  97.6 84.0 84.9 98.2 76.3 77.6 -7.3
PE 47.8 0.0 3.1 62.4 0.8 4.3 1.3
Basic Salaries (incl Public  47.8 0.0 3.1 62.2 0.0 3.6 0.5
Pension 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Good and Services (incl. Public  41.0 5.7 8.0 27.6 6.9 8.1 0.2
o/w Allowances 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.0 0.4 0.4
Maintenance 1.7 0.3 0.4 1.3 0.3 0.4 0.0
Current Transfer (incl PE) 7.2 78.0 73.4 7.0 68.3 64.7 -8.7
Capital 2.4 16.0 15.1 1.8 23.7 22.4 7.3
Infrastructure 0.0 5.0 4.7 0.0 16.8 15.9 11.2
Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 3.9 3.9
Rehabilitation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.8 12.0 12.0
Equipment 1.0 6.5 6.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 -5.4
Other Capital 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3
Studies 1.3 4.2 4.0 1.0 6.1 5.8 1.8
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Rec Dev Total Rec Dev Total Total
Current  94.7 65.0 72.2 93.1 13.3 35.5 -36.6
PE 45.9 2.0 12.5 32.2 0.0 9.0 -3.6
Basic Salaries 42.1 0.2 10.3 31.2 0.0 8.7 -1.6
Pension 5.7 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.4
Good and Services 36.5 8.4 15.2 29.2 0.1 8.2 -7.0
o/w Allowances 0.0 1.8 1.3 5.4 0.0 1.5 0.2
Maintenance 12.0 54.6 44.3 31.5 13.2 18.3 -26.1
Current Transfer 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Capital 5.3 35.0 27.8 6.9 86.7 64.5 36.6
Infrastructure 2.7 25.4 19.9 4.2 86.7 63.7 43.8
Construction 0.0 22.8 17.3 0.8 86.6 62.7 45.4
Rehabilitation 0.0 2.5 1.9 3.4 0.0 1.0 -1.0
Equipment 2.3 0.7 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.3 -0.8
Other Capital 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0
Studies 0.3 8.8 6.7 0.2 0.0 0.1 -6.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Water Sector = MDAs : Sector expenditure in share
Water Sector = LGAs : Sector expenditure in share
2009/10 2010/11
Water Sector Budget share
2009/10 2010/11
Water Sector = MDAs + LGAs : Sector expenditure in share101 
 
Appendix 17: MDAs Budget Estimates and Expenditure (In Billion Tanzania Shilling) 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance  
TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
Vote Vote description PE OC LOCAL FOREIGN PE OC LOCAL FOREIGN PE OC LOCAL FOREIGN
12 Judiciary Service Commission 0.1            0.6            -        -            0.7            0.1         0.9            -        0.1             1.2            0.1            0.9           -           -           1.0              
14 Fire and Rescue Force -            -            -        -            -            1.2         3.1            3.0         -            7.3            1.3            2.2           0.9           -           4.4              
15 Commission for Mediation and Arbitration -            -            -        -            -            0.7         1.3            -        1.1             3.2            0.5            0.9           -           0.7           2.0              
16 Attorney General's Office -            -            -        -            -            4.5         7.6            -        7.4             19.4          1.3            8.1           -           0.4           9.9              
18 High Court -            -            -        -            -            9.0         8.8            1.7         0.8             20.3          7.9            9.3           -           -           17.2            
19 District and Primary Courts -            -            -        -            -            4.2         6.1            2.0         7.5             19.9          11.7          6.6           -           -           18.3            
20 State House 1.4            4.5            -        -            5.9            1.8         5.4            -        -            7.2            2.8            6.0           -           -           8.8              
21 The Treasury -            -            -        -            -            69.7       528.0        10.2       63.8           671.6        298.7        663.3       50.8         49.2         1,062.1       
22 Public Debt and General Services 1.9            607.3        -        -            609.1        233.1     1,282.7     -        -            1,515.8     551.1        1,196.2    -           -           1,747.2       
23 Accountant General’s Department 2.4            93.9          0.4        5.8            102.4        34.4       63.2          6.0         6.1             109.7        2.8            79.6         4.2           6.1           92.6            
24 Cooperative Development Commission 0.5            6.1           0.1           -           6.7              
25 Prime Minister 0.3            3.0            -        -            3.4            0.4         5.0            -        -            5.5            0.5            5.0           -           -           5.5              
26 Vice President 0.5            2.0            -        -            2.5            0.5         4.0            -        -            4.5            0.5            4.0           -           -           4.5              
27 Registrar of Political Parties 0.2            17.8          -        -            18.0          0.3         19.7          0.1         0.3             20.3          0.3            19.1         0.1           0.0           19.5            
28 Ministry of Home Affairs - Police Force 66.4          75.0          5.3        0.3            146.9        92.6       99.1          19.9       3.0             214.5        111.2        137.1       17.0         2.0           267.3          
29 Ministry of Home Affairs - Prison Services 27.1          40.3          2.6        2.0            72.0          48.2       52.0          10.0       3.0             113.2        44.7          49.5         9.6           2.0           105.8          
30 President's Office and Cabinet Secretariat 0.8            120.4        10.3      59.3          190.8        1.3         157.2        13.0       34.4           205.9        1.1            170.2       17.8         49.5         238.6          
31 Vice President’s Office 0.7            34.8          3.8        9.8            49.1          1.0         62.4          8.6         7.2             79.3          0.9            40.6         6.1           17.4         65.0            
32 President’s Office - Public Service Management 1.8            8.1            6.2        21.4          37.5          2.3         15.1          3.6         17.1           38.2          2.6            14.0         4.5           18.1         39.1            
33 Ethics Secretariat 0.6            0.9            -        -            1.5            0.7         2.0            -        0.5             3.2            0.7            1.6           0.5           0.7           3.5              
34 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Inten. Co-op. 2.5            56.5          -        -            59.0          9.5         58.3          20.0       0.3             88.0          9.6            58.2         44.5         -           112.3          
35 Public Prosecutions Division -            -            -        -            -            -        -            -        -            -            3.7            3.0           -           1.5           8.2              
37 Prime Minister’s Office 1.6            10.7          4.9        18.9          36.1          2.2         23.2          9.8         35.7           71.0          10.3          19.5         8.0           31.3         69.1            
38 Defence 107.4        91.2          -        0.2            198.9        174.6     138.1        20.0       -            332.7        224.1        134.2       18.5         -           376.7          
39 National Service 23.5          24.1          -        0.2            47.9          27.9       41.1          13.5       -            82.6          50.1          38.3         12.6         -           101.1          
40 Judiciary 12.0          25.1          3.3        0.4            40.7          2.2         7.5            1.4         4.6             15.7          1.3            8.6           6.1           22.1         38.1            
41 Ministry of Constitutional Affairs and Justice 2.3            7.1            0.4        12.4          22.2          0.6         6.3            1.1         9.6             17.5          0.6            5.1           1.0           4.0           10.7            
42 The National Assembly Fund 5.5            36.9          0.2        0.2            42.7          7.2         54.9          5.6         0.5             68.3          7.8            44.8         3.8           0.5           56.9            
43 Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Coop. 11.3          60.6          6.8        53.3          131.9        14.2       121.6        2.4         90.3           228.6        14.2          135.2       3.4           100.5       253.4          
44 Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing 1.2            16.0          1.3        6.1            24.6          1.4         25.1          19.3       9.9             55.7          1.7            29.8         16.4         12.5         60.5            
45 National Audit Office 1.6            8.4            -        2.3            12.4          3.2         14.0          2.8         5.5             25.6          3.2            23.4         4.8           5.8           37.2            
46 Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 103.6        51.9          14.4      95.9          265.7        25.2       352.5        66.1       63.7           507.5        27.1          498.8       56.2         83.4         665.6          
48 Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Dev. 3.9            8.8            1.8        0.2            14.7          6.1         15.4          2.3         9.7             33.5          6.6            25.0         4.7           17.6         53.8            
49 Ministry of Water and Irrigation 4.7            8.8            70.8      154.2        238.4        9.7         9.6            50.5       195.2         264.9        11.9          6.5           41.6         191.5       251.5          
50 Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 2.5            250.4        4.1        29.6          286.6        2.8         94.2          6.0         182.2         285.2        3.0            91.3         7.3           271.6       373.2          
51 Ministry of Home Affairs 1.6            2.3            0.9        -            4.9            1.6         4.5            5.7         0.8             12.6          1.6            3.5           3.5           0.1           8.7              
52 Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 16.0          171.6        6.8        175.2        369.6        22.6       195.8        13.2       247.4         479.0        32.8          197.2       9.9           438.6       678.4          
53 Ministry of Community Dev, Gender and Children 3.0            4.2            2.7        1.2            11.0          8.7         5.9            5.2         1.9             21.7          6.6            5.0           6.8           1.5           19.9            
55 Commission for Human Rights and Good Gov. 1.0            1.6            -        0.1            2.7            1.1         3.5            -        1.3             5.9            1.3            2.4           -           1.1           4.8              
56 Prime Minister’s Office - Reg. Adm. and Local Gov. 2.1            87.3          4.5        23.4          117.3        2.4         122.0        7.6         65.9           197.9        18.8          36.2         13.5         26.8         95.3            
57 Ministry of Defence and National Service 0.7            8.2            54.0      -            62.9          0.8         12.6          14.4       0.3             28.1          0.9            13.7         129.0       0.1           143.7          
58 Ministry of Energy and Minerals 2.7            38.8          196.7    115.7        354.0        5.2         50.1          96.6       75.0           226.9        3.5            62.5         124.9       59.1         249.9          
59 Law Reform Commission 0.2            0.6            -        -            0.8            0.3         1.0            -        1.2             2.5            0.4            0.9           -           0.9           2.2              
60 Industrial Court of Tanzania 0.1            0.6            -        0.6            1.3            0.2         1.0            -        0.6             1.8            0.2            1.0           -           1.8           3.1              
61 Electoral Commission 0.4            10.0          -        -            10.4          0.5         11.3          -        6.7             18.5          0.8            61.3         -           5.7           67.8            
64 Commercial Court 0.2            0.7            0.2        0.2            1.2            0.2         1.0            0.1         0.5             1.8            0.2            0.9           0.1           0.5           1.7              
65 Ministry of Labour, Employment and Youth Dev. 1.5            5.3            2.4        1.7            10.9          1.9         7.1            2.0         5.9             17.0          1.8            7.2           1.5           5.1           15.6            
66 President's Office - Planning Commission 1.9            19.5          15.7      38.0          75.2          1.1         7.2            -        0.2             8.6            0.9            4.8           -           0.2           5.9              
67 Public Service Recruitment Secretariat 0.7            2.3           -           1.0           4.0              
68 Ministry of Communication, Science and Techn. 1.1            239.4        28.4      19.1          287.9        0.8         23.5          14.0       0.4             38.7          0.9            25.6         42.4         2.0           71.0            
69 Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 9.5            21.3          1.7        23.0          55.5          11.4       33.4          1.2         24.8           70.8          12.8          42.6         0.1           10.0         65.5            
90 Land Court 0.1            0.7            -        -            0.8            0.1         1.0            -        0.5             1.7            0.2            0.9           -           0.5           1.6              
91 Anti Drug Commission 0.1            1.0            -        0.4            1.5            0.2         1.0            -        0.1             1.4            0.2            0.9           -           0.1           1.3              
92 TACAIDS (Tanzania Commission for AIDS) 0.6            3.0            -        49.6          53.3          1.1         3.0            -        22.5           26.7          1.7            1.8           -           20.6         24.2            
93 Immigration Department 5.9            7.4            4.0        0.5            17.8          13.3       15.4          9.9         9.1             47.7          12.6          20.7         25.8         1.0           60.1            
94 Public Service Commission 4.2            3.6            -        -            7.8            3.8         5.5            -        0.7             10.0          3.9            4.1           -           0.1           8.1              
96 Ministry of Information, Culture and Sports 1.2            9.8            4.8        0.2            16.0          1.9         13.9          6.3         0.3             22.4          1.8            12.5         4.5           -           18.7            
97 Ministry for East African Cooperation 0.3            7.7            -        -            8.0            0.6         13.7          -        0.1             14.4          0.8            12.3         -           -           13.1            
98 Ministry of Infrastructure Development 3.9            204.7        225.5    252.9        687.0        3.2         267.6        340.1     230.4         841.3        2.9            290.5       370.9       500.7       1,165.0       
99 Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries 5.7            6.9            1.4        8.4            22.4          10.0       27.3          9.6         20.5           67.3          10.8          23.2         8.7           16.0         58.8            
MDAs total 451.6        2,521.1     685.9    1,182.7     4,841.2     857.8     2,869.5     876.5     1,224.8      7,301.3     1,535.7     4,376.1    1,082.1    1,982.0    8,975.9       
2008/2009 Actual 2009/2010 Approved estimates 2010/2011 Estimates
RECURRENT DEV RECURRENT DEV RECURRENT DEV 
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Appendix 18: Regional Budget Estimates and Expenditure 
 
 





VOTE NO Vote description PE OC LOCAL FOREIGN PE OC LOCAL FOREIGN PE OC LOCAL FOREIGN
70 Arusha Region                  28.6          10.4          2.7        13.3          16.0          4.1         77.4          7.8         15.6           104.9        4.1            86.5         8.1           26.5         125.2          
71 Coast Region                   23.5          9.3            1.5        15.0          25.8          1.4         57.1          6.0         14.2           78.7          1.5            65.3         10.0         14.1         91.0            
72 Dodoma Region                  33.1          10.2          2.0        14.3          26.4          3.4         73.6          6.7         16.7           100.4        3.6            83.4         17.5         22.7         127.2          
73 Iringa Region                  37.1          10.6          1.7        16.8          29.1          3.4         82.2          11.4       17.0           114.0        4.0            101.2       15.3         22.1         142.6          
74 Kigoma Region                  25.0          8.8            2.0        10.3          21.1          2.0         54.8          1.6         23.5           81.9          2.3            58.6         12.8         28.2         101.9          
75 Kilimanjaro Region 45.3          9.0            1.2        6.6            16.8          3.6         96.7          5.0         16.7           121.9        4.4            105.3       12.2         19.7         141.6          
76 Lindi Region                   18.0          7.3            2.6        12.7          22.6          2.5         41.9          6.0         12.8           63.3          2.5            45.5         8.7           13.6         70.3            
77 Mara Region                    29.9          10.7          3.8        9.0            23.5          2.9         71.8          7.2         16.5           98.3          3.1            78.2         13.9         17.4         112.5          
78 Mbeya Region                   44.6          13.5          2.1        14.2          29.9          2.4         107.0        8.5         23.0           140.9        2.3            115.9       15.6         34.0         167.7          
79 Morogoro Region                37.9          10.3          1.9        15.7          28.0          4.4         82.5          8.6         19.9           115.4        4.6            99.2         15.4         26.4         145.5          
80 Mtwara Region                  22.5          8.5            1.9        13.2          23.5          2.3         54.8          5.7         14.4           77.2          2.5            60.0         11.2         20.7         94.4            
81 Mwanza Region                  48.9          18.0          2.4        20.8          41.3          3.5         131.5        10.4       28.3           173.8        3.4            146.0       20.2         35.9         205.5          
82 Ruvuma Region                  27.5          7.7            1.9        17.2          26.8          3.8         60.0          6.6         15.5           85.9          3.9            64.3         11.6         17.4         97.2            
83 Shinyanga Region 40.9          18.7          1.9        18.1          38.6          2.7         101.7        8.0         28.7           141.1        2.9            113.1       17.5         32.9         166.3          
84 Singida Region                 21.2          7.7            1.7        9.2            18.6          2.5         48.5          5.4         13.0           69.4          2.5            50.8         9.8           14.1         77.3            
85 Tabora Region                  26.5          12.6          2.2        10.6          25.3          2.5         62.0          5.5         17.6           87.6          2.5            74.3         13.6         19.7         110.2          
86 Tanga Region                   39.2          12.3          2.5        16.4          31.2          3.5         89.1          7.2         21.4           121.2        3.8            102.5       13.8         28.2         148.2          
87 Kagera Region                  33.6          13.1          1.7        16.9          31.7          2.7         85.2          7.4         24.3           119.7        3.4            91.0         16.3         24.3         135.1          
88 Dar es Salaam Region           41.5          12.4          11.1      12.2          35.6          1.0         152.9        5.0         16.1           175.0        1.1            162.7       14.9         17.6         196.3          
89 Rukwa Region                   19.9          8.7            2.6        8.7            20.0          2.3         47.1          6.5         14.6           70.5          2.3            53.7         12.7         20.5         89.2            
95 Manyara Region 20.2          8.4            1.7        8.2            18.3          1.2         53.4          5.9         14.2           74.6          1.5            59.1         11.9         15.9         88.4            
Regions total 664.8        228.3        53.3      279.2        550.3        57.8       1,631.2     142.4     384.1         2,215.5     62.1          1,816.6    283.1       471.9       2,633.6       
Grand total (MDAs + Regions) 1,116.4     2,749.3     739.2    1,461.9     6,066.8     899.3     3,827.4     938.5     1,550.5      9,516.9     1,597.9     6,192.7    1,365.2    2,453.9    11,609.6     
2008/2009 Actual 2009/2010 Approved estimates 2010/2011 Estimates
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This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.  
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
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